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Abstract 
Australian historical scholarship has traditionally neglected public employment services as an 
area of research. However, in recent years as the State has repositioned itself in the labour 
market the role of public employment services has become a popular area of debate. While 
contemporary scholars have contributed to these debates, their historical counterparts have 
been slower to follow suit. In overcoming this neglect, this thesis provides an historical 
examination of one of the earliest forms of state intervention into the Australian labour 
market: public employment services. This study examined the establishment and operations 
of public employment services in NSW from 1887 until 1942, when they were transferred 
across to the Federal Department of Labour and National Service, to comply with 
Commonwealth Wartime legislation.  
 
Within the Australian contemporary scholarship, public employment services have been 
conceptualised according to three dominant economic traditions: neo-classical economics, 
Keynesian economics and the writings of W.H. Beveridge. However, these traditions are 
predicated on inherent assumptions and predetermined outcomes, all of which fail to identify 
the origins and development of public employment services in Australia. Neo-classical 
economists have been the most critical arguing that the public provision of employments 
services is both inefficient and ineffective. Within the historical literature, Institutional 
economists in the United States have been influential in identifying the socio-economic 
factors that led to the development of the public employment services: asymmetrical labour 
market information and fraudulent acts perpetrated by private employment registries, all of 
which distorted the functioning of the labour market. By adopting the institutional economic 
approach, this thesis found that it was these socio-economic concerns that led to the 
introduction of the public employment service in NSW. This thesis disputes the claims of the 
neo-classical economists that the public employment services were both inefficient and 
ineffective, instead it argues that the public employment service played a pivotal role in the 
development of the NSW economy performing the role of labour market intermediary: 
channelling information and bringing together those wishing to buy and sell labour; while 
safeguarding those vulnerable in the labour market: the unemployed.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
This thesis provides an historical examination of one of the earliest forms of state 
intervention into the Australian labour market: public employment services. The study is 
confined to a case study of the NSW public employment services from 1887 until 1942 when 
the State Labour Exchanges, as a wartime measure, were transferred to the Federal 
Department of Labour and National Service. By focusing on a specific case study this thesis 
was able to analyse both the origins and trace the development of the public employment 
services in NSW. A longitudinal study provided a greater understanding of the issues, as it 
permits complex phenomena to be viewed over time. This allows the observer to distinguish 
between the short term and long term effects of some events. Such longitudinal studies have 
been rare in academic and policy debates regarding the role of public employment services in 
Australia.  
Aims of this Thesis 
Since the 1970s, in the context of increasing economic instability and rising unemployment, 
economists and policy makers have engaged in debates about the state’s role in the labour 
market. In response to this, a proliferation of literature has emerged. Dominated by neo-
classical economists advocating for the removal of state intervention in the labour market, 
policy makers have begun repositioning the role of the state in the labour market. 
Consequently, over the past two decades there has been a major shift across the OECD 
towards a greater involvement of private providers of employment services.1 
In Australia, following the election of the Howard Liberal National Coalition Government in 
1996, policy makers undertook a number of labour market reforms in a bid to extricate the 
state from the labour market. Part of this labour market reform included the abolition of the 
public employment service in 1998. Based on the prevailing neo-classical economic 
orthodoxy, it was claimed that the public provision of employment services was an inefficient 
                                                           
1
 A. Dockery & T. Stromback , ‘Devolving Public Employment Services: Preliminary Assessment of the 
Australian Experience’, International Labour Review, Vol. 140, No. 4, Winter, 2001, pp. 429-452; R. Fay, 
‘Making the Public Employment Service More Effective Through the Introduction of Market Signals’, Labour 
Market and Social Policy Occasional Papers, No. 25, 1997, OECD; S. Ricca, ‘The Changing Role of Public 
Employment Services’, International Labour Review, Vol. 127, No. 1, pp. 19-34; D. Kubler, ‘Coexistence of 
Public and Private Job Agencies’, Public Choice, Vol. 101, No. 1, 1999, pp. 85-107; P. Zweifel & C. 
Zaborowski, ‘Employment Service: Public or Private?’, Public Choice, Vol. 89, No. 1, 1996, pp. 131-162.    
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and ineffective use of state resources. Instead, it is argued that a system of private 
employment agencies improves allocative efficiency since private agencies and their 
employees have stronger performance incentives than employees in the public sector. 
Furthermore, it was claimed that competition results in a greater range of approaches being 
tested, leading to innovation, a higher rate of improvement in service quality and cost 
effectiveness, and greater responsiveness to client needs.2  
However, this neo-classical economic literature suffers from a number of significant flaws. 
Firstly, it is laden with inherent assumptions and pre-determined outcomes which subsequent 
studies have failed to substantiate. Secondly, this approach fails to explain why the public 
employment service was established, or what factors influenced and shaped its structure and 
programs. Clearly a striking feature of this discourse has been its almost total failure to place 
these contemporary debates within a broader historical context. Why would this be 
important? As Hyman reminds us, ‘the present is historically conditioned and historically 
contingent’.3  
If the present is both historically ‘conditioned’ and ‘contingent’, what can history tell us 
about the role of public employment services. Contributions to the historical literature by 
institutional economists in the US have been influential in identifying a range of factors that 
have contributed to the formation of the public employment service. Unlike their neoclassical 
economic counterparts, institutional economists refute the idealised notion of market forces 
and predetermined economic modelling and instead analyse social explanations for economic 
behaviour. Commons found that provision of public employment services in the United 
States during the early twentieth century was a social and economic necessity to counteract 
the discrimination and fraud perpetrated by private fee charging agencies.4  
Throughout the literature it is evident that public employment services have been a time 
honoured policy response to the recurring problem of unemployment. Public employment 
services are specific state regulated institutions embedded within the labour market. They 
perform the role of labour market intermediaries: channelling information, sometimes 
                                                           
2
 However, it is important to note that while the Howard Government embarked on an agenda of privatisation 
they were in fact following the same path as the previous Hawke-Keating Labor Government who had sold 
Qantas, floated the dollar amongst others. S. Bell & B. Head, (ed.), State, Economy and Public Policy in 
Australia,  Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1994, pp. 3. 
3
 R. Hyman, ‘Contribution to Review Symposium’, Industrial Relations, Vol. 21, No. 1, 1982, pp. 108.   
4
 J. Commons,  History of Labor in the United States 1896-1932, Vol. 3, Augustus M. Kelly, New York, 1966, 
pp. 114-136. 
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establishing prices, and bringing buyers and sellers of labour together. Since their emergence 
on a wide scale in the second half of the nineteenth century, employment services/agencies 
have operated as either privately operated, usually fee-charging agencies (with a view to 
profit or not); or, as state operated, usually free, public employment services, labour bureaus 
or exchanges.5 
Prior to the emergence of labour bureaus, as they were commonly known, the unemployed 
had limited avenues to gain employment. For skilled tradesmen union membership not only 
regulated their wages and conditions but also provided them with an avenue to gain further 
employment. Both Leeson and Quinlan found that trade unions in both the UK and Australia 
played an instrumental role in assisting their members into employment. Acting as de-facto 
labour bureaus the early unions in Britain operated a tramping system amongst journeymen 
as a means of assisting and distributing men to employment, both generally and 
geographically. In Australia Quinlan found that the early craft unions operated a similar 
system called the ‘houses of call’ which acted as a labour exchange. This would occur at a 
pub where the union was based and employers would come to the pub to hire union members. 
For those who were not union members, being mostly the unskilled workmen, the only 
avenue to gain employment was either informally by referral or through the unregulated 
private employment registries that were known to be charge high fees and use unscrupulous 
and fraudulent practices.6   
Free government operated labour bureaus first began appearing in the first half of the 
nineteenth century. Interestingly, as Weishaupt argued, it was the local authorities rather than 
the national Governments that attempted to systematically deal with problem of 
unemployment through the use of public employment services during this time. The earliest 
labour bureaus were established in Germany in the cities of Dresden in 1840 and Leipzig in 
1844. A similar pattern also occurred in the United States. Leiserson found that Ohio 
established the first labour bureau in 1891 and by 1914 eighteen states had established over 
sixty labour bureaus offices. A national public employment service was established in 1907. 
However, Commons found that the United States Employment Service (USES) was largely 
                                                           
5
 R. Mitchell & A. O’Donnell, ‘Employment Agencies: The Regulation of Public and Private Employment 
Agencies in Australia: An Historical Perspective’ Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal, Vol. 23, 2001, 
pp. 7-37. 
6
 M. Quinlan, ‘Early Trade Union Organization in Australia’, Labour and Industry, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1987, pp.73-
80;  R. A. Leeson, Travelling Brothers The Six Centuries’ Road from Craft Fellowship to Trade Unionism, 
Allen and Unwin, London, 1979, pp.133 & 236. 
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ineffective and faced considerable hurdles due to the existence of both the State and Federal 
system of labour bureaus. Following the Wagner-Peyser Act in 1933 Commons argues that 
the United States finally had an integrated and effective national employment service.7 
Lee claims that regional public employment services offices also emerged in Belgium in 
1870, France in 1884 and Italy in 1897. In the United Kingdom the first labour bureau was 
established in London on 1902 under the Labour Bureau (London) Act 1902, and nationwide 
public employment service was established later in 1909 following the Labour Exchanges Act 
1909. Sweden also established its first public employment service in 1902, opening their first 
labour bureau in Goteberg.8 
Reeves stated that one of the earliest national public employment service systems occurred in 
New Zealand. Established in 1891 the New Zealand Labour Bureau was an integrated labour 
market system divided into eleven districts with branch offices and agencies in every 
important town. Reeves, Cook and Endres claim that the New Zealand Labour Bureau system 
was influential in the design of the NSW Government Labour Bureau, opened in 1892. 
However, while the New Zealand labour bureau system appears to be the earliest national 
public employment services there were earlier attempts to establish public employment 
services in both NSW and Victoria.9 
The public employment service in Australia emerged in a similar manner to Germany, the US 
and UK with labour bureaus opened initially in the metropolitan centres of the various 
colonies during the late nineteenth century. It was not until 1942 following the outbreak of 
World War II a national public employment service emerged. The earliest report of a 
government labour bureau being established occurred in Victoria in 1874. During this time 
the Victorian Parliament received numerous deputations from the unemployed advocating for 
a government labour bureau. The Government believed that the role of the labour bureau was 
                                                           
7
 Leiserson claims that eighteen states had established labour bureaus by 1914: Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana, 
Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Washington, West Virginia and  Wisconsin - see W. M. Leiserson, ‘The Theory of 
Public Employment Offices and the Principles of their Practical Administration’ Political Science Quarterly, 
Vol. 29, No. 1, 1914, pp. 28;J. Commons, History of Labor in the United States, pp. 114-136; J.T. Weishaupt: 
Managing public employment services: Trends and experiences with recent governance reforms (Geneva, ILO 
Report 164) 12 November 2010 www.pesbenchmarking.eu/inc/download.asp?file accessed 4/8/2012. 
8
 Lee, W., Private Deception And The Rise Of Public Employment Offices In The United States, 1890 – 1930, 
National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 13695, 2007  
9
 W.P. Reeves State Experiments in Australia and New Zealand, State Experiments in Australia and New 
Zealand, Vol. 2, Macmillan, South Melbourne, 1968 (First Published 1902)pp. 219-220; T. Endres & M. Cook, 
‘Administering “The Unemployed Difficulty”: The NSW Government Labour Bureau 1892-1912’, Australian 
Economic History Review, Vol. 26, No. 1, March 1986, pp. 56-70. 
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to assist immigrants who had arrived in the Colony in finding employment. The State Labour 
Bureau of Victoria opened in January 1885. However, by 1886 there was growing concern 
over its role and it was abolished later that year. In August 1892 the Victorian Labour Bureau 
was reopened, and like its NSW counterpart (The Government Labour Bureau), it continued 
to operate until 1942 when they were transferred to the Federal Department of Labour and 
National Service.10  
During this late nineteenth century period other Colonies also began establishing labour 
bureaus. In Queensland the Government Labour Bureau opened in Brisbane in 13 October 
1891. While in Tasmania there is Government interest in establishing a labour bureau from 
1893 and on 22 May 1894 a Government Labour Bureau was opened in Launceston. In West 
Australia a Government Labour Bureau was established in Perth on 17 June 1898.11 
Within the literature there has been confusion over the origins of the early NSW labour 
bureau. Reeves, Endres and Cook claimed that the first labour bureau in NSW occurred in 
1892, while Coghlan stated it was established 1894. However, as this thesis argues the labour 
bureau that they were referring to was the Government Labour Bureau, established by the 
Dibbs Government on 18 February 1892. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 4 it had a 
predecessor, the Casual Labour Board established on 2 May 1887 and later abolished on 29 
December 1888. Like its earlier Victorian counterpart the Casual Labour Board was also only 
short-lived and in both cases a more permanent labour bureau emerged later in 1892.12 
As the preceding discussion has alluded to, the origins and role of the public employment 
service has generally been neglected in Australian scholarship. It is argued that this neglect 
can be attributed to a pluralist preoccupation with state intervention in the form of the system 
of arbitration and conciliation and those involved in the system: paid workers. The 
unemployed being the predominant users of public employment service fell outside their 
sphere of study and have been largely excluded. Consequently, a significant gap still remains 
in our historical knowledge of public employment services in Australia. The aim of this thesis 
                                                           
10
 Date of closure of the State Labour Bureau of Victoria’s closure is unknown in existing literature and 
conflicting dates in the press.South Australian Register(hereafter SAR), 18.9.1874 pp. 4, 1.2.1875, 13.6.1892, 
pp. 6; Sydney Morning Herald, (hereafter SMH),23.8.188, pp. 7.  
11
 The Mercury, 13.10.1891, pp. 2, 14.1.1893, pp. 3, 8.12.1893, pp. 3, 5.1.1894, pp. 2; SMH, 14.3.1893, pp. 7; 
The West Australian, 18.6.1898, pp. 4 & 9, The Launceston Examiner, 24.5.1894, pp. 7.  
12
 W.P. Reeves, State Experiments in Australia and New Zealand, pp. 219-220; T. Endres & M. Cook, 
‘Administering “The Unemployed Difficulty”: The NSW Government Labour Bureau 1892-1912’, pp. 56-70, 
T.A. Coghlan, Labour and Industry in Australia, Vol. IV, MacMillan, Melbourne, 1969 (First Published 1918), 
pp. 2019-2020. 
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is to fill the current gap in Australian historical literature by analysing the origins and 
development of public employment services in NSW.  
To address the current gaps in the literature, this thesis examines public employment services 
in NSW from 1887 until 1942. Between 1887 and 1942 the public employments service 
operated under the following names: Casual Labour Board 1887-1888; Government Labour 
Bureau 1892- 1900; NSW Labour Commissioner’s 1900-1906; State Labour Bureau 1906-
1912; State Labour Branch 1912-1942. Between 1892 and 1942 the public employment 
service operated continuously albeit under different names. 
This thesis has two aspects. The first is historical. This thesis emphasises the role that history 
can play in informing us about current issues and debates. An historical understanding is 
crucial for a variety of reasons. By failing to place their analysis in a broader historical 
context, much of the current debate rests upon assumptions, as opposed to an understanding 
of the past. Unless these developments can be compared against previous behaviour, any 
detailed analysis on the extent and nature of contemporary developments is rendered 
meaningless. Historical analysis not only provides a medium in which to assess current 
behaviour; it also alerts us to the dangers of repeating past mistakes. Historical analysis also 
allows us to separate the rhetoric from the realities of the past, what labour historians have 
called the ‘noise effect’. Much of the current literature suffers from this ‘noise effect’ as 
writers have dismissed the public employment service as ineffective and inefficient based on 
economic modelling and not on an analysis of its origins and development.13 
The second aspect of this thesis is to challenge the theoretical literature regarding the role of 
public employment services. The prevailing neo-classical economic orthodoxy argues that 
public employment services are both ineffective and inefficient. This thesis will test an 
alternative proposition that the NSW labour bureaus’ played an important role in the 
development of the Australian economy, performing the role of labour market intermediaries: 
channelling information and bringing together those wishing to buy and sell labour. In doing 
so this thesis will examine the origins of the NSW labour bureau, identifying what factors and 
events led to its introduction. This thesis will also analyse the methods and techniques used to 
                                                           
13
 G. Patmore, ‘Changes in the Nature of Work and Employment Relations: An Historical Perspective’, in R. 
Callus & R. Lansbury (ed.), Working Futures. The Changing Nature of Work and Employment Relations in 
Australia, Federation Press, Sydney, 2002, pp. 34; G. Patmore, ‘Digging Up The Past: Historical Methods in 
Industrial Relations Research’, in K. Whitfield & G. Strauss  (ed.), Researching the World of Work, Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca, 1998, pp. 214.  
 15  
 
bring buyers and sellers of labour together and in doing so will evaluate why certain methods 
were effective and others were not.  
In short, this thesis fills a gap within Australian historical literature regarding the role of the 
NSW labour bureaus, during an exceptional period in Australian history. In doing so, this 
thesis not only provides contemporary Australian scholars with a medium in which to assess 
current behaviour, but it also provides a broader framework for understanding the role of 
public employment services. In doing this, this thesis has attempted to demonstrate how 
historical analysis can contribute to contemporary debates.  
Research Plan and Methodology: 
This thesis relies on qualitative research methods. A historical case study approach, relying 
on documentary evidence, was undertaken. The reasons for this are varied. Labour-market 
programs involve an intricate web of factors that range from the social to the economic, from 
the collective to the individual. Such complexity means that an understanding of the causes 
and effects certain programs can be best understood through in-depth qualitative analysis. 14 
Historical case studies were chosen for a number of reasons. Firstly, case studies offer an in-
depth, multifaceted observation of social phenomena, which enables a procedural, contextual 
and longitudinal analysis of the various actions that occurred within these agencies, thereby 
providing an understanding of both the formal and informal processes that have occurred 
over time. Whilst also allowing us to determine why certain strategies or approaches were 
adopted, rejected or changed. Secondly, by adopting a historical case study this thesis is able 
to test the current assumptions and established theories. Finally, the open-ended nature of 
data collection also provides a more in-depth examination of the findings. While the positivist 
believes that facts are ‘out there’ waiting to be collected, it is argued that this approach is 
                                                           
14
 R. Whipp, ‘Qualitative Methods: Technique or Size’, in K. Whitfield & G. Strauss  (ed.), Researching the 
World of Work, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1998, pp. 56; M. Denscombe, The Good Research Guide, 
Open University Press, Philadelphia, 2001; C. Hakim, Research Design, Allen & Unwin, London, 1987, ch. 4; 
R. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, (2nd edn), Sage, Thousand Oaks; H. Becker, ‘The 
Epistemology of Qualitative Research’ in R. Jessor, A. Colby, & R. Schweder (ed.), Ethnography and Human 
Development: Context and Meaning in Social Inquiry, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1996, pp. 53-71; 
C. Cassell & G. Symon (ed.), Qualitative Methods in Organisational Research: A Practical Guide, Sage, 
London, 1994, pp. 1-13. 
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deeply flawed, as it fails to take into account the complexities of the social world, and the 
conscious volition of the human beings that inhabit it. 15 
The research for this thesis is based on historical methodology. Documentary evidence 
provided a rich source of historical data for this research. Both primary and secondary 
documents were used in this research. Primary documents included NSW Industrial Gazette, 
NSW Votes and Proceedings Legislative Assembly, NSW Parliamentary Debates Legislative 
Council Legislative Assembly, NSW Parliamentary Papers, and NSW Government Gazettes. 
Secondary document’s included metropolitan newspapers: The Sydney Morning Herald and 
local newspapers: The Maitland Mercury, The Argus and the Clarence and Richmond 
Examiner.  
Documentary evidence, despite its advantages, suffers from many flaws. Many archival 
records are either misplaced or destroyed because of age, carelessness or because they 
contain sensitive material. Therefore, it is important to question what has been recorded and 
why, and more importantly what has not been recorded or destroyed. Limited surviving 
material means that researchers are often unable to either disprove or validate the claims of 
the document. This problem can undermine the researcher’s conclusions. Without further 
material to either challenge or validate these findings, the researcher recreates the past as best 
they can. Secondary documents also provide considerable challenges for the researcher. The 
researcher must ask why this author embarked on this research and how they came to these 
conclusions. As Ellem argues, written sources require careful work, the past or present does 
not speak to us, but it is the job of the researcher to try and evaluate, balance, wonder and 
criticise.16  
The question of the author’s intended meaning is crucially important in undertaking 
documentary analysis.  It is important to be aware that the nature of the language used in 
documents changes over time.  In studying industrial relations the researcher must be aware 
that jobs not only change in name, but also in how they are performed.  This weakness is 
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further compounded by the fact there is no general accepted measure for meaning.  While the 
positivist will impose their own categories, the interpretivist develops categories based on the 
perspective of the subjects being studied.  This alerts us to the fact that coding is not a 
theoretically neutral process. The job of the researcher is to remember that every document is 
a socially constructed piece in itself, bearing certain values and assumptions.17  
In attempting to overcome this problem job categories were defined in part by using the 
ANZSCO - Australian and New Zealand Standard Classification of Occupations produced by 
the Australian Bureau of Statistics. In classifying jobs into industry sectors, this thesis utilised 
ANZIC Australian and New Zealand Standard Industrial Classification. However, both 
ANZSCO and ANZSIC are designed for twenty first century jobs and industries and for 
historical analysis this is not always appropriate. To overcome this, the data where possible 
within this thesis is presented in the same manner as the official publications.18 
This thesis encountered a number of problems in using documentary evidence. Firstly, many 
of the documents relating to the operations of the Casual Labour Board have sadly been lost. 
The only remaining documents relate to the Report of the Casual Labour Board Inquiry 
Commission and reports cited in NSW Parliamentary Papers. In an effort to validate facts 
secondary newspaper reports were relied upon. However, in terms of the exact numbers of 
men registered by the Casual Labour Board no official register remained and approximate 
figures quoted in the Parliamentary reports have been cited in this thesis. Terminology has 
changed over time as has the name of certain geographic locations. In an attempt to overcome 
this I have included their contemporary names for example the Holt Sutherland Estate is now 
known as Sylvania, a southern Sydney suburb.19 
In the later period there were also numerous problems with the data. For example the data 
relating to the operations of private registries has some significant gaps. Between 1930 and 
1932 there no data was published. The data is again published from 1932 until December 
1933 however, no data is published in the following period. There were also problems with 
the data relating to the sub-agents appointed by the labour bureau’s in the 1920s and 1930s. It 
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was difficult to identify the total number of sub-agents, as only those who transacted business 
in any given month were recorded in the official publications. For example in July 1928 only 
27 sub-agents were recorded, while 65 agents were recorded in July 1931 and 138 sub-agents 
in 1937.20  
Reliability and validity are important concerns for this research. To overcome inconsistencies 
the evidence has been triangulated.  This crosschecking involved multiple sources of 
documentary evidence, most notably, official publications, Parliamentary reports and debates 
and newspapers. In short, historical methodology provided the most appropriate and valid 
means to recreate the past.21 
Thesis Structure 
This thesis is structured in the following way. Chapter Two sets out the theoretical and 
conceptual basis of this thesis. It examines both the International and Australian contributions 
to the study of public employment services. This chapter also highlights the limitations within 
the literature, and the way in which this study differs from previous work. 
Chapter Three examines the earliest public employment service in NSW: The Casual Labour 
Board 1887-1888. This chapter answers the following questions: What factors led to the 
development of the Casual labour Board? How successful was the Casual Labour Board? 
What role did it play in the development of the NSW economy? Why was it abolished? In 
answering these questions this chapter begins by examining the economic and industrial 
conditions and the late nineteenth century political landscape. The justification for this is that 
it is essential when understanding a historical event, to firmly locate it within its historical 
context. This contextual structure will be applied in the following chapters. Despite its short 
tenure, the evidence highlights the significant role played by the public employment service 
in supporting the capital development of NSW, whilst safeguarding the social and economic 
concerns of the unemployed. Importantly this chapter identifies an important aspect that has 
generally not been discussed within the literature on public employment services: the agency 
of the unemployed. 
Chapter Four examines the origins and development of the Government Labour Bureau 1892- 
1900. Again, it provides an understanding of the social, economic and political factors that 
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shaped this period and how they affected the nature and structure of the public employment 
service. This chapter examines the claims put forth by Nurick, Coghlan, Endres and Cook 
that the early public employments services were temporary ad hoc responses to the social 
problem of unemployment and ultimately lacked long term commitment from the State. 
Again the agency of the unemployed is evident in their successful campaigning for the 
establishment of a public employment service. In a period of economic and industrial crisis 
this chapter will identify the social and economic factors that led to a public employment 
service.22 
Chapter Five provides an analysis of the renamed and restructured public employment 
service: NSW Labour Commissioner’s 1900-1906. After reviewing the social, economic and 
political factors this chapter provides an early insight into the various methods trialled and 
adopted. Early attempts at innovation provide an understanding of how and why certain 
public employment services were developed.  This chapter examines the claims by Endres & 
Cook that under the NSW Labour Commissioners the labour bureau only underwent a 
cosmetic transformation and failed to develop innovative labour market programs. This 
chapter continues to demonstrate that the State did remain committed to the public 
employment service continuing to evolve by developing and expanding labour market 
programmes.23 
In chapter Six the renamed State Labour Bureau 1906-1912 is examined. Following yet 
another name change and restructure, this chapter provides an understanding of how the 
public employment service continued to adapt and to change to its environment. Again new 
approaches were adopted as the public employment service continued to support capital 
development and assist the unemployed.  
Chapter Seven provides an analysis of the renamed State Labour Branch 1912-1942. For the 
public employment service this proved to be one of the most challenging periods of time with 
two World Wars and a worldwide economic depression. Against such considerable 
challenges, this chapter demonstrates how the public employment service adapted to the 
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various challenges. This chapter examines the development of the public employment service 
as it expands further and how it responds to the exceptional circumstances of the period. 
Chapter Eight concludes by clarifying the argument put forth by this thesis against the claims 
in the literature. This thesis provides a historical context to contemporary debates and in 
doing so refutes the neo-classical economist’s claims that public employment services are 
inefficient and ineffective. In this chapter it is argued that public employment services have 
played a vital role in the development of the NSW economy, safeguarding the social and 
economic concerns of the unemployed. This thesis found that the origins and development of 
the public employment services were shaped by a number of socio-economic and political 
concerns. This chapter concludes with suggestions for future research.  
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
Introduction  
In Australia unemployment policy is currently informed by neo-classical economic notions of 
labour market flexibility and mutual obligation. However, things have not always been this 
way. Over the past century there have been profound shifts in the way unemployment and 
government policy has been conceptualised. Evidence of such significant shifts in policy 
direction can be found in the literature regarding the role of public employment services. In 
Australia following World War II Keynesian macroeconomic policy dominated leading to the 
establishment of the Commonwealth Employment Service (CES) in 1946, however, 
following the oils shocks and instability of the 1970s, policymakers rejected Keynesian 
economics in favour of neo-classical economics and its rejection of state intervention in the 
market. For the CES, this significant shift in policy direction ultimately signalled the end of 
the national public employment service.24 
Recent commentators have noted that theoretical and conceptual analysis does not occur in a 
vacuum and the changing fashions in state theory can be linked to substantiative changes in 
the political economy of advanced societies. Bell and Head argue that the revival of 
theorising about the state in recent decades is partly due to the expanding and changing forms 
of state intervention in the economy, partly to the inadequacies of traditional economic 
theories in explaining these changes, and partly to the failure of state regulation to produce 
economic stability and growth in most capitalist world since the end of the long boom in the 
1970s. Labour markets are central to the capitalist system but it has become increasingly 
evident since the 1970s that they are failing to distribute jobs and incomes effectively. 25  
The current literature on public employment services has been overwhelmingly shaped by 
economic discourse and is divided between those who advocate for state intervention: writers 
following in the tradition of W. H. Beveridge, Keynesian economics, and institutional 
economics, and those who oppose it: Neo-classical economics. Each tradition holds differing 
assumptions over the role of the public employment services. The word ‘tradition’ is used 
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here in a general sense to imply a mode of thought followed by people continuously from 
generation to generation. As the following discussion will illustrate, these traditions have had 
an enduring effect on the subsequent scholarly debates in this area.26  
There are a number of problems with the existing literature on public employment services. 
Firstly, writers following in the tradition of Beveridge, Keynesian economics or neo-classical 
economics have remained faithful to their tradition and subsequently there has been a lack of 
cross fertilization of ideas. Secondly, the literature suffers from significant theoretical flaws: 
as the theories of Beveridge, Keynesian economics and neoclassical economics are predicated 
on inherent assumptions resulting in predetermined outcomes. Subsequently, within their 
analysis the role of the public employment service is judged on predetermined economic 
criteria without any reference to other possible socio-economic factors. Finally, the 
Australian literature has been dominated by scholars following in the tradition of Beveridge, 
neo-classical economics or Keynesian economics who have largely failed to examine the 
historical origins of public employment services to identify how, and why, it has developed, 
and what role it played in the labour market and economy.27 
This chapter outlines the theoretical and conceptual framework of this thesis. This chapter 
identifies and evaluates the existing literature that has contributed to the understanding of 
public employment services. The literature has been drawn primarily from overseas research, 
mostly from the United States and Britain. Australian scholars have been slower in 
contributing to this literature. Consequently, a significant gap remains in our historical 
understanding of the origins and effects of the public employment service in Australia. This 
thesis seeks to fill this gap by examining the origins and effects of the Australian public 
employment service to ascertain whether, as recent critics argue, that it was an inefficient and 
ineffective labour market institution. 
This chapter will begin with by defining and discussing the fundamental concepts within the 
literature on public employment services. Attention will then turn to evaluating the four 
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economic traditions evident within the literature. Neoclassical economic writing was 
influential on the formation of public policy in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. 
Furthermore, the neoclassical economic conception of the role of the state and the labour 
market has largely influenced and shaped later economic discourse, and it is argued that it 
provides an important point of departure for evaluating the economic literature in this area. 
Following this, our attention will turn to the State Interventionists: Beveridge, Keynesian 
economics and institutional economics. Beveridge was influential in British policy in the 
early part of the twentieth century. Keynesian economics was the dominant paradigm of the 
post World War II period. The breakdown of Keynesian economics in the late twentieth 
century provided the impetus for the resurgence in neoclassical economics. Finally, the 
discussion will examine the Instuitional economic contribution to the literature. The influence 
of institutional economists on public policy is a little bit harder to trace, thought it can be 
found in the early decades of the twentieth century in the United States. Following this there 
will be an examination of the historical literature.28  
Concepts and Definitions  
This thesis focuses on the role of public employment services in the labour market, and thus 
requires some degree of explanation. Public employment services are specific state regulated 
institutions embedded within the labour market. They perform the role of labour market 
intermediaries: channelling information, sometimes establishing prices, and bringing buyers 
and sellers of labour together. Since their emergence on a wide scale in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, employment services/agencies have operated as either privately operated, 
usually fee-charging agencies (with a view to profit or not); or, as state operated, usually free, 
public employment services, labour bureaus or exchanges.29 
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Labour markets, however, unlike competitive product markets, are typical examples of search 
markets and thus require some degree of explanation. Firstly, they are not in least 
homogenous; because jobs and skills differ greatly in terms of level and scope and there is 
also a wide variety of labour market segments. In addition, personnel attitudes on both sides 
of the market play an important role. It is this heterogeneity that causes problems when it 
comes to matching labour supply and demand.30 
Employment services are seen as a means of attempting to overcome this heterogeneity in the 
labour market. In doing so, the role of employment services consists of job-matching 
activities for employers and job-seekers, plus associated activities such as preparation for 
employment, gathering labour market information and administration of labour market 
adjustment programs. In bringing together a narrow set of buyers (firms) and sellers 
(workers), it is argued that they reduce the uncertainty on both sides of the market. 
Uncertainty results from the fact that the search efforts of employers or job seekers may not 
led to proper matches. This accounts for one possible reason for this is the aforementioned 
heterogeneity of the labour market. Another possible reason is the quality of jobs and 
experience of workers. Thus mediation by employment services may constitute a means to 
correct certain market failures. Such mediation has occurred in two ways. Either by privately 
operated, usually fee-charging employment service agencies (with a view to profit or not), or 
through state operated, public employment service, which generally provides free services to 
job seekers.31 
From an efficiency perspective, the rationale for the public provision of employment services 
generally rests on market imperfections that can be expected to lead to an under-provision of 
employment services. These include the presence of social externalities, imperfect capital 
markets, asymmetric information or the existence of the conditions for a natural monopoly. 
From an equity perspective, the need for a public role in the job brokerage market is clear. As 
private brokerage firms are paid for each successful job-match, private providers will service 
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those job seekers who are easiest to place, that is, the most advantaged job seekers. 
Disadvantaged job seekers themselves will typically have low incomes and a lower capacity 
to purchase employment assistance. A private employment services market will therefore led 
to the exclusion from assistance of the most disadvantaged job seekers. The tendency for 
agencies to offer services to those job seekers who already have the greatest chance of 
finding work is known as ‘creaming’. In labour market programs, creaming contributes to 
greater deadweight loss (payments for outcomes that would have occurred anyway) and 
limits the amount of assistance directed to job seekers most in need.32 
As an aspect of state intervention, many writers argue that employment services are pivotal to 
understanding the general character of the state during early twentieth century capitalism. 
This importance arises because the power resources of the key classes in a capitalist society 
depend significantly upon their strength in the labour market. Capitalism is about buying and 
selling labour power and those actors capable of using the state to strengthen their position in 
this relationship will increase their power. Labour market policy, in general, and public 
employment services in particular, thus constitute state intervention at the core of the 
capitalist process. Blankenburg makes a similar point arguing that employment agencies are 
peculiar among the public administration institutions in that they have to mediate more than 
they can govern. Since their task is to achieve a match between the supply and demand for 
labour, they have simultaneously two types of clients with partly opposing interests, job 
seekers and employers.33 
As a form of state intervention, theorists have noted that public employment services operate 
within various labour market regimes. The literature implies that these labour market regimes 
largely dictate the role and expectations of the public employment service within each labour 
market. Recent studies have identified two broad types of labour market regimes. Firstly, 
social democratic labour market policies combine Keynesian measures with micro labour 
market measures to provide comprehensive placement services and training programs for job 
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seekers. Secondly, neo-liberal policies which prioritise business interests and link this with 
labour market measures to shape the workforce to meet the employers’ needs. In the social 
democratic system, public employment services act as key coordinating institutions in the 
labour market administering benefits and directing workers to positions or training schemes 
or offering counselling. In the neo-liberal system, the principal responsibility of the public 
employment services is to police the labour market for benefit abuse and to compel claimants 
to participate in training programmes as a condition of receiving assistance. King and 
Rothstein assert that countries with neo-liberal policies made public employment services 
principally responsible for administering work tests, whereas those with social democratic 
policies limited the public employment services responsibilities to placement activity.34  
Walwei provides a similar, though it is argued more sophisticated understanding of labour 
market regimes. Walwei identified three labour market regimes: monopoly system, 
coexistence system and a market system (refer to table 2.1). The purpose of strict monopolies 
is to ensure that the public employment service is afforded a strong position through the 
prohibition of private employment services of any kind and through the requirement of 
mandatory registration of vacancies. By contrast, in the case of the moderate monopoly 
system the use of the public employment system is voluntary for both employers and job 
seekers. In coexistence systems the public employment services and private employment 
service operate side by side. In regulated coexistence systems there are regulations for private 
employment service. In free coexistence systems there are no such requirements. In a pure 
market system only private employment services provide mediation services. However, he 
notes that such system does not necessarily imply the absence of any public intervention, for 
example the contracting out from public employment service to private employment service 
still requires some degree of regulations to be met. Recent developments in Australia provide 
a good example of this system35  
Recent theorists have noted that public employment services have a choice of four different 
mediation procedures when filling registered vacancies (refer Table 2.1). Mediation 
procedures for closed systems require intensive resources, while semi-closed systems require 
little if any of the public employment service’s resources. The type of mediation procedure 
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depends on the degree of assistance required by the job-seeker. The resources available to 
public employment services will ultimately depend on the state’s commitment to offering 
such services.36 
Table 2.1 Typology of Placement Systems 37 
As we will see in the following section economists have devoted considerable attention to 
understanding the public employment services ability to manage, and some argue alleviate 
unemployment. Therefore, we must define the terms commonly applied by economists to 
unemployment. Economists have noted that unemployment takes three distinct forms. Firstly, 
frictional unemployment occurs when workers move between jobs and are temporarily out of 
the labour market. Secondly, cyclical unemployment stems from economic slumps or patterns 
of slow economic growth that destroys and weakens job creation. Thirdly, structural 
unemployment is seen as a labour supply-side problem stemming from skill inadequacies, the 
debilitating effects of long-term unemployment, wage rigidities, work disincentives and 
various other forms of labour market impediments and mismatches.38  
As noted in the introduction, in Australia since 1996 the state, influenced by a neoclassical 
agenda, has attempted to reposition its role in the labour market. Writers such as Bell and 
Head, amongst many others, argue that much of the current debate on economic policy 
consists of hard-nosed debate about sectional interests overlaid by the rhetoric of efficiency 
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and the national interest. The following discussion will examine the various economic 
perspectives on the public provision of employment services.39 
TYPE OF SYSTEM MEDIATION PROCEDURE 
Semi-open system Self-selection – public employment service plays passive role 
and concentrates on the acquisition of vacancies. Self-selection 
based on an open-file computer system – both clients and job-
seekers have direct access to the system and have no further need 
to approach PES staff 
Semi-open system Conditional self-selection - public employment service plays 
passive role and concentrates on the acquisition of vacancies. Is 
the provision of basic information to job seekers and for further 
details they contact public employment service staff. 
Closed system Administrative matching – matching registered job seekers with 
register vacancies. Selective matching – most time consuming – 
public employment service screens candidates for vacancies. 
Closed system Selective matching – most time consuming – public employment 
service screens candidates for vacancies. 
Table 2.2 Mediation Systems40 
Economics Perspectives on Public Employment Services 
Economic theorists have not only provided the most comprehensive contribution to the 
literature on public employment services, they have largely influenced the historical 
literature. Writers such as Webster argue that state intervention in the labour market, through 
labour market intermediaries, such as public employment services, are time honoured policy 
responses, not only to rising unemployment, but also to labour and skill shortages. From the 
literature it is clearly apparent that overtime the rationale for the public provision of 
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employment service has shifted with the evolution of economic theory, and has not been the 
exclusive preserve of one area of economic thought.41  
The economic literature on the provision of public employment services can be traced to four 
schools of economic thought: neoclassical economics; Beveridge, Keynesian economics and 
institutional economics. While each school of thought contains varying assumptions in 
regards to the role of state intervention in the labour market, through public employment 
services, they can be divided into two distinct camps: those who advocate for state 
intervention in the labour market (Beveridge, Keynesian economists and institutional 
economists) and those who oppose state intervention in the labour market (neoclassical 
economics).  
Against State Intervention: Neoclassical Economics 
Neoclassical economic theorists’ opposition to the public provision of employment services 
is predicated on a number of inherent assumptions. These assumptions can be traced to the 
18th century classical economic writings of Adam Smith. In Smith’s seminal work, he 
claimed that state and personal efforts to promote social good are ineffectual compared to 
unbridled market forces. Based on these early classical writings neoclassical economists have 
opposed, in principle, any extension of the economic power of the state.  They have argued 
that the state should be seen as an external body, parasitic on a free society but a necessary 
evil to avoid the greater evils of coercion and insecurity. Subsequent theorists, such as 
Freidman amongst many others, have asserted that state’s role should be ideally limited to a 
few core functions such as providing defence, law and order, and general rules of fair 
dealing.42  
Smith’s notion of unbridled market forces provides the basis of the neoclassical 
microeconomic analysis. Neoclassical microeconomic analysis is based on five crucial 
assumptions. Firstly, statements about aggregate phenomena are grounded in a rigorous 
theory of individual behaviour. Secondly, and related to the first assumption, individuals are 
rational economic maximisers who exhibit price taking behaviour. Thirdly, the absence of 
externalities in the market will bring about the efficient allocation of resources. Fourthly, the 
principle of substitution – agents choose from a wide range of commodities. Finally, there is 
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a strong tendency for markets to clear and for economic agents to be in, or rapidly 
approaching, equilibrium. Critics, however, such as King claim that the neoclassical 
economists approach focuses on short-run concerns and an over-exaggerated value of market 
relationships. 43 
Based on these assumptions, the neoclassical economists’ view the labour market as an 
idealised competitive market: workers are assumed to be driven by maximising utility (doing 
the best they can given the conditions they face) where they can work as many hours as they 
wish at the given wage rate. Unemployment in this model is voluntary: the unemployed are 
those people who are unwilling to work at the current market wage, but would be willing to 
work only if they were paid higher wages. It is assumed that everyone receives wage offers. 
In this model involuntary unemployment is possible, only if for some reason wages are fixed 
above equilibrium, either by governments imposing minimum wage wages or by non-
competitive forces, like unions. Many writers reject this simplistic distinction as there is an 
involuntary element in all unemployment, in the sense that no one chooses bad luck over 
good, while also there is also a voluntary element in all unemployment in the sense that 
however miserable one’s current work options are one can always choose to accept, or reject, 
them.44 
Within the literature the neoclassical economists assume that the efficient use of labour 
means simply allowing the market mechanisms to operate by itself. Interferences in the 
market are seen as inefficient and external regulation of the market is unnecessary, because 
economic competition places maximal pressure on each employer/individual to make the 
most efficient possible use of his or her labour force (or for individuals to make their most of 
their opportunities). Block notes that this simplified model is most compatible with an 
economy in which employees’ skill levels are relatively low.  Otherwise, it would be difficult 
to assume that rapid adjustment of the labour market to various kinds of disruptions. For 
example, it is assumed that if a particular industry were to go in decline, for one reason or 
another, the displaced workers would be able to find work in another sector of the economy 
relatively quickly. However, the neoclassical economists fail to elaborate on the mechanisms 
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for these displaced workers to find other jobs. It is assumed that they just do, as they have 
perfect information, and act rationally.45   
Many critics challenge the basic assumptions motivating the methodology of neoclassical 
economics. Block claims it rests on two fundamentally flawed building blocks. The first is 
the idea that the economy is an analytically separate realm of society and can be understood 
in terms of its own internal dynamics. Block argues that neoclassical economists are perfectly 
aware that politics and culture influence the economy, but they see these as exogenous 
factors, that can be safely bracketed as one develops a framework that focuses purely on 
economic factors. The second foundation is the assumption that individuals act rationally to 
maximise utilities. Here again, he argues they are acutely aware that individuals are capable 
of acting irrationally or in pursuit of other goals, other than maximisation of utility, but the 
strategy of excluding these deviations from the rationality principle is justified by the effort to 
identify the core dynamics of the economy. Together these assumptions provide a basis for 
the model of self-regulating market which purportedly harmonises transactions for products, 
capital and labour. However, critics such as Block, argue that these assumptions are cast in 
universal and a historical terms which obscure social, cultural and political determinants of 
economic action.46  
Industrial relations scholars argue that the standard neoclassical models of the labour market 
do not provide an adequate basis for understanding the employment relationship and the 
institutional features of the labour market. Instead, they argue that the labour market is 
different from other economic exchange relationships. The non-standard nature of labour 
market adjustment processes distinguish it from other market transactions, and the non-
market nature of industrial relations have all posed special problems for economic modelling 
processes. These scholars argue that neoclassical labour economists view the labour market 
as analogous to other markets and expect them to behave in ways consistent with standard 
market analysis. This approach begins from a theory of the labour market based on the 
assumptions of perfect competition. The model is predicated on an unrealistic notion of the 
employment relation as purely a market relation. Implicit in all of the above is the idea that 
adjustment to any exogenous ‘shock’ will be costless. Worker mobility will be perfect, and 
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firms are capable of adjusting capital-labour ratios and other inputs into production easily. 
Search mobility for firms and workers are costless, hiring and firing decisions are assumed to 
be costless, and so on.47 
Critics argue that the neoclassical approach fails to explain a number of fundamental 
economic phenomena. The most important of these are the existence and persistence of 
unemployment, and the failure of wages to adjust downwards in periods of unemployment. 
Other labour market phenomena defy the predictions of the models as well, such as 
discrimination, the formation of trade unions, the persistence of a union/non-union wage 
differential, internal labour markets and labour market segmentation. King argues that there is 
nothing to support the neoclassical prediction that competition alone is sufficient to eliminate 
discrimination.48   
The neoclassical notion of ‘perfect information’ has also received considerable attention 
within the literature.  In the early 1960s, Stigler claimed that information as a resource and 
subject of study ‘occupies a slum dwelling in the town of economics’.49  Writers such as 
Stigler, have greatly enhanced the analysis of information, particularly that of the labour 
market. These writers argue that it is clear that information in the labour market is imperfect, 
and no matter what, some degree of imperfection is going to remain. For example as Stigler 
notes that  
‘No worker, unless is his degree of specialisation is pathological, will ever be able to 
be informed on the prospective earnings which would be obtained from every 
potential employer, let alone keep the information up to date. He faces the problem of 
how to acquire information on wage rates, stability of employment, conditions of 
employment, and other determinants of job choice, and how to keep his information 
current.’50  
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Based on British evidence, Sholwer argues that whilst perfect information is not going to be 
achieved, there is evidence that if the existing level of information and the nature of job 
search is poor, this is a very important deficiency in the labour market, which the public 
provision of employment services could substantially remove.51 
Economic sociologists such as Block, argue that ‘labour’ is both the most fundamental and 
most inherently problematic of all neoclassical economic categories. Block argues that 
neoclassical economists treat the major inputs (labour, capital and raw materials) in a parallel 
fashion, and thereby analyse labour in isolation from the social relations of which they are 
embedded. It is not actual human beings who are an input in production, but one of their 
characteristics - their capacity to work. Block argues that this is an inherently paradoxical 
strategy, since the individual’s capacity to work is not innate; it is socially created and 
sustained.52 
The development of Human Capital Theory in the 1960s has provided the most significant 
contribution to the neoclassical economic literature on education and manpower policy. 
Inspired by Smith’s original notion that investment in education and skill formation was a 
significant factor in economic growth, Becker and Shultz developed Human Capital Theory. 
From the 1960s human capital theory became the basis of neoclassical economists’ analysis 
of labour markets, education and economic growth. In Human Capital Theory all human 
behaviour is based on the economic self-interest of individuals operating within freely 
competitive markets. Other forms of behaviour are excluded or treated as distortions. The 
basic idea of human capital is simple. It involves treating workers for the purposes of 
analysis, in much the same way as physical capital.53 
Marxist writers, Bowles and Gintis, claim that Human Capital Theory provides fundamental 
insights not found in earlier neoclassical economic literature. Firstly, they argue that it treats 
labour as a produced means of production, whose characteristics depend on the total 
configuration of economic forces. Secondly, they note that it rejects the simplistic assumption 
of homogeneous labour and instead centres its attention on the differentiation of the labour 
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force. Finally, they state that it brings basic social institutions into the realm of economic 
analysis.54  
Showler argues that the relevance of the human capital concept to the provision of 
employment services can be appreciated if the significance of ‘location’ of the individual in 
the labour market is considered. He claims that it is the location in the broadest sense that will 
largely determine output and income. He argues that the functions of the employment service: 
information; training; advice; placement; manpower planning, can be brought in play in this 
process, and can be seen as one of the main methods of improving human capital stock. He 
argues that it has a further advantage of providing a bridge between the ‘macro’ and ‘micro’ 
economic aspects of employment service provision.55 
Human Capital theory is not without its critics. As noted previously, scholars have argued 
that the adoption of a conceptual framework that rests on a ‘competitive market’ model has 
limited usefulness. King argues that there is a strong prima facie case for state intervention in 
the market for human capital. Education, training, migration and job search are all semi-
public goods, with benefits to society as a whole, in addition to those that accrue privately to 
the individuals. Moreover, the finance for human investments is almost certainly obtained in 
an imperfect market, since the absence of serfdom or slavery no guilt-edged security can be 
offered for loans. Marxist writers, Bowles and Gintis argue that it provides little more than a 
good ideology for defending the status quo and completely ignores the asymmetrical power 
relationship at the heart of the capitalist system.56  
Showler and Simon have argued that a focus on economic values, leads to methods of 
approach to policy matters that underestimate the partially non-quantifiable social and non-
market benefits of labour market intervention. They assert that it is unwise to frame a 
discussion of the socio-economic contribution of the public employment service provision 
around a concept of human capital with so many disadvantageous features. In practice, it is 
largely through an analysis of the deficiencies of the ‘market’ explanation of the labour force 
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behaviour, that we find the case state intervention in the form of labour market 
intermediaries: the public employment service.57  
Many writers have noted that over the past two decades there has been a major shift 
throughout the OECD towards greater involvement of private providers. Ricca claims that 
this shift has been most pronounced in Australia since 1996 with the election of the Howard 
Government and the contracting out of employment services. Dockery and Stromback claim, 
that this can be seen as part of a wider trend in public policy to open the public provision of 
services to competition through privatisation or contracting out. Neoclassical economists 
argue that the privatisation of employment services improves allocative efficiency, since 
private agencies and their employees have stronger performance incentives than employees in 
the public sector. It is argued that further competition results in a greater range of approaches 
being tested, leading to innovation, a higher rate of improvement in service quality and cost 
effectiveness, and greater responsiveness to client needs.58   
However, there is only a limited amount of empirical research pertaining to the relative 
merits of public versus private employment agencies, or of the optimal mix between the two 
sectors, to support the theory. Fay claims that undoubtedly the respective roles of the public 
and private sectors vary with the institutional labour market framework in each country. 
However, there is evidence to show that public employment services generally do target 
assistance to disadvantaged job seekers, namely the low skilled and longer-term unemployed, 
while private agencies concentrate on more highly skilled and better-educated workers.59  
The effectiveness of that assistance is another matter. A review of the performance of the 
public employment service in several countries, by Fay, indicates that the brokerage function 
of the public employment service is effective in at least assisting the most disadvantaged. An 
evaluation by the Department of Employment, Education, Training and Youth Affairs of 
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Australia's previous experience with purchasing case-management services from private and 
non-profit providers found that the public and contracted case-managers achieved almost 
identical outcomes, both in terms of the profile of clients served and placement rates. 
However, it took about a year for the success rate of contracted managers to match that of the 
public-sector managers, reflecting the conclusion that ‘initiatives to increase contestability, 
such as contracting out, will be subject to a learning curve before operating effectively’.60  
Gregg and Wadsworth model the impact of different job-search activities on the transition 
rate out of unemployment in the United Kingdom. Direct approaches to employers were 
found to be the most effective method. They found that Jobcentres did have a significant 
positive impact, though less so than private employment agencies. Moreover, Gregg and 
Wadsworth find that the greatest beneficial effect of the use of Jobcentres is experienced by 
the long-term unemployed, while private agencies produce no beneficial effect for this group. 
Hence they find that the public employment service is not only effective, but is most effective 
in serving its traditional target group.61  
Thomas argues that the failure of previous studies to allow for the timing of assistance has 
biased findings against the public employment service. If job-seekers turn to public 
employment services only after trying other search methods, having already spent some time 
in unemployment, then one would expect to find an association between use of public 
employment services and longer duration of unemployment. He claims that job seekers using 
the public employment service early in their spells of unemployment experience shorter 
duration of unemployment than those who use alternative search methods. Those who 
eventually found work through the public employment service, but who did not use it early in 
their spell of unemployment, experienced a longer duration of unemployment than those 
using alternative methods did. This result points to the likelihood of bias in studies that do not 
take account of the timing of interventions.62  
In terms of equity and social justice considerations, comparisons of private and public 
agencies demonstrate how market pressures can result in unexpected outcomes. Boreham et 
al’s study of Australian private employment agencies focused on the relative capacities of 
public and private agencies to balance employer and job-seeker interests. This study found 
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that private agencies considered their clients to be the employers, and not the job-seekers. 
Due to market pressures they found that these private agencies accepted and fulfilled the 
discriminatory criteria (most notably sex, race, ethnicity, class and disability) dictated by the 
client, instead of providing the most experience and suitable applicant for the position. Thus 
they argue, that there are few restraints on an employer’s capacity to dictate the terms of an 
appointment there is an increased risk that discriminatory practices will be unchecked. Unlike 
their private counterparts, public agencies were found to be devoid of discriminatory 
practices. Thus, they argue that the public employment service acts as a vehicle for averting 
discriminatory practices. These writers believe that privatisation has the capacity to weaken 
an important link in the chain of policy delivery in the workplace.63 
In terms of cost effectiveness or ‘process efficiency’, comparisons between public and private 
agencies are frustrated by the need to standardise output quality. Boreham et al, found that 
private agencies tend to specialise in higher yielding market sectors based on a particular set 
of skills, while public agencies service a greater proportion of unskilled or low-skilled clients. 
Clark compared the total placement costs for private and public employment agencies in the 
United States. Contrary to the normal approach which would predict lower costs in the 
private sector, he explores the hypothesis that, when the attributes of output are not easily 
observed, public agencies will put fewer resources into providing services since, unlike 
private agencies, they do not face the market rigours of customer satisfaction. Consistent with 
this view, public agencies were found to have lower placement costs.64 
Kubler models the implications of the coexistence of public and private agencies, rather than 
attempting to establish the superiority of one over the other. The private agency is assumed to 
match workers of a given quality more efficiently than the public agency, but to charge a 
positive amount for doing so. Information on the productivity of workers is distributed 
asymmetrically, such that the workers know their own particular productivity while the 
employer knows only the productivity distribution across workers. The notable outcome is 
that the inefficiencies associated with assumptions of information asymmetry and the 
slowness of the public services are not reinforcing in the presence of private agencies. This is 
because of a sorting process in which "good" workers use private agencies in preference to 
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the public agencies, where "bad" workers receive information rent. Kubler concludes that the 
cost of policies to improve the efficiency of the exchange needs to be weighed against the 
beneficial sorting effect where a range of institutions of varying efficiency in matching 
exist.65  
Overall, the recent evidence is reasonably convincing that public employment services 
provide direct assistance to disadvantaged clients and that this has a positive effect on the 
clients' labour market outcomes. It is clear that private agencies target the upper end of the 
market, but evidence to support the proposition that private agencies operate more efficiently, 
than public agencies, is weaker. Clearly such results cast considerable doubts over the 
neoclassical economists’ claims that the privatisation of employment services will create 
more effective and efficient outcomes. Furthermore, without historical evidence to prove 
otherwise, we must question the current claims that public employment services were an 
ineffective and inefficient labour market program. 
State Interventionists: Beveridge, Keynesian Economics and Institutional 
Economics 
Within the literature the success and failure of state intervention in the labour market, and in 
particular the role of the public employment service, has generally been intertwined with the 
success and failure of British writers: John Maynard Keynes and W.H. Beveridge. Both 
Keynes and Beveridge have been influential in British policy debates over the role of public 
employment services and their impact on labour market outcomes. While both argue for state 
intervention in the labour market in the form of public employment services, they do so, as 
Tomlinson argues, based on very different assumptions and focus.66 
The Keynesian economic tradition emerged from John Maynard Keynes seminal work The 
General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, published in 1936. Keynes provided an 
alternative economic theory to neoclassical economics. In essence this involved a shift in 
focus from distribution and prices to employment and demand: instead of being limited by 
finite resources, economic output was now seen to be elastic, a product of effective demand. 
The central conclusion of Keynesian economics is that there is no strong automatic tendency 
for the level of output and employment in the economy. Keynes most influential contribution 
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was to show that high unemployment could remain a feature of the economy for indefinite 
periods in the absence of government action. Thus, it was argued that state intervention is 
essential in keeping economic activity close to the desirable level, so that there is neither 
substantial involuntary unemployment nor excess demand in the economy as a whole leading 
to accelerating inflation.67 
Unlike Keynes, whose focus was on the ‘economy as a whole’: consumption, investment and 
government budgetary policy, Beveridge focussed on the mechanisms of the labour market. 
W.H. Beveridge outlined his novel cure for unemployment in Unemployment, a Problem of 
Industry, first published in 1909 and later in Full Employment in A Free Society, published in 
1944. Beveridge relied upon improvements in the labour market and the ability of industry to 
absorb the unemployed. Beveridge drew his ideas from early studies of voluntary bureaux 
and municipal exchanges in Germany. From his early research Beveridge claimed that labour 
exchanges could improve the working of the labour market, and in particular, the flow of 
information to job seekers.  Beveridge argued that unemployment at its most wasteful was 
seen to be the result of market inefficiency, as workers spent time tramping the streets trying 
to find permanent jobs or settling for casual work. Thus, he concluded that such waste could 
only be avoided through a national system of labour exchanges.68 
Beveridge’s analysis of the role of public employment services is predicated on three 
fundamental assumptions. Firstly, he states that like all areas of economic activity a definite 
market must exist to bring together would be purchasers and would be sellers. Therefore, he 
assumed that by bringing buyers and sellers into a coordinated system of employment 
exchanges it would produce an orderly efficient labour market to serve the industrial 
community. Secondly, Beveridge assumed that a public national exchange system would 
provide the state with the ability to alleviate and control unemployment. Thirdly, Beveridge 
assumed that a national public employment exchange would enable the state to embark on a 
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policy of ‘decasualisation’ of the labour market, which he deemed to be the greatest evil 
facing workers.69 
Beveridge’s most ambitious claim was his policy of ‘decasualisation’. Beveridge believed 
that the presence of casual labour was due to a failing in the labour market. He argued that 
this was due to maladjustment between supply and demand one which he argued could only 
be solved through policy. He believed that the State provision of temporary relief work was 
useless, because there is no further guarantee of good employment when the relief is over, 
instead focus should be on the mechanisms of the labour market. For Beveridge the problem 
was administrative and could only be solved through the provision of a network of public 
employment services.70 
While Beveridge’s analysis provides an important insight into the role of public employment 
services, it is argued, that it suffers from being prescriptive and deterministic. It is clearly 
evident from subsequent studies on the operation of British labour exchanges that they have 
largely failed to fulfil two of Beveridge’s objectives: alleviating and controlling 
unemployment and the ‘decasualisation’ of the labour market.71 
Why weren’t the British labour exchanges successful? In later writings, Beveridge in part, 
places the blame on the British regulated coexistence system. Beveridge claims that their 
inability to achieve his objectives should not be laid at the doors of the exchanges themselves, 
but at the door of the employers. Despite acknowledging that the exchanges had no 
compulsory powers and relied only on gradual voluntary conversion of employers he 
dismisses arguments put forth by the Webb’s that the success of such a system necessitated 
compulsory notification by employers.72  
Writers such as O’Donnell and Showler have since challenged Beveridge’s assumption that 
the British and German government established labour exchanges to alleviate unemployment. 
They argue that the state established labour exchanges to redistribute labour and not alleviate 
unemployment and this explains why they did not enforce compulsory notification. King and 
Rothstein, drawing from a cross national government survey of public and private 
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employment services, found countries with regulated co-existent systems had the weakest and 
most ineffective public employment service.73 
Anderson makes a very interesting and important point when she states that ‘success is 
relative to expectations.’74 She notes that those, and here she is clearly talking of Beveridge, 
who thought that through the exchanges seasonal unemployment could be reduced, casual 
work could be made continuous, and mobility between occupations and areas greatly 
facilitated, have been disappointed. She claims that the exchanges have been useful in such 
readjustments to varying degrees, but they have provided no cure-alls for the difficulties. For 
example, she notes that the exchanges have had no effect on regularising casual work. 
However, she argues that the exchanges have been useful in moving people from depressed 
areas. In support of the labour exchanges, she argues that they can only transfer workers 
when there are jobs available, and can only transfer workers who are able to fill the jobs. 
Furthermore, she states that for those who expected the exchanges to be merely clearing 
houses for the labour market, this she argues has been accomplished. She claims that with 
thirty three per cent of the labour market going through labour exchanges by the 1930s, a 
proportion which she argues was growing steadily, this demonstrates an impressive 
coordination of the labour market.75 
Anderson provides a further contribution to the literature in regards to the British regulated 
coexistence system. She found that despite the British government initially forbidding local 
authorities to license commercial agencies, that the labour movement favoured such a law. In 
a similar vein to findings by the institutional economist’s to be discussed next, she found that 
due to commercial pressure and competition from public agencies, private agencies adopted 
‘sharper’ practices and charged higher fees to job seekers. In response labour exchange 
officials ignored the agencies, their attitude being that if people choose to use agencies, it is 
none of their affair and that agencies will disappear if the exchanges can win over the 
business. King and Rothstein argue that while British Laws provided some regulation of 
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private agencies, this regulation was very weak and undermined the ability of the national 
labour exchange to prosper.76  
Institutional economists, like Keynesian economists, reject the elegant theories of the 
neoclassical economics and advocate for the public provision of employment services. 
Institutional economists predicate their analysis on the notion that economics is not a body of 
immutable and timeless truths but is socially and historically relative. Writers from this 
tradition place emphasis on habit, custom and collective behaviour and its insistence that 
these phenomena cannot be reduced to the maximising behaviour of calculating individuals. 
For institutionalists the social formation of consumers and workers’ preferences is the most 
important of all economic issues and forms the basis of analysis.77 
Ramstad states that there are two crucial distinctions between neoclassical and the 
institutional analysis of the labour market. In neoclassical economics, the concrete 
institutional context of a market is seen as many frictions that inhibit the functioning of the 
core process and result in suboptimal outcomes. This interpretation carries a normative 
judgment: institutions that are frictions, such as collective bargaining agreements, create 
inefficiency and produce social outcomes in which some are at less worse off. Conversely, 
institutional economists reject such normative judgments. Institutional economists’ rejection 
of the existence of the neoclassical core process is part of a broader methodological 
individualism in favour of one of a number of social explanations of economic behaviour. 
Market behaviour is understood as an expression of an underlying rule structure embedded in 
institutions, an analysis of labour market behaviour thus begins with uncovering the rule 
structure of the relevant institutions.78 
Based on this methodological and ontological approach, institutional economists, such as 
Commons, have provided significant contribution to the literature on the origins of labour 
market institutions, their effects on labour market mobility and unemployment. Commons 
argued that the focus in the early part of the twentieth century had been placed on prevention 
                                                           
76
 C.M. Anderson, ‘A View of the British Employment Exchanges’, pp. 93-104; D. King & B. Rothstein, 
‘Government Legitimacy and the Labour Market’, pp. 296. 
77
 J.E. King, Labour Economics, Ch 1. 
78
 Y. Ramstad, Neoclassical Revisionism or Neoinstitutionalism: A Further Look at Labor Economics in the 
1950s, Mimeo, University of Rhode Island, 1987; Y. Ramstad, ‘Institutional Economics and Dual Labour 
Market Theory’, in M. Tool (ed.), Institutional Economics: Theory, Method, Policy, Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, Boston, 1993, pp.173-233; M. Hillard and R. McIntyre, ‘Is there a New Institutional Consensus in 
Labor Economics’, Journal of Economic Issues, Vol. 28, No. 2, June 1994, pp. 619-630. 
 43  
 
(identifying and attacking the economic and political situations, practices and forces that 
result in unemployment i.e. curing the symptoms that lead to cyclical unemployment such as 
economic fluctuations) and not on accepting that unemployment is always apparent (due to 
technological change and business adjustment). He claimed that emphasis needs to be placed 
on the most efficient and equitable regulation of the labour market: employment offices to 
facilitate job finding during both good and bad economic times. Commons found that the 
provision of public employment services was both a social and economic necessity to 
counteract the discrimination and fraud, which was being perpetrated by private employment 
agencies. Commons is commonly characterised as an institutional economist and has 
provided the most notable contribution to the historical literature. Therefore, for the purpose 
of this chapter his contribution to the literature will be discussed in further detail in the 
following section with the other historical writers.79 
King argues that during the heyday of human capital theory in the 1960s, neoclassical theory 
seemed to have overwhelmed the institutionalists.  However, he notes that there was a 
powerful reaction against this neo-classical dominance spearheaded by Michael Piore’s Dual 
Labour Market Theory. This theory provides an interesting perspective on the employment-
unemployment-poverty relationships. The theory suggests that a dichotomisation of the 
labour market had occurred over time, forging two separate labour markets – a primary and a 
secondary market – in which workers and employers operate by fundamentally different 
behavioural rules.80 The distinction of the two markets is as follows:  
‘the primary market offers high wages, good working conditions, employment 
stability and job security, equity and due process in the administration of work rules, 
and chances of advancement. The secondary market had jobs which involve low 
wages, poor working conditions, considerable variability in employment, harsh and 
often arbitrary discipline, and little opportunity to advance. The poor and vulnerable 
are thus confined to the secondary labour market’.81  
From this perspective, Piore has argued that the role of the employment service can be of 
central concern to policy makers. If labour market duality exists, which Lansbury and 
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Gilmour state to be the case in Australia, and the chances of moving from secondary low 
paid, low status jobs into primary ones are restricted, this throws into even greater emphasis 
the need to provide appropriate training, information, placing and follow up for new entrants, 
and also for existing secondary market workers into the labour market. For those in 
secondary jobs the role of the employment service could lie in the accurate identification of 
the problem in individual cases, and the provision of appropriate guidance and training to lift 
these workers into primary jobs. If, however, certain groups experience discrimination, 
guidance and training may not be sufficient to break the barrier. Thus, Piore’s theory 
emphasises the need to concentrate upon countering employment discrimination. He claims 
that the possibility of duality in the labour market emphasises the need for an integrated 
policy approach, which not only provides information, placement service and training, but 
also to counter discriminatory and the institutional forces that may present such services 
being fully successful.82  
In conclusion, the previous discussion has demonstrated there are four economic traditions 
within the literature. All of which hold different assumptions and points of reference in their 
analysis of the public employment services. The following table 2.3 summarises the 
economic traditions regarding public employment services.   
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Economic 
Tradition 
Influence on 
Public Policy 
Justification for  Public Employment Service Economic analysis 
Neoclassical Nineteenth and 
early twentieth 
century 
 
Re-emerges after 
the economic 
crisis of the 
1970s until 
present 
No role for the following reasons; 
- assume that the privatisation of employment 
services improves allocative efficiency, since 
private agencies and their employees have 
stronger performance incentives than employees 
in the public sector. – argue that further 
competition results in a greater range of 
approaches being tested, leading to innovation, a 
higher rate of improvement in service quality 
and cost effectiveness, and greater 
responsiveness to client needs 
- Competitive Market 
-  Absence of 
externalities will bring 
efficient allocation of 
resources i.e. no state 
intervention  
- Individual are rational 
maximisers 
- Market reaches 
equilibrium 
- Focus on individual 
behaviour 
Beveridge In the UK from 
the early 
twentieth 
century 
Yes for the following reasons 
- to cure unemployment 
- to regulate the labour market 
- eliminate casualisation of labour 
- Micro analysis of the 
labour market 
- Improvements in the 
flow of information will 
lead to improvements in 
the labour market and 
flow on to industry 
- Elimination of casual 
work replaced by full-
time stable employment 
 
Keynesian 
 
In the UK from 
the early 
twentieth 
century until the 
economic crisis 
of the 1970s 
In Australia and 
the US from 
1945 -1970s 83 
 
Yes for the following reasons 
- to alleviate unemployment 
- to regulate the labour market 
- to eradicate unemployment  
- Macroeconomic focus 
on employment and 
demand 
- State intervention 
required to control 
inflation and 
unemployment 
Institutional In the US from 
1920s until 
WW1. 
 
Yes for the following reasons 
- to counter discrimination and fraudulent 
behaviour perpetrated by private employment 
agencies 
- Dual labour market theory stipulates that a 
public employment service will enable workers 
to move from the secondary to the primary 
labour market 
- Economics is not a 
body of timeless truths 
but is socially and 
historically relative 
- Social explanations of 
economic behaviour 
- Market behaviour is 
understood as an 
expression of an 
underlying rule structure 
embedded in institutions 
Table 2.3: Economic Traditions84 
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Historical Literature on the Origins of Public Employment Services 
The historical literature on public employment services has also been largely influenced by 
the economic traditions discussed in the previous section. American writers have 
overwhelmingly adopted the institutional economic approach. These writers have generally 
been interested in asking why public employment services have been established, what 
factors shaped their existence and what role have they played.  The British and Australian 
contribution to the historical literature has overwhelmingly influenced by Beveridge and 
Keynesian economics. However, this literature suffers from a number of problems. Firstly, it 
is laden with inherent assumptions surrounding the role and operation of public employment 
services. Secondly, in Australian scholarship the success and failure of the public 
employment service has been intertwined with the success and failure of Keynesian 
economics and the failure of Beveridge’s prophecies for the decasualisation of the labour 
market. The following section will begin with a discussion of the international literature 
before turning to the Australian literature. 
International Literature 
The United States scholar, John R. Commons, has provided the most significant contribution 
the historical literature on public employment services. Influenced by his background in 
institutional economics, Commons in his History of American Labor in the United States, 
first published in 1918, identified the impetus for the establishment by of a public 
employment service in the United States. Unlike Beveridge, who provides a prescriptive and 
deterministic analysis of the role of employment services, Commons draws on historical 
evidence of discrimination and fraudulent practices perpetrated by private agencies, which 
led both the Federal, and many state governments, in the United States, to regulate private 
agencies, and established public employment services. Inspired by Commons, many writers 
have focused on the regulatory frameworks and broader socio economic issues associated 
with public employment services.85 
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 Unlike Beveridge who claimed that the public employment service could alleviate 
unemployment, Commons argued that public employment services could contribute to 
assisting with the regulation of unemployment. Commons traced constructive thinking on 
public employment services in the United States back to the Massachusetts reports of 1893-
1895. However, he notes that despite such early considerations, the focus from 1914 to 1933 
had been placed on prevention (identifying and attacking the economic and political 
situations, practices and forces that result in unemployment i.e. curing the symptoms that led 
to cyclical unemployment such as economic fluctuations) and not on accepting that 
unemployment is always apparent (due to technological change and business adjustment) and 
that emphasis needs to be placed on employment offices to facilitate job finding during both 
good and bad economic times.86 
In his work, Commons charts the development of the United States Employment Service 
(USES), first established in 1907. He argues that during its formative years the USES was 
ineffective and faced considerable hurdles. The USES ineffectiveness he attributes to the lack 
of coordination between state and federal employment services, which created further 
inefficiencies in the labour market. Commons argues that it wasn’t until the enactment of the 
Wagner-Peyser Act in 1933 that an integrated and effective national employment service was 
finally established in the United States. He stated that the new employment service differed in 
several ways. Firstly, a national advisory council was appointed to help the employment 
service work out its policies, maintain neutrality between employers and labour, and put 
efficiency before political considerations. Secondly, a federal subsidy was only given to 
states which entered into a formal written agreement with the USES, which bound the state to 
federal regulations and standards, including supervision of salaries, selection and training of 
personnel, standardised record keeping, clearance, premises used for offices, and the 
acceptance of the policy that during strikes or lockout individuals sent out on an employer’s 
request be given notice that a strike or lockout existed.87 
Commons’ claimed that the development of a nationally integrated public service was aimed 
at the regulation and organisation of the labour market has been disputed by later writers. 
Breen claims that the USES was a political grab for jurisdictional power. Breen argues that 
the Federal Department of Labor seized the opportunity, provided by a chaotic labour market 
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during World War I, to establish control of the national labour market. He argues that a 
prolonged struggle occurred between the states and the ‘aggressive administrative empire-
builders’88 in the Federal government. He also states that while the Federal government was 
initially successful in their bid for jurisdictional power, they were ultimately undermined by 
their inability to coordinate the individual states.89 
Commons’ most significant contribution to scholarly debates was his insight into the impetus 
for the public provision of employment agencies. He argued that the provision of regulatory 
laws on private agencies by various states was indicative of the abuses that have characterised 
the business. In his research, Commons found that regulations were enacted to forbid 
fraudulent advertising, misrepresentation and other forms of fraud. He discovered that some 
states forbade agencies from collecting fees from both the employer and employee, while 
others prohibited fee splitting between the agencies and employers. Other states endeavoured 
to regulate the fees charged by private agencies. In regards to industrial disputation, 
Commons found that a number of states required the agencies to post notices of strikes and 
lockouts or to stamp the information on the introduction cards given to men sent out to jobs 
where disputes were in progress.90  
Later scholars influenced by Commons’ approach have examined the discriminatory and 
fraudulent acts perpetrated by private agencies and their effects on labour market outcomes. 
However, some writers argue that the extent of such abuses will never be known. Becker 
claims ‘those who commit deviant acts protect themselves from prying outsiders. Deviance 
within an organized conventional institution is often protected by a cover up.’91 Martinez, 
argues that private agencies have typically covered up such abuses. What then have been the 
frauds perpetrated by these private agencies? Harrison cites a list of seven common abuses 
and frauds committed by private agencies, which are detailed in table 2.4.92 
Martinez’s historical overview of the changing role of employment agencies also provides 
some corroborating evidence of these concerns. He found that private agencies had been 
prepared to accept radically and sex-biased employment requirements without protest. Unlike 
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Harrison, Martinez provides a more sophisticated analysis of the abuses perpetrated by 
private agencies. He has characterised them around four themes: misrepresentation, fee-
splitting; proselyting; discrimination, which are detailed in table 2.5.93 
Charging a fee and failing to make any effort to find work for the applicant 
Sending an applicant where no work exists 
Sending applicants to distant points where no work or where unsatisfactory 
work exists but whence the applicant will not return on account of the expense 
involved 
Collusion between the agent and employer whereby the applicant is given a 
few days work and then discharged to make way for new workman, the agent 
and the employer dividing the fee 
Charging exorbitant fees or giving jobs to such applicants as contribute extra 
fees, presents etc 
Inducing workers, particularly girls, who have been placed to leave – pay 
another fee- and get a ‘better job’ 
Other evils charged against employer agents are the congregating of persons 
for gambling or other evil practices, collusion with keepers of immoral houses, 
and the sending of women applicants to houses of prostitution  
Table 2.4 Harrisson’s Common Abuses and Frauds Committed by Private Agencies94 
One of Commons greatest contribution to the scholarly debates surrounding employment 
services was his focus on the regulatory arrangements of employment services. Harrison 
concurs with Commons and argues that the abolition of private agencies would not 
necessarily reduce fraudulent practices, as he believes that they would continue to operate. 
Rather, he argues it is more important to tighten the regulatory arrangements and build a good 
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constructive, competing organisation to minimise their effects and provide protection for the 
consumers.95  
So what forms of regulation have occurred? Martinez argues notes by 1914, twenty-four 
states in the United States had attempted direct regulation of the activities of private 
employment agencies and nineteen states attempted indirect regulation in the form of 
establishing a free public employment service designed to compete with private agencies. By 
1928, all but nine states had provided in some manner of regulation of private agencies.96 
Theme Definition 
Misrepresentation ads, jobs, vacancies in areas – Martinez found an early reliance on 
misleading advertisements.   
Fee-splitting This refers to turnover being accelerated through firing with the fee being 
split between the recruitment agency and employer. 
Proselyting This refers to attempts by agents to influence former applicants and 
potential recruits to leave their present jobs in order to accept another 
through the agency. Also now known as headhunting. Often used when 
specific skills are required by an employer, Martinez argues that 
proselyting is becoming an increasing practice among private agencies, 
and their methods of contacting new recruits are often unscrupulous 
Discrimination Up until the Civil Rights Movement of the mid 1960s employment 
agents have accepted racially, religiously and sex-biased job orders 
without significant protest. In a survey of 457 private agencies it was 
found that 85% were willing to accept a discriminatory request. They 
argue such request were made by strangers to the agencies and that it is 
logical to assume that discriminatory job orders from regular clients 
would be greeted with a higher acceptance rate 
Table 2.5 Martinez’s Typology of Private Employment Agency Abuses.97 
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Writers such as Martinez and Sol identified that a parallel movement had occurred in other 
nations who had also been confronted with the problems arising from the unhampered 
activities of private employment agencies. In 1913 the Canadian Labor Congress called for 
the complete suppression of private employment agencies. The first official International 
Labor Conference of the League of Nations made a similar resolution a few years later. 
Germany had also become so concerned with unscrupulous practices of private agencies and 
their effect on the labour market that in 1922 the German government called for their 
abolition within ten years. Austria met the problems created by private agencies by refusing 
to issue any new licenses following World War I. By 1926 Finland, Romania and Bulgaria 
had legislated for the abolition of private agencies.98  
Many scholars including Sol, Jacoby and Finkin have identified how the concern for human 
exploitation reached the international arena. These writers have argued that the early 
concerns took concrete form in International Labour Organisation Convention No. 34 (1935), 
which proposed the abolition of profit-making employment agencies in favour of a state 
monopoly. Several European nations followed suit establishing publicly operated 
employment exchanges with exclusive jurisdiction. In 1949, the ILO promulgated 
Convention No. 96, which authorised limited exceptions to the rule laid down by Convention 
No. 34. However, the ILO capitulated in Convention No. 181 in 1997. This convention 
abandoned the prohibition of profit-making agencies and proposed the adoption of a system 
of governmental licenses and regulation.99 
Hall argues that the need for regulation was enhanced not only by the profound effect of these 
agencies upon the labour market and the economy in general, but also by the very nature of 
the business, which provided a very fertile ground for unscrupulous business practices. As 
Hall argues  
‘commercial agencies are under certain peculiar temptations. Employment agencies 
may be opened by an outlay of but little capital and current expenditures are very 
small. Relationship with the labourers is not continuous and an unscrupulous manager 
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is therefore not to the same degree as in most businesses under the necessity of 
maintaining the good will of his constantly changing customers.’100  
Many scholars influenced by the institutional economic tradition, including Martinez, 
Harrison, Finkin and Jacoby argue that the combination of a highly vulnerable clientele and 
the low degree of skill necessary to open and maintain a private employment agency created 
the image of an industry riddled with abusive and unscrupulous practices. Despite this 
negative image and the wealth of facts that supported it, obtaining government regulation was 
fraught with political and legal complications, largely because of the precedent setting nature 
of such regulation.101 
While much of the British literature on public employment service has strictly followed in the 
Beveridge tradition there has been one British historian, Brian Sholwer, who has broadened 
this tradition by incorporating the socio economic concerns of the American scholarship. 
While Showler shares Beveridge’s concerns he argues that the public employment service 
can also achieve important social objectives: reducing poverty and the social costs of 
unemployment. Influenced by Piore’s Dual Labour market theory he contends that public 
policy should also concentrate upon countering employment discrimination.102 
While Sholwer’s findings concur with previous studies that found that the labour exchanges 
failed to achieve Beveridge’s objectives: alleviating and controlling unemployment and 
curbing the ‘decasualisation’ of the labour market, he claims that these objectives can only be 
achieved by prohibiting private agencies. He contends that private employment agencies 
undermine the social purpose of the public employment service. Furthermore, he supports 
these claims by noting that greater economies of scale could be obtained from a monopolistic 
public service, and undesirable labour market practices could be avoided.103    
As the previous discussion has illustrated Commons and subsequent writers have provided 
important insights socio economic justification for the public provision of employment 
services: to curtail and prevent the abuses that have characterised the industry.  While the role 
of the public employment service has received considerable academic attention in the 
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international literature, Australian scholars have been slower to engage in such debates. The 
following discussion will examine how these traditions have influenced Australian 
scholarship on the origins and role of public employment services.104  
Australian Literature 
Prior to the 1980s Australian labour history had generally neglected the origin and impact of 
state intervention in the labour market. While early labour historians such as Coghlan and 
Reeves documented numerous aspects of state intervention such as the existence of Labour 
bureaus they provide contradictory accounts of the origins and effects of these bodies. 
However, since the 1980s Australian labour historians have shown a greater interest in the 
origins and effects of state intervention in the labour market namely through compulsory 
arbitration and wage boards. Attacks by deregulationists and the New Right on the system of 
arbitration during the 1980s provided the impetus for Australian scholars to re-assess its 
genesis and early impact. This preoccupation resulted in a plethora of studies on the system 
of arbitration by scholars such as Macintyre and Mitchell, Niland, and Plowman, amongst 
others.105  
In part, the narrow and sustained interest of state intervention in the form of compulsory 
arbitration can also be attributed to one of the dominant theoretical influences in Australian 
industrial relations research: Dunlop’s ‘systems theory’. While Dunlop’s ‘systems theory’ 
included the state as an actor in the industrial relations system, it was generally only in its 
capacity as conciliator and arbitrator that it was analysed. Heavily influenced by Dunlop’s 
model Australian scholars have had a long-term preoccupation with the macro interactions of 
the industrial relations system. This preoccupation resulted in a plethora of studies focused on 
trade unions, collective bargaining and arbitration. As dedicated pluralists, these writers 
viewed organised labour as the great moderator of the excesses of unbridled capital, and the 
state as the empowered and independent adjudicator of these collective arrangements. Based 
on this presumption, pluralist scholars assumed that the system of compulsory arbitration 
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would protect vulnerable workers from the power of capital. By investing the state and labour 
movement, with such an important function, these scholars inevitably treated other forms of 
state intervention in the labour market, and in particular, public employment services as 
socially retrograde, and thus undeserving of scrutiny.106  
Despite this neglect there have been some Australian scholars who have contributed to the 
historical literature on public employment services. Economic historians Tony Endres and 
Malcolm Cook examined the NSW Government’s response to unemployment between 1892 
and 1912. Focussing on the Government Labour Bureau they argued that despite Beveridge’s 
claims, the Government Labour Bureau facilitated the casualisation of the labour market. 
However, due to their preoccupation with Beveridge and the aggregate nature of their 
statistical analysis they failed to examine why the Government Labour Bureau was 
established, the non-economic factors that shaped their approach or how the labour bureaus 
changed and developed over time.107  
More recently, Richard Mitchell and Anthony O’Donnell, labour law academics, have also 
provided a valuable contribution to the literature. Mitchell and O’Donnell examined the 
historical regulation of private and public employment agencies in Australia. While this 
research provides an interesting account of the development of regulation of private 
employment agencies, they failed to examine the factors that led to its introduction. 
O’Donnell’s later research on the regulation of the CES also provided an interesting account 
the effects of labour laws on social policy. However, his legalistic and regulatory approach 
again failed to take into account other external socio-economic factors such as fraud and 
discrimination.108 
Consequently, the Australian literature suffers from a number of flaws. Firstly, while the 
previous international literature has generally adopted an institutional economic approach, the 
Australian historian literature has largely followed either Beveridge or a Keynesian economic 
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approach. Thus the success and failure of the public employment services in Australia have 
been intertwined with rise and fall of Keynesian economics or judged against Beveridge’s 
policy of decasualisation. Secondly, the socio economic concerns identified in the 
international literature have been overwhelmingly neglected in Australian scholarship. As the 
following discussion will illustrate, the state bodies have been largely neglected within the 
literature.109 
In Australia, the earliest forms of state intervention in the provision of employment services 
were found at the state level, these were known as labour bureaus. Within the literature there 
is some confusion of their origins and role. John Nurick a neo-classical economist argues that 
the colonies had from time to time set up Labour bureaus as a temporary response to 
unemployment. He argues that the first of these occurred in South Australia in 1849.110 
William Reeves, former New Zealand Statesman and Fabian socialist, on the other hand, 
argues that NSW established the first bureau in 1892; a year after a similar exchange had 
been set up in New Zealand, making it one of the earliest exchanges in the world. Reeves 
states by 1902 Queensland, Victoria, South Australia and Western Australia had also 
established public labour bureaus. Endres and Cook concur with Reeves claiming that the 
NSW Government Labour Bureau, established in 1892, was one of the earliest labour bureaus 
in Australia.111 
Coghlan provides a differing account of the origins of the Australian labour bureaus. Against 
a backdrop of economic uncertainty, high unemployment, industrial unrest and structural 
change in the labour market, Coghlan argues that the colonial government received faced 
pressure from the trade unions to address these concerns. Coghlan notes that a Labour 
Conference, of an inter-colonial character, was held in Sydney in January 1894, at which ‘a 
resolution was passed calling on all governments to set up departments of labour, collect 
statistics of employment, organise surplus labour locally and place unemployed men on the 
land in land settlements’.112 Coghlan claims that NSW was the first to establish a bureau in 
1894; this is two years after Reeves, Endres and Cook’s account. Despite establishing a 
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labour bureau, Coghlan argues that the NSW colonial government had no serious intention of 
engaging in any extensive plans for the long-term operation of the labour bureau.113  
Other writers trace their early beginning to policy debates in Britain. O’Donnell argues that 
these ideas echoed a strand of opinion that had emerged in Britain in the early decades of the 
twentieth century when a group of social and administrative reformers, such as Sidney and 
Beatrice Webb and, most famously, William Beveridge, promoted the idea of the Labour 
Exchange in an explicit attempt to decasualise the labour market. Influenced by the approach 
of the motherland, Endres, Cook and O’Donnell claim that policy makers adopted this 
approach to cure the ills of unemployment.114 
What role did the labour bureaux play? On this issues both Reeves and Coghlan produce 
similar findings. They argue that the functions of the bureaux were two-fold – to relieve the 
distress among the unemployed, and to act as a channel through which labour passes into 
government employ. The main objective of the labour bureaux was to get the workless out of 
the cities and larger towns and disperse them about the country. They noted that the 
government bureaus provided help in four main ways:  
1) engage any labourers who may be required by the public departments 
2) select and send out men willing to work for private employers 
3) where men are willing to try their luck in country areas where there is a fair chance of 
employment, the bureaux will give them passes on the state railways 
4) picking men for special relief projects – during times of emergency.115 
Endres and Cook claim that the Government Labour Bureau was an ad hoc policy response, 
operating merely as a ‘means of social control and as a charitable institution’.116 By the mid 
1890s they claim that the Government Labour Bureau changed from acting as a dispenser of 
charity to an allocative function: dispensing manual labour onto Government works and into 
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private employment. In the period from 1892 to 1912 they claim that the Government Labour 
Bureau only underwent cosmetic change and failed to develop innovative labour market 
programs.117 
Where the labour bureaus successful? The evidence seems to suggest that labour bureaus 
were not successful. Endres, Cook and O’Donnell argue that despite Beveridge’s prophecies, 
they failed to alleviate unemployment or to decasualise the labour market. Endres and Cook 
argue that the Government Labour Bureau assisted employers by encouraging the 
casualisation of the labour market. Reeves notes, during the early years the NSW bureau was 
accused of playing into the hands of astute employers by allowing them to make use of it to 
pick up labour at less than current rates. Coghlan also found that the Government Labour 
Bureau was criticised for its failure to insist on union rates of pay from employers and its 
supplying of labour to take the place of strike breakers. Coghlan and Nurick contend that they 
were seen as only temporary measures to organise the labour market during the 1890s, and 
the state’s lack of commitment to their purpose undermined their overall success.118 
What became the fate of the state labour bureaus? O’Donnell argues that persistent high 
unemployment during the 1920s led policy makers to consider the role of labour bureau more 
broadly than simply as a means to govern the unemployed. He cites evidence found in the 
1927 Royal Commission into the establishment of a national insurance scheme, which 
recommended a national system of employment bureaus. He found similar sentiments were 
echoed the following year by the Development and Migration Commission’s Report on 
Unemployment and Business Stability. This report concluded that there was a lack of co-
ordination between government bureau, trade union bureau, privately controlled bureau and 
more informal methods of recruitment tended ‘to be confusing, inefficient and wasteful…and 
to contribute to the creation of numbers of separate reserves of labour within the respective 
industrial groups’ and accounted for a considerable proportion of unemployment.’119 By 
contrast, it was argued, based on the Keynesian economic theory, that a national uniform 
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labour exchange could abolish the labour reserves of individual industries, concentrating 
them into one, as well as providing the information that would aid labour mobility and 
vocational guidance and supervise and co-ordinate private agencies. 120 
O’Donnell notes that little progress on these proposals was made until World War II, with the 
establishment of the Commonwealth Employment Service. O’Donnell argues that this 
development sounded the death knell for state labour bureaus.121 
Conclusion 
This chapter outlined the conceptual context for this thesis. From the previous discussion it is 
evident that scholarship on public employment services has trodden a very narrow path. 
Overwhelmingly scholars have posited there analysis within one of the four economic 
traditions, however, three of these traditions suffer from being heavily laden with inherent 
assumptions and predetermined outcomes: Neoclassical economics, Beveridge and 
Keynesian economics. It is also apparent that scholars have been reluctant to examine the 
scholarly debates outside of their tradition. Furthermore, there has been a lack of cross 
fertilization of ideas, particularly between traditions, and especially between US and British 
writers. This thesis seeks to break with these traditions, and argues that it is essential that any 
analysis of the role public employment services needs to take into account all traditions in its 
analysis.122 
The literature on public employment services has been overwhelmingly shaped by economic 
discourse. As the previous illustrated there are four economic traditions within the literature, 
three of which suffer from a number of flaws. Writers from the neoclassical economist 
tradition argue that the privatisation of employment services improves allocative efficiency, 
since private agencies and their employees have stronger performance incentives. However, 
there is little evidence to support such claims. Writers from the Keynesian economic tradition 
reject such assumptions, and instead advocate for state intervention to stimulate economic 
growth and full employment. Writers influenced by Beveridge’s claims that that public 
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employment services would alleviate unemployment and decasualise the labour market, have 
been left disappointed.123 
Unlike the previous economic traditions which have focused predominantly on economic 
aspects, writers from the institutional economic tradition have adopted a broader view 
highlighting the fact that labour markets have both economic and social dimensions. This 
tradition has been particularly significant and influential in American historical literature. 
From their historical analysis of the origins of public employment services these writers 
advocate for the public provision of employment services and labour market regulation to 
avoid the discriminative and fraudulent practices that have been perpetrated by private 
employment agencies. While this thesis adopts the assumptions and approach of the 
institutional economic tradition, it also seeks to evaluate the claims of the other traditions 
over the role and origins of the public employment services in Australia.124  
As was previously noted there are a number of significant problems with Australian historical 
literature. Australian scholars have generally influenced by either the Keynesian economic 
tradition or Beveridge’s policy of decasualisation. Consequently the success and failure of 
public employment services have been tied to the success and failure of Keynesian 
economics or Beveridge’s policy of decasualisation in Australia. In recent times, the 
neoclassical tradition has become dominant in recent literature, particularly since the demise 
of the CES. The institutional economic tradition is sadly lacking from Australian discourse. 
However, it is argued that this tradition allows scholars to identify the socio-economic factors 
in asking why public employment services were established and their role in the labour 
market. Though it is argued that any analysis of the public employment service must take into 
account the arguments and debates across all traditions. This thesis aims to rectify this gap in 
our knowledge, by providing an integrated analysis of the public employment service in 
Australia.125  
The literature examined in this chapter raises interesting questions for this thesis. Firstly, as 
noted earlier, the state has sort to abrogate its role, which raises questions about what role it 
has played, and what role should it play? Secondly, what were the origins of the NSW labour 
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bureau, and was it as ineffective and inefficient as others have assumed? Finally, was the 
private employment industry riddled with fraudulent behaviour, and did this provide the 
impetus for the development of public employment services in Australia? 
In seeking to address these considerations the following chapter will examine the 
development of the earliest NSW labour bureau. In doing so, it will seek to determine its 
origin and role and the factors that shaped the development of public employment services in 
NSW. 
 61  
 
Chapter 3 Casual Labour Board 
Introduction 
Throughout the literature little appears to be known about early Government attempts to 
provide public employment services in Australia. As previously noted, there is much 
conjecture over when and where these first occurred, also in what form they took, and who 
influenced their design. Reeves, Endres and Cook claimed that the first labour bureau in 
NSW was established in 1892, while Coghlan states it was established 1894 in response to 
growing pressures, predominantly from the trade union movement.126 
While the Government Labour Bureau cited by both Reeves and Coghlan was actually 
established in 1892, there was an earlier labour bureau: the Casual Labour Board, established 
by the Parkes Colonial Government in 1887. Faced with high unemployment and industrial 
unrest the Colonial Premier and Colonial Secretary, Sir Henry Parkes, established the Casual 
Labour Board on 2 May 1887. Parkes later terminated the Casual Labour Board on 29 
December 1888. While Coghlan argued the introduction of the Labour Bureau in 1894 was in 
response to growing pressure, predominantly from the trade unions, it appears that the 
introduction of the Casual Labour Board was largely due to the increasing pressure on the 
Colonial Government from the unemployed.127 
Despite its short tenure of nineteen months, Parkes had originally hoped that the Casual 
Labour Board would have sophisticated and far reaching implications for the labour market. 
Parkes intended for the Casual Labour Board to be responsible for the registration of the 
unemployed, gathering labour market information, and selecting unemployed persons for 
relief works across NSW, with the aim of generally absorbing some men into private 
employment, thereby easing the industrial distress of the time. Despite having such 
sophisticated aims, the Casual Labour Board acted primarily as a labour market intermediary, 
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focussing predominantly on the placement of men on Government relief works with the hope 
that this would support industry and led to more opportunities for private employment.128  
Parkes believed that the provision of Government relief works would give the economy the 
necessary capital injection to assist private industry and thereby led to the absorption of men 
into private employment. However, despite these intentions it largely failed to receive the 
necessary long-term support due to the cyclical nature of the economy and labour market, and 
the unsustainable costs associated with the government relief works. Furthermore, following 
a Parliamentary Select Committee inquiry in 1889, it was disbanded under a cloud of 
allegations relating to corruption and misappropriation of funds.   
This chapter will begin by examining the economic, industrial and political conditions in 
NSW during the period of the Casual Labour Board 1887-1888.  In light of this discussion, 
the origins of the Casual Labour Board will be analysed. The discussion will then focus on 
the operations of the Casual Labour Board. Finally, the criticisms, problems and reasons for 
its eventual demise will be analysed.  
Economic and Industrial Conditions 
During the second half of nineteenth century, burgeoned by the gold rushes, Australia 
experienced a period of substantial population growth. In NSW the population grew rapidly 
from 357,978 in 1861 to 1,085,740 in 1888.129 The substantial proportion of residents lived in 
cities and towns. By 1888, Sydney had a population of 360,000 inhabitants, second largest to 
Melbourne with 420,000.130 The largest increase in population occurred in 1885, when due to 
the depression occurring in the other colonies, most notably Victoria, there was a large influx 
of men coming to NSW in search of work. Coghlan claims that this influx created congestion 
in the labour market which was felt in the following years as the unemployment situation 
worsened.131 
The Australian economy expanded rapidly with the wealth generated by the gold rushes 
laying the foundation of a long boom of growth between 1851 and 1891. Butlin estimates that 
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economic production increased from £53.4 million in 1861 to £211.6 million in 1891(1911 
constant prices). However, economic conditions varied between colonies. NSW experienced 
minor recessions in 1863, 1871, 1879 and 1886. In particular, NSW experienced a period of 
marked unemployment in 1885-1886. In an attempt to curb the economic crisis and support 
capital development and growth, the NSW Government borrowed heavily. In doing so the 
NSW Government debt grew rapidly from £11,724,419 in 1877 to £40,993,349 in 1887.132 
In NSW, pastoralism remained a key area of economic growth. Between 1860 and 1890 there 
was increasing demand for Australian wool which saw the sheep flock increase five-fold. By 
the mid 1870s wool had accounted for one tenth of the national product and wool prices had 
peaked. This patterned continued and by 1890 wool accounted for almost two-thirds of export 
earnings. Despite this economic growth, the industry was not without its own problems. In a 
bid to increase production, NSW pastoralists moved into arid areas where capital 
requirements such as water supply and transportation infrastructure were greater. 
Consequently … ‘drought, falling wool prices, rabbit plagues and overstocking during the 
1880s’133 … left many pastoralists struggling to survive. As a result of these problems and 
despite increased wool production, the proportion of the workforce employed in the pastoral 
industry declined in NSW from thirty-four per cent in 1871 to twenty-one per cent in 1891.134 
Other NSW industries also experienced considerable economic growth. Coal mining 
experienced a significant increase in production from 71,000 tons in 1850 to 4,038,000 tons 
in 1891. Much of this production was exported to Asia, the America’s, New Zealand and the 
Pacific Islands. The building and construction industries also contributed to economic 
expansion. The increasing population led to a growing demand for housing, especially in the 
cities areas. However, businesses in the building industry remained small. For example, in 
1891 Sydney builders employed on average 5.6 workers.135 
While not as renowned for manufacturing as Victoria, NSW’s manufacturing sector expanded 
during 1860-1891. Despite this growth, the industry continued to serve the domestic needs of 
a growing economy rather than export markets. The industries that dominated manufacturing 
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were metal working and engineering, clothing and footwear, production of building materials 
and food and tobacco processing. Factories were unsophisticated and small, yet there are 
some examples of large employers. Patmore cites P.N. Russell, a Sydney engineering 
business that employed 300 to 400 workers in the 1860’s and at Mort Docks 1,000 workers 
were engaged in 1886.136  
Overall, the Australian economy remained dependant on Britain. In 1861 Britain purchased 
67 per cent of Australian exports and supplied 70 per cent of imports. By 1891 Britain bought 
73 per cent of Australian exports and supplied 65 per cent of imports. Furthermore, between 
1883 and 1887, 25 per cent of British foreign investment went to Australia. These loans 
financed railway construction and the further expansion of export industries.137 
Due to the economic expansion of the period, it was assumed that Australia was a worker’s 
paradise. This notion that Australia was a worker’s paradise has been largely contested within 
the literature. Early economic historians such as N.G. Butlin cited aggregate statistics to 
support the argument that there was a seller’s market for labour, thereby resulting in high 
wages. However, writers such as Patmore, Lee and Fahey have disputed these findings, 
arguing that Butlin had ignored the actual earnings and living conditions of these workers. 
Moreover, it is argued that he failed to take into account the irregularity of the work. For 
example, pastoralism and building industries relied on seasonal, casual and temporary 
labour.138  
In terms of the organisation of workers, it has been found that early unionism generally 
remained confined to skilled tradesmen. Many trade unions imposed strict requirements for 
entry. For example, Amalgamated Society of Engineers and the Boilermakers placed strict 
controls over apprenticeships, yet as they were unable to recruit effectively they relied on 
collective bargaining rather than unilateral regulation. J. C. Docherty estimated that by 1890-
91, only 20.9 per cent of the NSW labour force were trade union members. Despite low trade 
union membership, there were examples of both individual and collective action. In NSW 
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Patmore found that as early as 1857 porters on the NSW Railways petitioned the Chief 
Commissioner for Sunday pay. Temporary combinations were not trade unions, since they 
lacked continuity and the administrative structure of unions. Generally they were formed 
based upon single issues.139 
The unemployed also formed temporary combinations. During the long period of severe 
pastoral, commercial and industrial depression, which fell upon NSW in 1863, 1871, 1879 
and 1886, the unemployed formed temporary combinations to campaign the government to 
take action to relive their distress. It was reported on 25 April 1884, that the unemployed had 
applied to the Agent of Immigration and other Members of Parliament, seeking employment 
across the Colony. Less than a week later, a further deputation of the unemployed waited 
upon the Premier and Minister of Public Works at the Legislative Assembly in Sydney, 
where they presented a petition from nearly 600 men seeking relief. These unemployed 
temporary combinations were not solely the preserve of unskilled labour, as there were also 
examples of skilled labour agitating for relief. It was reported that on 10 August 1886, a 
deputation of unemployed carpenters waited upon the Minister of Works to request work in 
the Railway Department.140  
While these deputations were generally peaceful, there were incidents where police 
attendance was required. On 24 March 1887, the police monitored the consideration of 
applications for relief work in Sydney. On 22 April 1887, police attended a riot at the 
Queen’s statue in Sydney, which occurred during the allocation of food. The Police were 
often called to the Queen’s Statue in Sydney, where the unemployed gathered, voicing their 
calls for relief: ‘work or bread’.141 
In terms of seeking private employment the unemployed were often in the hands of 
unscrupulous employment agencies. On 3 March 1884, the Sydney Morning Herald reported 
that some private employment agents in Sydney were professing to be able to obtain billets 
for government relief works. It was claimed that these agents could show letters purporting to 
be written by three Members of Parliament: Robert Stewart, Henry Copeland and George 
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Dibbs, which guaranteed employment on government works.  In response to these allegations 
Copeland requested a police inquiry. While the validity of these allegations are unknown, it 
appears that such deceitful practices were commonly being used to deceive the 
unemployed.142 
Late Nineteenth Century Political Landscape 
The British Parliament’s enactment of the Constitution of NSW in 1855 brought responsible 
government to the colony. Modelled on the British system, the NSW Parliament consisted of 
two houses of Parliament: the Legislative Assembly, with members elected by the male 
residents of NSW, and a Legislative Council with members appointed for life by the 
governor.143  
Under responsible government, the state played a major role in the supporting the 
development of the Australian economy. Borrowing large amounts of money on the London 
money market, the Colonial Government built the necessary infrastructure to support capital 
development: harbours, roads, telegraph lines, railways and water and sewerage systems. As 
Patmore argues this was not ‘Colonial Socialism’ instead it was designed to assist the 
development of the capitalist economy. Macintyre claims that the Colonial Government 
sought to develop a thinly populated land by creating the necessary infrastructure for 
producing primary export commodities.144  
Beyond the provision of infrastructure, the state also supported business interests through 
assisted immigration. For many capitalists, immigration remained an important source of 
labour. Between 1861 and 1890 net migration contributed to thirty seven per cent of the 
overall increase in Australia’s population. Immigration had two significant consequences for 
labour relations. Firstly, men brought with them their previous union experience to the colony 
and subsequently could organise and form trade unions and secondly, employers had a 
guaranteed labour supply, thereby enabling them to reduce labour power and decrease wages 
and conditions.145 
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Due to the nature of the electoral system, capitalists were able to dominate colonial 
legislatures and further their own interests. While the 1860 NSW Colonial Government had 
extended the franchise, it still excluded certain groups: women and transient workers. 
Moreover, the system largely favoured capitalists as electoral boundaries were biased against 
voters in working class suburbs and plural voting allowed individuals with property in several 
electorates to vote in each constituency. Subsequently, by 1885 capitalists from mining, 
commerce and manufacturing held almost half the seats in the NSW Legislative Assembly. 
As Patmore, Buckley and Wheelwright argue, under this system the interests of the working 
class went unheard and parliamentary politics focused on temporary factions and 
personalities rather than disciplined parties.146 
In an effort to represent the working class interest, trade unions engaged in a number of 
strategies so as to have their voice heard in parliament. One strategy involved the use of an 
unofficial Labour spokesmen, this person would often be a current or former trade unionist. 
The most notable example being William Francis Schey, secretary of the Amalgamated 
Railway and Tramway Service Association, who in 1887 won a seat in the NSW Legislative 
Assembly and later became Chief NSW Labour Commissioner in1900 and Director of the 
NSW Labour Bureau in 1905. He actively campaigned on labour related issues including the 
establishment of a public employment service. Other strategies included organised 
deputations, public meetings and petitioning Members of Parliament. Following the 1884 
Intercolonial Trade Union Congress, Trade and Labour Councils also adopted a proposal for 
parliamentary committees. These committees lobbied Government over particular pieces of 
legislation.147  
The state was also the major employer of the time. Following the advent of responsible 
government, ministers directly ran government departments and state enterprises. 
Subsequently, political patronage became a serious problem of the period. Patmore cites an 
example of a traffic manager on the NSW Government Railways who claimed that political 
interference made it impossible to discipline his staff. Financial constraints in the 1880s 
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forced Colonial Governments to create independent statutory authorities to curb the excess 
staffing and inefficiencies caused by patronage.148  
The political period of the late nineteenth century was precarious in nature. Before the advent 
of strict political party lines, a range of leaders gained power often through tenuous 
coalitions. As Macintyre explains, the ‘leaders themselves were seen as artful, theatrical and 
above all resilient - none more so than Sir Henry Parkes, five times Premier between 1872 
and 1891who arrived as a young English radical and ended as arch-opportunist Sir Enry’.149 
However, as Loveday and Martin argue, colonial politics need to be understood in terms of 
factions, pragmatic politics and the competition of power. Parkes political success can 
certainly be seen in these terms.150  
As a self made man, Parkes was guided by the prevailing classical economic ideology of the 
time. In line with this and his Protestant faith, Parkes drew his political support from the 
predominantly Protestant Free Trader factions in the Parliament. In terms of his political 
pragmatism however, as Cochrane argues, while sectarianism for Parkes was never far from 
the surface, he would largely subordinate his Protestant faith to the cause of parliamentary 
liberty. As the following discussion on the Casual Labour Board will demonstrate, Parkes’s 
political pragmatism was indeed never far from the surface.151  
Origins and Members of the Casual Labour Board  
The 1886 minor recession led to a period of high unemployment and industrial distress in 
NSW. In an attempt to relieve this distress, the NSW Colonial Government undertook a series 
of actions designed to assist the unemployed.  In 1886 the Government established a State 
Soup kitchen in Hyde Park Barracks, Sydney. Further action included the provision of free 
rations to men engaged on relief works.152 
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“deputation after deputation … a dirty rabble who were first relieved by soup tickets and the 
establishment of kitchen at Hyde park Barracks” 153 
This statement by Cricket Walker, Principal Under Secretary of the Colonial Secretary’s 
Department, indicates the prevailing pressure placed by the unemployed on the NSW 
Government. He went on to claim that “the unemployed caused a great deal of work and 
trouble”154 alluding to the regular use of police involvement to quell the riots and deputations 
of the unemployed.155 
Faced with such political pressure, Parkes established the Casual Labour Board on 2 May 
1887, as an attempt to provide what was called ‘practical political action’ for the industrial 
distress of the time. It was claimed that ‘the Government established the Casual Labour 
Board for the purpose of relieving unemployment by the provision of work, which was 
almost entirely relief work’.156 Previously, the organisation and distribution of relief work 
was under the control of the Colonial Secretary’s Department.157   
The Casual Labour Board was not an outcome of an Act of Parliament. Its authority and 
jurisdiction was outlined in a letter by Parkes to the newly appointed members of the Casual 
Labour Board: John Davis, Frederick Wells, and David Houison. Both Frederick Wells, who 
was Assistant Engineer in the Roads and Bridges Department, and David Houison, who was 
District Engineer in the Harbour and Rivers Department, were employed in the Public 
Service. John Davies had until January 1887, held public office as a Member of the NSW 
Legislative Assembly.158 
Upon receipt of the letter from Parkes, Davies, Wells and Houison held a formal meeting 
electing Davies as Chairman of the Casual Labour Board, thereby investing him with the 
executive work of the Department. Wells and Houison did not actively engage in the day to 
day working of the Casual Labour Board, as they held important positions in the Roads and 
Bridges and the Harbours and Rivers Department. It appears that they provided a more 
consultative role, but in most other matters, they appeared to have mainly relied on Davies. 
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However, when their concurrence or signature was necessary or desirable, it appears to have 
been given without much inquiry. Davies, on the other hand, assumed the active management 
of the Casual Labour Board.159 
While is difficult to determine the depth of the relationship between Parkes, Wells and 
Houisin, it could be argued that through their respective positions in the Public Service 
Parkes had gained an understanding of both their characters and valued their previous 
departmental experiences in the provision of relief works. John Davies, on the other hand, 
had personally been known to Parkes for twenty years, a fact that would latter come to haunt 
Parkes and in part, led to the termination of the Casual Labour Board.160  
By the late 1880s Davies had gained considerable experience in both the public and private 
sector. Like Parkes, Davies came from humble beginnings starting out as an ironmonger, later 
setting up a business in York St, Sydney in 1864. However, he soon became politically 
active, after renouncing his Catholicism to become a Protestant in April 1861. In 1864 he was 
elected president of the Protestant Friendly Society. In this position, Davies an avid and 
outspoken teetotaller rallied the political temperance fraternities in the 1860s and 1870s to 
become a significant political organizer. His influence was seen as he garnered Protestant 
support for the election of thee James Martin's NSW Government Ministry 1863-1865 and 
later for the Martin-Parkes NSW Government Ministry 1866-1868.161  
Davies’s own political career began when he was elected as a Member of the NSW 
Legislative Assembly 8 December 1874 – 28 January 1887. During this time he was 
appointed whip for the Parkes-Robertson Colonial Government 1878-1883 coalition. Later 
whilst employed as the Chairman of the Casual Labour Board, Parkes appointed Davies to 
the NSW Legislative Council in February 1888.162  
During the later Parliamentary Select Committee Inquiry into the Casual Labour Board, many 
questions were raised about the nature of the relationship between Parkes and Davies. In an 
effort to distance himself from Davies, Parkes rebuked claims that they were close. Instead he 
stated that while he had known Davies for twenty years and was in frequent communication 
with him, he found him to be “at different times ... amongst the bitterest of my political 
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opponents”.163 Yet, both Parkes and Davies relied on the Protestant-Free Trade factions for 
their political support. It could be argued that upon losing his seat in the NSW Legislative 
Assembly in January 1887, Parkes patronage led him to bestow upon him the position at the 
Casual Labour Board, and shortly thereafter he was further rewarded with an appointment to 
the NSW Legislative Council in February 1888. Despite Parkes claims, it appears more likely 
that they were close and had at times been political allies. Furthermore, it is possible to 
assume that the political patronage Parkes bestowed on Davies may have been in return for 
previous political favours or to garner future parliamentary support.164 
Operations of the Casual Labour Board 
In outlining his vision for the Casual Labour Board Parkes stated, “The chief objective ..., is 
to draft the men off in parties of 400-600 to permanent work where their labour maybe of 
value to the country, and from which they may be gradually absorbed (or, at least a portion of 
them) by private employers.”165 It is clear that Parkes was seeking to use the Casual Labour 
Board as a labour market intermediary so as to disperse the unemployed across NSW, but 
also as a means of control, so as to minimise the very public and vocal demonstrations of the 
unemployed against the Government in Sydney. 
The Casual Labour Board was located at 426 Pitt Street, Sydney, near Hyde Park Barracks, 
where the soup kitchen was located, and the unemployed regularly gathered, seeking relief 
work. In an attempt to create an integrated public employment system, Parkes wanted the 
office in Pitt St Sydney to be in regular communication with local authorities, notably local 
policeman, in the principal country districts, so as to obtain information on employment 
vacancies and labour market shortages. This information was to be used to assist in the 
transportation of men to areas of labour shortage.166  
The Casual Labour Board was charged with creating what Parkes called a ‘proper register’167, 
to be placed in charge of a ‘careful and trustworthy person.’168 Parkes had concerns over the 
highly sensitive nature of the registry information and the possible fraudulent use of such 
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information and believed that Davis was the right man for the position. When later defending 
his choice of Davies he stated he “had formed the opinion ... that he was the best qualified 
man within my knowledge to take charge of the works carried on by these unemployed 
persons”.169 However, Davies’s previous employment does not indicate any experience in 
recruitment or dealing with the unemployed.170 
The mediation procedure of administrative matching was adopted with registered job seekers 
matched with registered vacancies. As Table 3.1 below indicates, the registration process 
required the applicant to provide both personnel and employment information. Due to the 
industrial distress of the time, residency and marital status were considered. Parkes decreed 
that preference for work was also to be given to local NSW men of good character, especially 
those who were married and with dependents. On 6 May 1887, in a further attempt to assist 
married men with dependents, Parkes announced that the men engaged in work in rural or 
remote locations would also be given weekly rail passes to return to their families.171  
Name in full   
Address   
Trade or calling   
Age   
Nationality   
Married or Single - If married number and ages of children   
Date of arrival in the Colony   
Where from   
How long unemployed   
Name of last employer   
Substance or any certificate of character  
Table 3.1 Registration Information172 
Despite Parkes’s requirements that vacancies be awarded upon the outlined criteria there 
appear to be evidence that this did not always occur. There appears to be evidence that in 
seeking to placate some of Parkes’s strongest critics, preferential treatment was given to those 
most vocal and well known. One such example was the employment of George Marshall 
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Johnson, a former leader of the unemployed, who was promptly employed as a storeman for 
the newly established Casual Labour Board.173 
The Casual Labour Board under Davies adopted a harsh no nonsense approach in their 
assistance to the unemployed. Davies was emphatic that the register was updated regularly to 
ensure that if any of the registered men had been allocated with work which they 
subsequently refused, then all future aid and relief was withdrawn. To reiterate this, when six 
men failed to attend the railway for relief work at Stoney Creek, near Mudgee, Davies 
adopted a fire and brimstone approach, publicly denouncing the men’s actions in the Sydney 
Morning Herald, where he claimed that the details of those who failed to show had been 
recorded and subsequent applications be ‘opposed absolutely’.174  
Government Relief Work 
From the outset the Casual Labour Board faced an uncertain and increasingly difficult future. 
Armed with the task of finding employment in a small and depressed economy with a limited 
industrial base, the Casual Labour Board relied heavily on the Government’s ability to 
provide relief work. In response to the prevailing pressures, Parkes announced on 11 May 
1887 the starting of a number of relief works: sewerage works in Sydney, employing 500-600 
men, and the construction of water tanks in the Dubbo district, Hay District, Cobar district, 
Wilcannia district and Narrabri district employing 500-600 men and other smaller scale 
projects. Total employment for these relief works being 2,580.175  
On the 12 May 1887 it was reported in the Sydney Morning Herald that the Casual Labour 
Board had also sent many men to works outside of Sydney. A large number of men had been 
sent to the National Park in Southern Sydney, where it is claimed that the men were properly 
housed, and the camp was visited twice a week by a Government medical officer. In 
anticipation of further work at the National Park, 209 men registered that day at the Casual 
Labour Board.176 
By late May 1887, with over 2,700 men being sent to work in both Sydney and across NSW, 
registrations at the Casual Labour Board slowed down significantly. It was believed that 
many unemployed labourers were hoping to remain in Sydney, as they expected a further 
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announcement of Government contracts, which many believed would absorb the surplus 
labour. Despite this, the Casual Labour Board announced that the bulk of the forthcoming 
employment vacancies would be in rural NSW, most notably in the National Park. In an 
effort to encourage the remaining unemployed in Sydney to register at the Casual Labour 
Board, it was announced that a schedule, drawn from the register, would soon be appearing 
detailing the names, ages, trades and qualifications of those who could apply for the 
forthcoming employment.177 
Beyond Government initiated relief works ,the Colonial Government also encouraged and 
sponsored local government relief projects. On the 21 April 1887, Parkes announced the 
intention of the Government to subsidise half of the wages the municipalities agreed to pay. 
In accordance with such agreements the Casual Labour Board in May 1887 sent men to the 
Parramatta district where extra works had been commissioned. Men were also reported to 
have been sent to assist in the municipality of Alexandria and a further 20 men were sent to 
Leichardt.178  
By June 1887, 4,210 men had been engaged on Government relief works at the following 
locations - National Park, Waterfall, Rookwood, Prince Alfred Hospital, Beecroft, 
Carlingford, the University of Sydney, and Gordon. While this largely absorbed most of the 
unskilled labour, skilled tradesmen were still struggling to find employment. In response, the 
Government announced further relief work projects and by the end of June 5,677 men were 
engaged on relief works.179  
By late July 1887, it was reported that a marked improvement had occurred in the labour 
market. In a report to Parkes, Davies claimed that the demand for both skilled and unskilled 
labour was increasing and men were leaving casual work for permanent employment. In 
response the Government announced in August 1887 the cessation of free rations to the 
unemployed. Furthermore, it was decided to scale back the relief work program and narrow 
down the operations of the Casual Labour Board. Subsequently, on 18 October 1887 only 
1,986 men were employed on government relief works: clearing crown land, making public 
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roads, improving the grounds at the Coast Hospital, Garden Island, Prince Alfred Hospital, 
the University of Sydney and the National Park.180  
Relief Work Location 
Northern Railway Line-  road making and 
clearing lands 
Rye 
Eastwood 
Carlingford 
Beecroft 
Hornsby 
Berowra 
The Southern line – road making and 
clearing lands 
Bankstown 
Rookwood 
Liverpool 
Eckersley 
Illawarra line – road making and clearing 
lands  
Unwins Bridge Road 
Peakhurst 
Great Illawarra Road 
Cook Park 
Kogarah 
Sutherland 
National Park 
 Heathcote 
Waterfall 
Cawley’s Creek 
Otford 
Bulgo 
Pearce’s Corner Line –road making and 
clearing lands 
Gordon 
Northern Beaches - Sewerage Works Johnson’s and White Creeks 
Northern Beaches –Road Making and 
clearing Lands 
Manly Beach 
French’s Forests 
Narrabeen 
Other Sydney Locations 
 
Forming Leichhardt Park 
Clearing Little Bay Hospital Reserve 
Improving Sydney University and Prince 
Alfred Grounds 
Table 3.2 Relief Works December 1888181 
By early 1888, with the reported continued improvement in the labour market, the role of the 
Casual Labour Board was reduced further. In March 1888, Parkes announced his intention to 
bring the relief works to a close as quickly as possible over the forthcoming two months. By 
this time, there were 1600 men still engaged on relief works: road making, clearing and 
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preparing for the subdivision of Crown Lands as well as drainage works. The relief works 
were predominantly around the Sydney basin at the following locations; Narrabeen, Hornsby,  
Gordon, Berowra, Beecroft, Ermington, Liverpool, French's Forest, Peakhurst, Illawarra, 
Bulgo , Waterfall, Wentworth, Cook Park (Botany), Bankstown, National Park Heathcote and 
Rookwood.182 
Despite Parkes announcement of the cessation of relief works it appears that they did 
continue during the tenure of the Casual Labour Board. An avid supporter of the relief works 
program, Davies claimed that the relief works were of “highly reproductive nature”.183 By the 
time the Casual Labour Board had been terminated in December 1888, 930 men were still 
employed on relief works at the locations outlined in Table 3.2. 184  
Private Employment 
The Casual Labour Board also actively pursued private employment opportunities in an 
attempt to assist capital development in the colony. In doing so, the Casual Labour Board 
forged links with most of the large private employers across in NSW. In response to 
applications received from employers in various portions of the colony, Davies adopted the 
procedure of a closed system of administrative matching: selecting men according to the 
employer’s requirements, while also assisting them further by supplying railway passes.185  
While there is no surviving record detailing the private employment engagements transacted 
during the period, there are, however, numerous accounts of the Casual Labour Board 
sending men into private employment. In May 1887 the Casual Labour Board supplied a 
contractor from Burrawang in Southern Highlands of NSW, with 40 men, while at the same 
time some temporary employment had also been found for men at Muswellbrook. A further 
example of private employment was also reported on the 13 October 1887, when the Casual 
Labour Board engaged and forwarded over 200 shearers at the highest rate of pay: 20 
Shillings per 100 sheep.186 
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By March 1888, it was reported that the Casual Labour Board had supplied private employers 
with 1772 men, many of whom had been transferred from relief works. Following the 
reduction in Government relief works, the Casual Labour Board focussed their energies on 
private employment opportunities. In the period from March 1888 to the closure of the 
Casual Labour Board in December 1888, it is estimated that a further 628 men were placed in 
private employment. 187 
Davies claimed that as Chairman of the Casual Labour Board, he actively pursued private 
employment vacancies. In doing so, he claims he travelled on average 500 miles per week 
working between 12 and 14 hours per day, writing to the ‘different benches in the country, to 
large employers, and to all centres where he thought employment could be afforded, and 
succeeded mainly by his own exertions, in drafting no less a number than 2,400 of these men 
into private employment.’188  Furthermore, Davies stated that he assisted a large number of 
men who had been engaged in temporary employment by finding them subsequent 
employment.189 
Registrations 
Who registered at the Casual Labour Board? Despite the limited data available, it is 
overwhelmingly clear that the largest proportion of men registered were unskilled labourers.  
In March 1888, after ten months of operation, it was reported that 7,690 men had registered 
with the Casual Labour Board, of these, over fifty seven per cent or 4,433 men were 
labourers. By November, a further 226 men had registered bring the total to 7916 men, of 
which 4,494 were labourers, accounting for fifty-six per cent of the total.190 
From the March 1888 data, it appears that the majority of men that registered were involved 
in industries that relied predominantly on seasonal and temporary labour (refer to table 3.3). 
Manufacturing produced the largest single industry grouping with 15.2 per cent, this included 
metal and non-metal manufacturing, food manufacturing, footwear and textiles 
manufacturing. These manufacturing sectors were highly susceptible to fluctuations in the 
domestic economy. As previously noted, despite the expansion of the building trades, skilled 
building workers often found themselves unemployed due to often intermittent and temporary 
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nature of the work. As a result building workers: Carpenters, Bricklayers, Plumbers, 
Galvanisers and Plasters together accounted for almost eight per cent of registrations. Further 
notable industries included transport (sea), mining and agriculture.191 
Industry Percentage 
Labourers 56% 
 Manufacturing 15.2% 
Building and Construction 7.9% 
Transport – Sea 5% 
Mining 3.6% 
Agriculture 1.4% 
Professionals 2.1% 
Administration 1.3% 
Repairs and Maintenance 1.8% 
Other 5.7 
Table 3.3 Casual Labour Board Registrations by Industry192 
Expenditure of the Casual Labour Board 
As the Casual Labour Board did not produce official reports, it is difficult to accurately 
estimate the total cost associated with the Government’s relief work program. However, 
numerous newspaper and parliamentary reports provide an insight into the overall income 
and expenditure of the Board. As the following will illustrate, these costs continued to spiral 
and were soon found to be unsustainable.193 
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On 9 June 1887 at the initial height of the Government relief work program, Parkes claimed 
that the total costs for wages and food for the first month of the Casual Labour Board was 
£14,780. By November 1887, with a vast improvement in the labour market and the 
subsequent scaling back of relief work projects, Parkes claimed that the expenditure of the 
Casual Labour Board had reduced to approximately £2,180 per week. By late November 
1887, it was reported that the overall costs associated with the relief works to that date was 
approximately £105,000 and the revenue raised from the sale of land cleared was £31,639. 
Therefore, for the first seven months of operation there was a net cost of £73,361.194  
Following the termination of the Casual Labour Board, it was claimed that total expenditure 
on Government relief works was £235,000, this included the Municipal Relief works. In 
justifying this expenditure, Davies claimed that the unemployed cleared 61,689 acres of 
suburban land, which was later sold at a profit of over 50 per cent. Furthermore, 358 miles of 
road were cleared and formed; 20 bridges, 83 culverts and 18 miles of side drains were cut.195   
Beyond the expenditure associated with relief works, the Casual Labour Board had further 
outgoings in relation to its own staff. While it is difficult to estimate the total staffing costs, 
there are some reports which provide some insight into the costs. The Casual Labour Board 
employed a paymaster and secretary, who were both paid £350 per annum, an assistant pay-
master and registrar at £250 per annum and two clerks at 6s per day. While it is known that a 
storeman was also employed, there are no details of his wages though it would be fair to 
assume that he would have received the same pay rate as the clerks, if not less.196  
In forming the Casual Labour Board Parkes had neglected to negotiate or agree to the 
payment to be given to its members: Davies, Houison and Wells. In fact it appears it had not 
been discussed until the Casual Labour Board’s termination. The Chairman, Davies requested 
payment only for the period prior to his appointment by Parkes in February 1888 to the NSW 
Legislative Council. While he did continue on as Chairman following this appointment, he 
regarded this as honorary service. For the period 2 May 1887 until 29 December 1887 he 
requested payment, which was granted, of £873 12s for 416 attendances at the Sydney office 
and for 22 days visiting relief works. Both Houison and Wells requested payment of £200, 
which was granted for the total period of operation, however, there appears to be no specific 
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details of their attendances. It is particularly interesting that Houison in the later 
Parliamentary Select Committee inquiry claimed that the board did not have regular 
meetings, in fact he goes further when he states the ‘board is almost a fiction’197 yet he still 
requested payment. Wells concurs with these sentiments by claiming that the infrequent 
meetings were short and no records are kept of them, yet both requested and accepted 
payment.198 
Criticisms of the Casual Labour Board 
Since its inception, the Casual Labour Board had been seen to be largely successful in easing 
the industrial distress of the time. During its existence the Casual Labour Board facilitated the 
absorption of a vast majority of unemployed on Government relief works (approximately 
5,600 men), while also placing a significant number of men in private employment 
(approximately 2,400). Despite these achievements it was not without its critics.  
While the newspapers of the day largely applauded the day to day work of the Casual Labour 
Board, there was one area that received considerable attention and criticism: wage rates. The 
Casual Labour Board initially fixed the rate of pay for relief work at 11s per day, and by June 
the rates had been reduced further to 8s.6d. per eight hour day, less rations. By late 1888, as 
the State’s finances dwindled further the rates were again reduced further to 3s.6d per day.199 
Regardless of these rates, the overwhelming majority of men were engaged on piece rates and 
received far less. In March 1888 150 men employed at Cook Park removing dry sand were 
paid between £6 and £7 per cubic yard, which equated to being paid between 3s and 4s per 
day. In June 1888 it was reported that men employed on government relief works: clearing 
crown land, making public roads, improving the grounds at the Coast Hospital, Garden 
Island, Prince Alfred Hospital, the University and the National Park were being paid piece 
work rates which equated to an average of 3s to 5s per day.  Many viewed piece rates as 
inherently unfair and unjust. However, in line with the prevailing classical economic 
                                                           
197
 Report of the Casual Labour Board, pp. 22. 
198
 NSWPP, Vol. 6, 1889, pp. 1255-1256, Vol. 42, 1889, pp. 5720; Casual Labour Board, pp. 22; SMH,  
8.1.1889, pp. 4.  
199
 SMH, 21.7.1887, pp. 3, 13.10.1887, pp. 4, 19.3.1888, pp. 4, 4.1.1889, pp. 4. 
 81  
 
ideology, Davies defended this system by arguing that it was just and fair as it rewarded those 
men who worked hard, and penalised ‘loafers’.200  
For men placed in private employment often the wage situation was worse. On one occasion 
it was reported that men engaged on contract work were receiving less than half the fixed 
rate: 4s per day. When challenged in Parliament over these rates, Parkes argued that the 
Government’s role was to act as a labour market intermediary, which did not include setting 
pay and conditions. He claimed, based upon his own neo-classical economic beliefs, that the 
market should determine the pay rates.201  
How did employers view the Casual Labour Board? Generally employers viewed the Casual 
Labour Board in a positive light as it provided them with a source of labour. However, some 
employers argued that the Government’s published relief rates had led many to leave private 
employment for the more lucrative relief work. In particular, some rural employers argued 
that the introduction of Government relief works in their local areas meant that they were 
often unable to obtain sufficient labour at what they considered reasonable wages.202  
How did the unemployed view the Casual Labour Board? Generally, the unemployed viewed 
the operations of the Casual Labour Board favourably as it provided them with an avenue for 
employment. However, there were some notable exceptions. Country labourer’s who had 
previously enjoyed a strong bargaining position in areas of labour shortage, soon protested 
over the increased supply of labour to their areas, which undermined their bargaining position 
in negotiating wages and conditions. Men also formed temporary combination protesting over 
wages rates, however, the Government was generally reluctant to concede to their demands. 
At Shea’s Creek, men went on strike demanding better pay and conditions. In response, and 
in line with the prevailing ideology, Bruce Smith, Minister for Public Works dismissed the 
workers and engaged contractors to carry out the works. In Sydney there continued to be 
small group of dissidents who protested over the piecework rates and low wages being 
offered on relief works. This group of 332 men who had refused to accept the work offered, 
continued to agitate and formed deputations upon Parliament. In response, both Davies and 
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the Government publicly branded these men work-shy troublemakers and refused further 
assistance.203  
Another area that received notable criticism, by both the unemployed and the Government, 
was the origins of the men registering for assistance, particularly in relation to relief works. It 
was claimed that men were coming from other colonies to take advantage of the Government 
relief works. It was reported that in June 1887, of the 3,751 men registered, 300 were new 
arrivals from England, while 840 men were from other colonies; 313 from Victoria, 224 from 
New Zealand, 169 from Queensland, and 82 from South Australia. By November 1888, the 
figures had increased with 813 coming from Victoria, 524 from Queensland and 603 from 
New Zealand. In reaction to this, there were many calls for the allocation of work to be based 
on residency. In response, Davies reiterated that residency was taken into account in the 
allocation of work.204  
The conduct of those on engaged relief works was also an area of concern. During the term of 
the Casual Labour Board, Davies was responsible for nearly 8,000 men and while in most 
cases their conduct was overwhelmingly reported to have been highly satisfactory, there were 
instances of misconduct. It was reported that 426 men had been dismissed from relief works 
for drunkenness, general misconduct and disinclination to work. Another report claims that 
the men involved in clearing Centennial Park and Pittwater were destroying the natural flora 
and fauna.205 
A further source of concern was the actual nature of the relief works themselves. While it was 
widely claimed that the work of men engaged on relief works was of ‘solid value to the 
state’,206 others believed that the Government was wasting money on unnecessary projects, 
such as clearing the National Park, which many believed did not benefit society. It was 
argued that the relief works should be focussed on necessary state infrastructure such as 
railways, roads, water tanks for rural areas and hospitals for Sydney. In response, Parkes 
claimed that such projects would require considerable borrowings, which the Colony being in 
considerable debt was unable to obtain.207  
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Towards the later part of 1888, the management of the Casual Labour Board, and in 
particular Davies, came under considerable scrutiny and criticism. Allegations of fraud, 
corruption and misappropriation of funds resulted in a Parliamentary Select Committee 
inquiry into the operations of the Casual Labour Board. In March 1889 the Parliamentary 
Select Committee of Inquiry investigated the operations of the Casual Labour Board on the 
basis of two serious allegations: improper expenditure on the improvement of private roads at 
Holt-Hornsby Sutherland Estate, (now known as Sylvania, a suburb in southern Sydney) and 
the misappropriation of funds by Davies.208  
It was alleged that the Casual Labour Board engaged the unemployed to construct private 
roads on the Holt-Hornsby Estate at the cost of £50,000 for the benefit of private citizens. 
John Burns who was the Colonial Treasurer, George Withers MLA, and Frank Smith MLA, 
both known supporters of Parkes, were the owners of these properties and beneficiaries of the 
newly created private roads.  The allegation was that under the guise of relief works the 
properties owned by Burns, Withers and Smith had gained significant benefit in terms of land 
value and access from the ‘10 or 11 miles of roads that had been perfectly formed, cleared, 
ballasted and gravelled.’209  
Both the members of the Casual Labour Board and the property owners vehemently opposed 
the allegation of corruption and collusion. In response Davies, Housin and Wells claimed, 
that until confronted with these allegations, they were actually unaware of the ownership of 
the properties. Furthermore, they state that they did not receive any instructions or undue 
influence from Burns, Withers or Smith. The owners of the properties concurred with these 
statements and claimed that they did not have any meetings to discuss the works. While the 
members of the Casual Labour Board stated that they assumed that owners of properties in 
the area would benefit from the planned road project, they argued it was necessary work so as 
to gain access to crown lands for later sale. In a later gesture of goodwill, or it could be 
argued as a means to reduce the political damage to his reputation, Burns donated the 
adjourning land to the newly built roads to the Colony.210  
When questioned over who authorised this work, the members of the Casual Labour Board 
appear to become quite evasive, responding that as men were already working on the 
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Hornsby estates they did not need further permission from the Colonial Secretary. It is 
interesting to note that despite the implicit relationship between Parkes and the owners and 
the considerable gains achieved by these men, the Parliamentary Select Committee Inquiry 
appears to accept the explanation offered by the members of the Casual Labour Board of road 
necessity. In fact they appear to be far more concerned with allegations of fraud against 
Davies.211 
The second allegation of fraud concerned John Davies. During the Casual Labour Board’s 
tenure, the inquiry found that Davies exercised the important duties of the Board, ‘acting in 
many instances, and in matters involving considerable expenditure on his own sole 
authority.’212 Following an audit of the Casual Labour Board’ s accounts the Parliamentary 
Select Committee of inquiry found ‘grounds for belief that at least a grave irregularity 
implicating Davies had been committed.’213 An investigation of the books revealed that three 
cheques from the sale of firewood were paid into Davies personal account. Anomalies also 
arose over the names on the cheques as they were made in favour of T.S Hinchcliff 
(Secretary and Paymaster of the Casual Labour Board) for £52 3s 1d on 26 September 1887, 
E.M Burrows (Superintendent of the National Park Relief Works) on 19 July 1887 for £33 3s 
2d and Burrows on 16 May 1887 for £26 17s 7d.214 
In his defence Davies, claimed that he had cashed the cheques and was “holding the moneys 
in hand,”215  as Treasury did not accept cheques from tradesmen and placed the sums 
equivalent in the office safe for the payment of wages.216 A subsequent investigation into 
Davies personal accounts found that he had neither cashed these cheques nor withdrawn the 
exact sums. However, it appears that following the announcement of this inquiry, Davies 
repaid the amounts of two cheques: £52 3s 1d on 15 February, 1889 and £33 3s 2d on 29 
March, 1889.217 In response to the retention of £26 17s 7d Davies stated that it was not fraud, 
instead “it was merely a clerical error/oversight on his behalf”218 for which when brought to 
his attention he subsequently repaid.219 
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Despite finding these irregularities, and upon advice from their lawyers, the Parliamentary 
Select Committee inquiry did not pursue criminal charges against Davies. It was claimed that 
pursuing any charges would be both costly and unsuccessful. However, some Members of 
Parliament were particularly aggrieved by this outcome most notably George Dibbs, Leader 
of the Opposition, who criticised the Government and argued that the Commission had failed 
to ‘bring Davies to justice.’220 He believed the fault lay with the Government’s appointed 
legal counsel, implying Parkes was in some way involved in protecting Davies. He claimed 
that Davies had employed the “ablest criminal lawyer in the colony”221 while the Government 
engaged a “gentleman who, though an able common-law lawyer, was unheard of criminal 
matters. He claims that had they employed the counsel they ought to have they would have 
secured a conviction.”222 
During the Parliamentary Select Committee inquiry there were numerous personal attacks on 
Davies apparent ‘notoriously shady character.’223 In an attempt to discredit Davies, Hon John 
Kidd MP and William Crick MP cited numerous scandals. They claimed in his previous work 
in relation to the NSW Exhibition that it was found he had awarded the tender not to the 
highest bidder but to a gentleman who had given him a diamond ring. They also cite a further 
example, aptly named the Coonanbara Hats scandal, where it was alleged Davies received 
payment for three hats but did not supply the goods to the customer. In relation to the 
Coonanbara Hats scandal, no evidence was produced to substantiate this allegation.224 
Not surprisingly, both Parkes and Davies found fault with the Parliamentary Select 
Committee inquiry. Davies argued that the Parliamentary Select Committee demonstrated 
injustice and partiality in its proceedings, as it would not allow a representative from the 
Board to be present when evidence was being given to the inquiry.225 Parkes claimed that the 
Parliamentary Select Committee was a political witch-hunt with Davies as its target, and that 
‘the report is not worth the paper it is written on.’226 Furthermore, in defending Davies he 
states “I do not go into the very foolish, the very irregular, and the very reprehensible acts of 
paying those three cheques into his accounts; but I do not believe he ever paid them into his 
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private account with the intention to defraud the Government.”227  Despite such glaring 
evidence against Davies, it is reasonable to assume Parkes continued loyalty demonstrates the 
true strength of their relationship.228  
The Termination of the Casual Labour Board 
After eighteen months of operation, Parkes terminated the Casual Labour Board on 29th 
December 1888. It is interesting to note that the Parliamentary Select Committee Inquiry was 
announced one week prior to the termination of the Casual Labour Board.229  
 In an effort to distance himself from the allegations and the politically sensitive nature of the 
impending Parliamentary Select Committee report, Parkes was quick to terminate the Casual 
Labour Board. He argued that while the Casual Labour Board had done their best to direct the 
unemployed to the best advantage it was no longer in the public interest. He claimed that the 
expenditure on the relief works had gone beyond what was originally intended and had 
become a serious drain on public revenue. Furthermore, he stated that the relief works had 
brought ‘a certain class of men from other colonies’230 which had worsened the labour market 
situation.231  
This was clearly a period of heightened political pressure for Parkes. In addition to the 
Parliamentary Select Committee Inquiry into the operations of the Casual Labour Board, 
Parkes also faced increasing political pressure over his recent appointment of W.M. Fehon to 
the NSW Board of Railway Commissioners. Fehon was also facing corruption allegations. 
Parkes resigned as Premier on 16 January 1889 and George Richard Dibbs formed 
Government. Despite Parkes earlier announcement of the Casual Labour Board’s termination, 
Dibbs again announced its termination citing the evidence from the Parliamentary Select 
Committee concerning the misappropriation of funds to justify its closure. Clearly the Casual 
Labour Board became a political thorn in Parkes’ side and despite his initial intentions for 
labour market reform he was ultimately guided by his political pragmatism.232  
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Conclusion 
While Coghlan, Reeves and Endres and Cook have claimed that the Government Labour 
Bureau was the earliest public employment service in NSW, it had a predecessor: the Casual 
Labour Board. Established on 2 May 1887, the Casual Labour Board was the first attempt to 
provide a public employment service in NSW. Faced with high unemployment, unemployed 
deputations and industrial unrest, Premier Parkes, ever the political pragmatist, established 
the Casual Labour Board as an attempt to alleviate the recurring problem of 
unemployment.233  
In a period of cyclical unemployment, Parkes established the Casual Labour Board as an 
attempt to regulate the unemployed and organise the labour market. In doing so, the NSW 
labour market went from being characterised as a true market system to a co-existence system 
with the public employment service adopting the mediation procedure of a closed system of 
administrative matching. In line with previous findings, the Casual Labour Board provides an 
interesting and compelling example of how a public employment service can contribute to the 
organisation of the labour market. During its eighteen months of operations, the Casual 
Labour Board was largely successful in placing nearly 8,000 men in employment, of which 
approximately thirty per cent were placed in private employment.  In an economy with a 
limited industrial base this was quite an achievement and demonstrates a genuine need for an 
employment service.234 
However, the Casual Labour Board was largely born out of political necessity and failed to 
receive adequate long-term support. Ultimately, it was undermined by a number of politically 
sensitive factors: the unsustainable costs associated with the Government relief works; 
political patronage; and allegations of corruption and fraud concerning the operations of the 
Casual Labour Board. Faced with increasing political pressure and following the 
announcement of the impending Parliamentary Select Committee inquiry, Parkes terminated 
the Casual Labour Board on 29 December 1888. Ultimately the Casual Labour Board was a 
short-term political solution for a long-term problem.235  
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While Beveridge and the neoclassical and Keynesian economist’s analysis of public 
employment services have focussed on predetermined economic modelling, this example 
provides further support for the institutional economic approach. For example, Nurick argued 
that the early Labour Bureaus were set up as a temporary response to unemployment 
however; this fails to take into account other variables. In this case the origins, effects and the 
ultimate demise of the Casual Labour Board were shaped by a number of socio-economic and 
political concerns. The socio-economic concerns of the unemployed coupled with political 
pressure led to the introduction of the Casual Labour Board. In terms of its operation, the 
Casual Labour Board’s functions were similar to those cited by Reeves and Coghlan in 
reference to the operations of the Government Labour Bureau. The functions being three-
fold; relieve the distress of the unemployed; act as a channel through which labour passes 
into government employ and provide private employers with an avenue to engage labour in a 
bid to support capital development. Ultimately, it was the precarious financial situation of the 
state and political problems that ultimately led to its termination.236 
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Chapter 4 Government Labour Bureau 
Introduction 
As demonstrated in the previous chapter there has been much conjecture in the literature over 
the early Labour Bureaus in NSW. Reeves, Endres and Cook claimed that the first labour 
bureau was established in NSW in 1892, while Coghlan stated it was established 1894. 
However, the labour bureau that they were referring to was the Government Labour Bureau 
established by the Dibbs Government on 18 February 1892.237  
In a period of cyclical unemployment and spiralling economic depression, coupled with 
increasing state debt, the Dibbs Government established the Government Labour Bureau in a 
bid to assist the unemployed and support capital development. Financially unable to provide 
relief works and facing an increasing hostile electorate, the Dibbs Government was 
compelled to act. While Coghlan has argued that the impetus for the creation of a labour 
bureau came mainly from the trade union movement, it is argued that it was coalitions of the 
unemployed and Labor MPs who drove the agenda. The Labor MPs were concerned by the 
growing industrial distress and the increasing prevalence of abuses perpetrated by private 
registry offices on the unemployed. In terms of the labour bureau structure, the advocates 
were largely influenced by the New Zealand Labour Bureau system.238 
The Government Labour Bureau operated as a labour market intermediary in a free co-
existence system for over eight years before it was transferred to the control of the Labour 
Commissioners of NSW on 13 September 1900. The Government Labour Bureau was 
initially designed to be a straight forward metropolitan labour bureau - registering the 
unemployed, gathering labour market information, and selecting persons for relief work and 
private employment. However, as Endres and Cook have noted, during the early years it also 
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acted as a ‘charitable institution’239 providing shelter and distributing rations to the 
unemployed and their families. 240   
In 1893 a Select Committee was appointed to investigate the operations of the Government 
Labour Bureau. Following this inquiry, the operations of the Government Labour Bureau was 
dramatically expanded to include forty two rural branches and agencies, as well as the 
responsibility and management of other labour market schemes: state farms, village 
settlements and gold fossicking. While Endres and Cook have been critical of the 
Government Labour Bureau’s operations, claiming it only underwent cosmetic change and 
failed to develop innovative labour market programs, this chapter will demonstrate that these 
changes were quite progressive and innovative for that period of time.241  
While Coghlan and Nurick had argued it was only a temporary measure to organise the 
labour market and lacked the state’s long-term commitment, this chapter will demonstrate 
that the state did maintain a commitment to the problem of unemployment and in fact 
expanded labour market programs. However, it is important to note that the state’s approach 
to labour market programs was largely curtailed by its own financial situation, and not its 
lack of commitment. The Government Labour Bureau only ceased to operate in name and not 
in function, as public employment services continued to operate in NSW until World War II 
under subsequent names. Following the Government Labour Bureau it became the NSW 
Labour Commission with two Labour Bureaus operating in Sydney from 1901.242 
This chapter will begin by examining the economic, industrial and political conditions in 
NSW during the period of the Government Labour Bureau 1892-1901.  In light of this 
discussion, the origins of the Government Labour Bureau will be analysed. The discussion 
will then focus on the operations of the Government Labour Bureau. Finally, the criticisms, 
problems and reasons for its eventual termination will be analysed.  
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Economic and Industrial Context 
The 1890s were a period of economic and industrial crisis, yet despite this uncertainty NSW 
continued to experience significant population growth. Between 1891 and 1901 the 
population of NSW increased by almost twenty per cent from 1,132,234 in 1891 to 1,354,864 
in 1901. In the Sydney metropolitan area the population increased 26 per cent from 380,193 
in 1891 to 481,830 in 1901. With the economic shift towards urban industries such as 
manufacturing and building there was continued migration to urban centres and by 1891, 66 
per cent of the NSW population were residing in cities or towns. Immigration, which had 
previously been an important source of population growth, came to a halt from 1891 and 
during the following decade it attributed to a net increase of only 7,000 people.243  
Unlike the long economic boom, which began with the gold rushes of the 1850s, the 1890s 
represented a period of unprecedented economic crisis. As Buckley and Wheelwright argue, 
the seeds of the terrible depression of the 1890s were sown in the preceding boom. During 
the 1880s NSW relied heavily on foreign investment, predominantly from Britain for capital 
development. However, by 1891 problems were emerging in the form of distortions in the 
structure of the domestic economy and the lack of balance was associated with the flood of 
capital from overseas. By 1890 the cost of servicing public debt was crippling at forty per 
cent of export earnings. In net figures, the cost of public debt increased considerably from 
£16,924,019 in 1881 to £52,950,733 in 1891 and by 1900 had reached £65,332,993.244  
The structural problems in the economy were further compounded by the British banking 
crisis which resulted in major Australian banks either collapsing or suspending trade. After 
the London money market learned in 1890 that defaults by several South American 
Governments were jeopardising Barings, a leading merchant bank, and it refused new loans 
to Australia. By May 1893 most of the country’s banks had suspended business, plunging 
commerce and industry into chaos. Most local banks collapsed costing many depositors their 
funds.245  
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NSW suffered a severe economic depression from 1891 to 1896. During this time 
unemployment and poverty soared, government tax revenues collapsed and public works 
projects were abandoned. Between 1891 and 1895 the economy shrank by thirty per cent. 
Macintyre claims that unemployment reached thirty per cent of skilled labour in 1893. 
Among the unskilled, the proportion of unemployed was higher but as the later discussion 
will illustrate, no statistics were kept, as there was no systematic provision for their 
collection. Economic recovery was hindered further by a series of droughts between 1895 and 
1903. The long droughts crippled the rural industries upon which the NSW economy was 
precariously balanced.246 
Pastoralism, which had been a key area of economic growth, became crisis ridden by the late 
1880s. Pastoralists faced falling wool prices, increasing shearing costs, overstocking, rabbit 
plagues and the logistical challenges from expansion into arid areas. The depression and the 
lack of available credit compounded the problems and had devastating effects on landholders. 
After the depression came the drought. From 1895 to 1903 a run of dry years parched the 
most heavily populated eastern half of the continent. The land was already under the pressure 
from heavy grazing and repeated cropping. In terms of employment, shearers suffered 
significant wage reductions and the drastic reduction of flocks meant a long-term loss of 
employment opportunities.247 
The mining industry in NSW underwent a number of significant changes during the late 
1880s. Following the development of mining operations at Broken Hill with the 
establishment of the Broken Hill Propriety Company (BHP) in 1885, NSW emerged as a 
major producer of silver and lead. As Markey argues the establishment of BHP heralded a 
new era in social and industrial relations in mining. BHP’s operations were unlike anything 
ever seen before in Australia, with a high level of capitalisation, incredible richness of mines, 
cutting edge technological development, astronomical profits, heavy share speculation and 
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sophisticated management practices. Consequently, Broken Hill experienced significant 
population growth from 6,000 in 1887 to 26,700 in 1899. Broken Hill’s workforce became 
the third largest in NSW after the railways and the coal mines, although it fluctuated 
considerably. At its peak in the 1890s it was about 7,000 but in 1894 fell to less than 4,000.248 
Despite BHP’s early success, they were also affected by the economic problems of the 
period. In 1892 world silver and lead prices fell markedly, later stabilising at a lower level in 
1894. The decreased price coincided with both the financial crisis and with the increasing 
problems in extracting metals and ore consequently there were reduced metal mining 
operations between 1894 and 1898. In response BHP increased productivity and cut costs 
through the introduction of new technology, a reduction of labour costs and the 
intensification of workloads. To achieve these efficiencies in 1892 BHP reneged on a 
previous agreement with the Amalgamated Miners' Association, which led to one of the 
largest and bitterest strikes in the colony, ending in the miners defeat. Six years of high 
unemployment followed the strike. Markey noted that many unemployed left Broken Hill for 
South Australia in the 1890s, aided by rail passes supplied by the NSW Labour Bureau.249 
Miners throughout the colony were adversely affected by the economic depression of the 
1890s. Miners experienced very high levels of unemployment and significant wage 
reductions. In coal mining, irregularity of employment and fluctuations in wage rates were 
common in the 1890s. In gold-mining the proportion of the workforce fell from almost two-
thirds to one-half between 1881 and 1891. While metal mining employed a large migratory 
workforce that fluctuated between 11,000 and 18,500 in the 1880s and between 21,000 and 
31,000 in the 1890s, it was also faced high levels of unemployment and wage reductions.250 
By 1890 excess capacity had become a feature of the building industry in the sense that the 
provision of dwellings had out-run capacity of people to buy or rent them. The building boom 
of the 1880s was initially based on a real social need. However, while the population of NSW 
grew by 50 per cent between 1881 and 1891, the number of dwellings grew by sixty-eight per 
cent. This excess capacity and financial crisis had a debilitating affect on the building 
industry and its workforce during the 1890s.251 
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Manufacturing continued to experience growth during this period. However, as had been the 
case in the previous period the manufacturing sector continued to serve domestic needs rather 
than export. The rate of growth of manufacturing from 1861 to 1890 (8.4 per cent per annum) 
was second only to railways, ahead of the construction and pastoral industries (6.7 per cent 
per annum each). In the 1890s manufacturing investment remained attractive, despite a 
reduction in colonial capital formation as a whole. From 1881 to 1901 the manufacturing 
workforce increased by 112 per cent. In the 1880s the manufacturing workforce grew by 48 
per cent. However, the growth rate dropped to 43 per cent in the 1890s, but as Markey argues 
this figure is impressive given the loss of 7,000 jobs from the manufacturing workforce 
during the trough of the depression in 1891-1894.252 
The manufacturing workforce underwent significant changes during the 1890s. In Sydney, 
the metropolitan proportion of factory employment grew from 57 to 64 per cent from 1881 to 
1901. The building and building materials sector were the only industries whose workforce 
markedly decreased. The workforce of all other manufacturing industries significantly 
increased as a proportion of the total manufacturing workforce. Food and drink increased by 
34 per cent or 14 per cent of the total increase in the manufacturing workforce, metals and 
machinery by 26 per cent or 16 per cent of the total increase, and clothing by a remarkable 87 
per cent, or 37 per cent of the total manufacturing increase. The female proportion of the 
workforce grew from 15.7 per cent to 19 per cent between 1881 and 1891. A high proportion 
of female manufacturing employment was concentrated in Sydney and by 1891 females 
represented almost 24 per cent of the total manufacturing workforce.253 
Economic uncertainty coupled with declining profits forced manufacturers to reduce costs 
through technological change and productive reorganisation. Manufacturing was 
characterised by low capital, labour ratios, low productivity and relatively small industrial 
units. The productive re-organisation and increased capital requirements restricted the 
opportunities of the skilled workers. The relatively prosperous position of many skilled 
workers was eroded from the 1880s, often by technological change and by the 1890s it had 
accelerated.254  
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The turbulent economic conditions of the 1890s led many employers, particularly in 
manufacturing, mining and shearing, to seek efficiencies and cost savings through the 
introduction of new technology, productive reorganisation and harsher industrial relations 
strategies thereby culminating in a period of industrial turmoil.255 The misnamed Maritime 
Strike which began in late 1890 was the largest confrontation between unions and employers 
in nineteenth century Australia. The dispute arose from two sources: the maritime officers’ 
refusal to disaffiliate from the Melbourne Trades Hall and the wharf labourers’ secondary 
boycott of non-union wool. It spread to a wide variety of occupations including coal, metal 
miners, road transport workers, seaman and shearers. Between 40,000 and 50,000 workers, 
primarily in NSW, Queensland, South Australia and Victoria were involved. However, 
employers were well organised and due to the economic distress of the period there was 
sufficient surplus labour to fill the strikers place. The unprecedented extent of the strike 
alienated the middle class, who were concerned with maintaining law and order. The strike 
ended in a union defeat.256 
As Buckley and Wheelwright argue the maritime strike was a product of two converging 
forces: on the one hand rapid growth of trade unionism, assertive and buoyed by a confident 
expectation of continued gains; and on the other hand employer bodies were dismayed at the 
trade union advance and were intent on stopping it. Against the trade unions policy of ‘closed 
shop’ employers posed the principle of ‘freedom of contract’ by employing non-union labour. 
The resulting outbreak of industrial conflict and strike activity cemented a pattern of state 
intervention in industrial relations that prevailed throughout most of the twentieth century.257 
The strike had several effects on the labour movement. It raised class consciousness. Union 
affiliations to the trades and labour council in Sydney increased dramatically. It also 
strengthened the case for political action through a Labor party. Unionists accused the various 
colonial governments of assisting employers by providing police, special constables and even 
the military to protect strike breakers. In an attempt to redress the balance Labor 
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representatives attempted to win seats in the NSW parliament to counter the employer’s 
influence. In the 1891 election Labor candidates were successful in winning 35 out of 141 
seats in the Legislative Assembly.258 
The most important example of early experimentation with industrial regulation occurred in 
NSW with the introduction of the Trades Dispute Conciliation and Arbitration Act, which 
became law in April 1892. This legislation was a response to the 1890 Maritime Strike. The 
legislation required the agreement of both parties before a dispute proceeded to conciliation 
and arbitration. Employers took advantage of a declining labour market with the deepening 
1890s Depression to ignore the legislation. Miners, printers, railway employees and maritime 
workers, unable to force their employers to conciliation and arbitration in their fight against 
wage cuts and deteriorating conditions, found the legislation ineffective. The legislative 
machinery only settled two of the 22 cases that came before it in two years. By December 
1894 disillusionment led the Labor Party and a majority of the Protectionist opposition in the 
Legislative Assembly to end funding for this ineffective arbitration system and fuelled calls 
for a compulsory system.259 
Increased female participation in the workforce was also a notable feature of this period. 
Prior to this period, female workers had limited opportunity for employment beyond 
domestic service. Industrialisation heralded a significant change with the increasing growth in 
the manufacturing sector. Despite poor factory working conditions, the majority of women 
preferred manufacturing work to the tyranny of domestic service. In NSW, the female 
proportion of the manufacturing workforce grew rapidly from 13 per cent in 1881 to 24 per 
cent of the total manufacturing workforce in 1891. In the clothing trades, the percentage of 
women employed in NSW increased from at least 58 per cent in 1883 to 80 per cent in 1901. 
Small numbers of women were also employed as shop assistants, telegraphists, telephonists, 
clerks, postmistresses, teachers, nurses and governesses.260 
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Prior to 1900 trade unionism had little impact on women. Traditional views held: women 
workers expected to be married and to leave paid work. Marriage rather than militancy was 
seen as the solution to poor wages and conditions. Many male unionists supported this 
traditional view and felt that women should not work. Some trade unions such as the NSW 
Typographical Association and the NSW Confectioners’ Society saw cheap female labour as 
a threat, and refused women entry into apprenticeships.261 
Despite this traditional view, the harsh realities of the 1890s led some trade unions to actively 
recruit and organise female workers. While these trade unions were motivated by 
humanitarian concerns, they were also motivated by fear. Consequently, from the early 1890s 
the NSW Trades and Labour Council helped organise unions covering women, including the 
Tailoresses’ Union, the Laundresses’ Union and the Female Employees’ Union. Women also 
had their own unions as the corresponding male unions refused to admit them. Some new 
unions formed in this period: NSW Textile Workers’ Union admitted both men and women, 
but women were restricted to certain classifications. The General Labourers’ Union (later part 
of the Australian Workers’ Union) was one of the few established unions that explicitly 
welcomed women.262 
During this period the unemployed continued to band together and form temporary 
combinations actively campaigning for assistance. There are numerous reports of men 
marching on parliament seeking numerous forms of relief: public work projects, 
transportation and assistance to work, a free labour bureau and rations. Bruce Smith, the 
NSW Minister for Public Works, stated on 12 February 1890 that he received two 
deputations per week from the unemployed seeking assistance. On 7 May 1891 
representatives of the unemployed met with the Governor seeking assistance. In this 
deputation the representatives claimed that there were 10,000 unemployed persons in Sydney, 
many of whom were being abused and defrauded by the private registry offices and that the 
only solution was for the Government to establish both a labour bureau and relief works. 
Citing the New Zealand Labour Bureau model a success, they argued that this system should 
be adopted and established in NSW. On 17 February 1892, one day prior to the opening of 
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the NSW Labour Bureau, 150 unemployed men marched on Government House citing 
further private registry office abuses, while advocating for further relief with the introduction 
of a village settlement scheme.263  
 As Coghlan had noted, the trade unions were also influential in campaigning for a public 
employment service. In advocating for assistance, the Trades and Labour Council claimed 
there were 5000 men out of work and assistance was ‘absolutely necessary to prevent 
starvation.’264 Interestingly, they had also called for the establishment of a labour bureau for 
the assistance of female workers.265 
Political Landscape 
The NSW political landscape changed significantly during the last decade of the nineteenth 
century. Two of these changes heralded significant electoral reform. The first reform included 
the introduction of payment for Parliamentarians in 1889. Prior to this, only men of 
independent means could afford to be members of parliament, but from 1889 men from all 
quarters could afford to be members of parliament. The second reform came in 1893 when 
plural voting was abolished. Prior to that, some voters, through property ownership or 
through being university graduates, who were entitled to more than one vote. This reform 
represented the principle of "One man, one vote". By the end of the nineteenth century almost 
all adult males could vote. However, there were two exceptions to full suffrage: women and 
aboriginals. Women could not yet vote in NSW and, although not legally denied the right to 
vote in NSW, Aboriginal people were effectively disqualified through a range of 
discriminatory regulations and practices. Despite these inequities, both of these reforms held 
particular significance for the emerging Labor Party.266 
While the political landscape of the preceding period had revolved around individual political 
characters this period saw the emergence of political parties. The early political divisions 
involved the issues of protection versus free trade. By 1889 these opposing factions were 
forming what was, in effect, the first full-scale political party organisation in NSW. The 
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earliest to form government was Sir Henry Parkes’ last Ministry, a Free Trade Party 
Government from 1889 to 1891. He was succeeded by Sir George Dibbs’s Protectionist 
government of 1891-1894, before the return of the Free Traders in 1894 under George Reid 
1894 -1899.267  
During this time we also saw the emergence of the Labor Party. The Intercolonial Trade 
Union Congress at Hobart in 1889 unanimously called for the direct representation of the 
working classes in parliament. In January 1890 the NSW Trades and Labour Council 
endorsed a plan for candidates to stand at the next general election. As Patmore notes, several 
factors prompted the Council’s actions: the introduction of payment for parliamentarians; 
failure of the unions to achieve major legislative goals through traditional means; the growth 
of the affiliation to the Labour Council; and the end of the ‘classless’ legislature through 
divisions over protection and free trade.268  
The most dramatic development occurred in NSW when the Labor Electoral League (LEL) 
candidates won 35 out of 141 seats in the Legislative Assembly in the 1891 election. The 
party held the power between the Free-Traders and the Protectionists, but was largely 
ineffective. Few of the Labor members had trade union backgrounds and many carried their 
loyalties to the existing parties in the parliament. Before the end of the year they had split 
over the issue of tariff. In September 1892 some Labor parliamentarians defied party lines 
and helped the Dibbs Protectionist Government survive a censure motion over its treatment 
of strikers at Broken Hill. LEL conferences in November 1893 and March 1894 tried to 
tighten party discipline by devising a pledge for parliamentarians to abide by the majority 
decisions of caucus. However, only three members agreed to it. Subsequently, the LEL only 
endorsed four of the sitting members for the 1894 election, and the rest ran as independent 
Labor candidates. At the following election the LEL won 15 seats, yet the party was a more 
cohesive unit.  In 1895 election they won 18 seats and in 1898 they won 19 seats. Between 
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July 1895 and August 1904 it held the balance of power without relying on independent 
Labor members.269 
During this period middle class reformers also began advocating for the improvement of the 
social and industrial position of women. Concern over the vulnerability of women factory 
workers spurred male bourgeois liberals to support factory legislation. Middle class women 
began demanding greater legal rights in marriage and the vote. Women formed suffrage 
societies in all colonies in the 1880s and 1890s, and first gained the vote in South Australia in 
1895. The Labor Party in NSW gave priority to the abolition of plural voting but did not 
incorporate female suffrage into its platform until 1896.270  
The NSW Female Suffrage Movement had its origins in the late 1880s, led initially by 
organisations such as the Women's Christian Temperance Union and such women as 
Elizabeth Ward. The newspaper, The Dawn, published by Louisa Lawson (the mother of 
writer, Henry Lawson) added to the voices for justice for women. The NSW Womanhood 
Suffrage League was formed in 1891. In NSW several Bills for female suffrage were 
proposed between 1891 and 1901, generally being passed in the Lower House but defeated in 
the Upper House. Despite widespread ridicule of the idea of women being involved in 
politics, especially by the media, the movement gathered momentum and by the dawn of the 
new century was less than two years away from success.271 
A final striking feature of the late nineteenth century political landscape was the early debates 
over Federation. These debates can be traced to the early 1880s when the designs of the 
French and the Germans in the South-West Pacific alarmed the Colonies, but NSW’s 
suspicion of Victoria’s motives prevented anything more than a weak and incomplete Federal 
Council. In 1889 Parkes made a bid for immortality as the Father of Federation by issuing a 
call for closer ties. This brought representatives of the colonial parliaments to a Federal 
Convention in Sydney in 1891. At the Convention they drafted a constitution, however, the 
colonial parliaments later failed to approve it. The Federation debate was revived when the 
colonies authorised the direct election of delegates to a new convention and agreed in 
advance to submit its proposals to popular referendum. The second Federal Convention met 
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from 1897 to 1898, but only the four south-eastern colonies proceeded to referendum, and 
then only three produced the necessary affirmative vote. Further concessions were required 
before NSW did so, then following a second referendum both Queensland and Western 
Australia joined. The proclamation of the Commonwealth on 1 January 1901 in Centennial 
Park, Sydney came more than a decade after Parkes had appealed to ‘the crimson thread of 
kinship.’272 
Against this backdrop of economic uncertainty and political change, the NSW Government 
established the NSW Labour Bureau. The following section will focus on its origins and 
operations.  
Origins and Influences of the Government Labour Bureau 
The worsening depression of the 1890s created unprecedented levels of industrial distress. 
This industrial unrest culminated in increasingly turbulent deputations all calling on the 
Government to assist the unemployed through government relief works programs. However, 
due to the NSW Government’s precarious financial situation, such large-scale expenditure 
was largely impossible. In a bid to alleviate the unrest and provide political action the Dibbs 
Colonial Government refused further relief work programs and instead established the 
Government Labour Bureau on 18 February 1892.273  
The introduction of a labour bureau had been advocated in both labour and political circles 
prior to its commencement. Concern over the worsening condition of the labour market and 
the vulnerability of the unemployed, many of whom had become victims of the unscrupulous 
private registry offices provided the impetus for such debates. During 1890, and in his final 
term as Premier, Parkes was regularly asked in Parliament if it was the intention of the 
Government to establish a labour bureau. In response, Parkes claimed that he had met with 
various unemployed deputations and conceded that the issue was under consideration. 
However, he stated that at ‘present the Government had no intention of opening a free labour 
bureau.’274 By 1891, as the depression worsened, calls for a labour bureau continued yet 
Parkes reiterated his previous stance that the issue was under consideration. Following the 
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election of Dibbs on 23 October 1891, he continued the previous government’s mantra of the 
issue being under consideration by cabinet.275 
Unsurprisingly, it was the Labor MPs who championed the cause of the unemployed in 
Parliament. Most notable was William Schey, the MP for Redfern, who was a former trade 
unionist, serving as secretary of the Amalgamated Railway and Tramway Service 
Association. He later became a NSW Labour Commissioner in 1899 and then Superintendent 
of the State Labour Bureau in 1905. Schey regularly raised the issues of the unemployed in 
Parliament during the early1890s, often orchestrating meetings between unemployed 
deputations and both Premier Parkes, and his successor Premier Dibbs. Schey was a keen 
advocate for labour issues in parliament, citing examples of industrial distress, which were 
often compounded by the fraudulent behaviour of private registry offices. From as early as 6 
May 1890, Schey had been an ardent advocate and campaigner for the government to 
establish a labour bureau.276 
There were also other labour members of parliament who advocated for the introduction of a 
labour bureau. George Black, Member for West Sydney, founding member of the Australian 
Labor Party, argued that he did not believe further relief works were the answer. As an 
alternative, he advocated for the introduction of a labour bureau to assist in the flow of 
information concerning employment vacancies, and for the government to assist men to these 
locations. Jacob Garrard, former unionist, and member for Balmain, concurred with these 
sentiments claiming he knew of employers in country districts who wished to have 
information on available labour. Thomas Davis, Member for West Sydney and former 
unionist, and Andrew Kelly, Member for West Sydney, former unionist and founding 
member of the Labor Party, cited the abuses of the registry offices. Kelly argued that there 
was ‘no greater evil in the community.’277 They both called for the abolition of private 
registries and for the establishment of a government operated labour bureau.278  
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Amongst the trade unions, the Amalgamated Navies and General Labourers’ Union were 
ardent advocates for the creation of a government labour bureau. The Amalgamated Navies 
and General Labourers’ Union (ANGLU) was initially a separate body of the Australian 
Shearers Union (ASU) established in 1890, they later became part of the ASU in 1894 
following the maritime dispute. Following this, the union became known as the Australian 
Workers Union. The Secretary of ANGLU, whose membership overwhelmingly felt the 
effects of the industrial turmoil through ‘lack of work’279 outlined his concerns to Premier 
Parkes in July 1891. The ANGLU suggested that to alleviate the problem of unemployment 
and to curtail the fraudulent activities of private registry offices, the government should 
establish a labour bureau to assist the operations of the labour market. Furthermore, they 
argued that while the Trades and Labour Council Organising Committee had also endorsed 
the establishment of a union labour bureau, they believed that due to their own internal 
turmoil it would not eventuate. Subsequently, he called on the Government to take action. 
Following the announcement of the Government Labour Bureau, the Trades and Labour 
Council stated that while they agreed in principle with the Government Labour Bureau, they 
argued that men would refuse work if the rate of pay was less than the rate determined by the 
trade unions.280 
Within the literature it has been claimed that the early architects of labour bureaus were 
influenced by the policy debates in Britain in the early twentieth century. However, the 
Government Labour Bureau, and its predecessor the Casual Labour Board, emerged prior to 
these debates. In terms of influencing the structure of the Government Labour Bureau the 
majority of its advocates cited the New Zealand Labour Bureau system. Opened in 1891, the 
New Zealand Labour Bureau was an integrated labour market system divided into eleven 
districts with branch offices and agencies in every important town. In country districts the 
police acted as agents of the labour bureau registering the unemployed and allocating 
placements. It was argued that this decentralised system would be greatly beneficial to both 
employers and labour in NSW for two reasons. Firstly, a decentralised structure would ensure 
that rural labour markets were serviced, thus avoiding men travelling to Sydney seeking 
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employment. Secondly, and related to the first, this system would also facilitate the flow of 
employment information across the state.281  
While parliamentary debates focussed predominantly on the New Zealand Labour Bureau 
model, systems in other countries were also discussed. Reference was made to the labour 
bureau system in the United States. Under this system labour bureaus were responsible for 
the registration and collection of labour market information. Parkes argued that while this 
system had some benefit in collecting labour market information he believed it was too 
simplistic and NSW needed a more proactive institution. The proposed development of 
labour bureaus in South Australia and Queensland was also discussed, albeit briefly.282  
Alternative solutions to the unemployed problem were also being discussed during this time. 
Herbert Mills a British radical whose book Poverty and the State and Work for the 
Unemployed, was published in 1886 and was influential at this time. In his book Mills draws 
upon the depravity of the English Poor Laws and Workhouses. He argues that this system 
fails to deal with the recurring problem of unemployment. Instead he claims unemployment 
can be alleviated by creating villages of self-sufficiency. Both Schey and Black had 
expressed interest in the idea of creating ‘village settlements’ in NSW. Village settlements 
operated in Britain, Netherlands, France and Germany, where legislation had been enacted to 
provide the unemployed with land and support so as to become self-sufficient. Schey was 
greatly influenced by this work and claims to have attempted a similar scheme in the 1880s 
but due to NSW land laws found it impossible. Parkes was also interested in similar schemes. 
During the early 1890s he requested information on German Labour Colonies as a means for 
alleviating the recurring problem of unemployment. Following the 1893 Select Committee 
inquiry into the operations of the Government Labour Bureau, a village settlement scheme 
was proposed and later opened to assist the long-term and incapacitated unemployed.283 
As had been the case with Casual Labour Board, the Government Labour Bureau was largely 
born out of political necessity. However, unlike the Casual Labour Board, which had been 
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designed by Colonial Premier Parkes, the Government Labour Bureau was an outcome of the 
Dibbs Government. The Dibbs Government was elected on the platform ‘to provide work for 
the masses’284 and with the worsening industrial situation, the government faced increasing 
criticism and pressure to act. Financially unable to provide significant relief works programs, 
which had been undertaken in the late 1880s to relieve the distress, Dibbs announced the 
opening of a Government Labour Bureau in Sydney. Despite calls for an integrated labour 
bureau system with regional offices across NSW, as per the New Zealand model, it could be 
argued that the simplistic model proposed by Dibbs reflected his government’s limited 
financial capability. In short, he offered a short-term pragmatic solution to what was 
becoming a highly politicised problem.285 
In announcing their intention to open a Government Labour Bureau, and in line with the 
prevailing economic ideology, the Dibbs Government was emphatic that this was not an 
example of state socialism. Instead Dibbs argued that it was designed to assist capitalist 
expansion and industry and to act only as an intermediary between capital and labour. 
Furthermore, he argued that Government Labour Bureau would undertake no duty in relation 
to fixing the scale of wages or accepts any responsibility, except in obtaining and supplying 
accurate information.286  
On 16 February 1892 the Dibbs Government announced the appointment of Joseph Creer as 
the Superintendent of the Government Labour Bureau. Creer, like his predecessor Davies, 
shared a similar career trajectory: beginning in private enterprise and later holding public 
office. Creer also came from humble beginnings initially as a carpenter and builder, later 
starting a broom factory in Maitland. In 1870 he moved to Newcastle and began a cabinet 
making business, which was ruined by fire in 1872. Following this, he opened a large 
auctioneering and general business in Newcastle. During this time he also became an active 
member in the Temperance movement, most notably founding the Daughters of the Order of 
Temperance in Maitland and Newcastle. On the back of this support, he became politically 
active, firstly in local government as an alderman in 1875 and later Mayor of Newcastle in 
1881. On 16 October 1885 he was elected to the NSW Legislative Assembly as the Member 
for Northumberland. Creer was elected for three terms being defeated on 6 June 1891. It was 
claimed in the press that his defeat was due to his adherence to the principles of temperance, 
                                                           
284
 NSWPDLA, Vol. 56, 1892, pp. 4977. 
285
 NSWVPLA, Vol. 50, 1891, pp. 116 & 499; NSWPDLA, Vol. 56, 1892, pp. 4977-5010 & 5265. 
286
 SMH, 13.2.1892, pp. 8. 
 106  
 
in relation to his opposition for extending hotel trading hours. Despite this, during his tenure 
in the NSW Parliament, he actively campaigned on local issues.287 
While both Creer and Davies shared a similar career trajectory and were both members of, 
and influenced by, the Temperance movement, there were some significant fundamental 
differences in their approach to the unemployed. Davies approach to the unemployed was 
heavily influenced by the prevailing classical economic ideology of the time: men who 
worked hard would be rewarded. Men who refused work or questioned piece-work rates were 
commonly denounced as loafers or drunks and subsequently further assistance was refused 
and their names blacklisted.288 
Creer on the other hand, adopted a more compassionate approach believing that it was the 
role of the state to assist those most in need. In the 1893 Select Committee inquiry into the 
operations of the Government Labour Bureau, Creer was asked if men who had refused work 
were removed from the list and relief withdrawn. He claimed that he “would not strike a 
family man off the relief list if he refused to go to that work.”289 Furthermore, when 
defending his assistance of men who gained employment through private registry offices by 
supplying railway passes, he argued that despite his abhorrence over the practices of these 
private registries, he believed that if he didn’t assist these men, their families would become 
destitute.290 
Initially railway passes were issued without any form of guarantee from the prospective 
employer or avenue for recompense for the Government. Both Creer and the Dibbs 
Government became concerned over their misuse. In a bid to curtail the abuses perpetrated by 
private registry offices who were sending men to fictitious vacancies, the Dibbs Government 
decided that from July 1892 that the Government Labour Bureau would only provide railway 
passes to men travelling to a legitimate vacancy, and that the employer or employee would 
sign an order for the cost to be deducted from their first months wages.291 
Creer’s compassion and belief in rehabilitation can also be seen in late 1893 when he argued 
for the introduction of a village settlement scheme. He claimed that many of the men referred 
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to as ‘loafers’ were up until a few years ago hard working and industrious, but due to the 
industrial depression  had fallen into bad habits and bad associations and lost their way. He 
believed that these men would greatly benefit from such a scheme. Creer’s sympathetic 
stance and compassion guided him in his role as Superintendent of the Government Labour 
Bureau.292  
Operations 
The Government Labour Bureau began operations on the 18 February 1892. The offices were 
located at the Post Office Stables, Castlereagh Street, Sydney. The Government claimed that 
the purpose of the labour bureau was to assist the unemployed in finding work and to provide 
assistance to families impoverished by unemployment. The Government Labour Bureau 
registered the unemployed and endeavoured to find suitable positions for them. In terms of 
mediation procedures, the Government Labour Bureau operated a closed system of 
administrative matching. Creer personally selected applicants based on the requirements of 
the job and the applicant’s skills and past work experience, including references from 
previous employers. He thus attempted to create a job-person match. Using means such as 
circulars, advertisements and press coverage, the Government Labour Bureau advised 
employers of its major functions in assisting them to fill vacancies. The Government Labour 
Bureau also met some costs involved in finding work, including supplying railway tickets and 
rations to those seeking work.293 
The desperation of the times was clearly evident on the opening day of the Government 
Labour Bureau. With a growing crowd of over 200 men and three police constables stationed 
at the door to prevent crushing and to ensure good behaviour, Creer opened the Government 
Labour Bureau at 10am, two hours earlier than scheduled. The initial registration process 
involved the men completing forms with particular information relating to their skills, trades 
and previous experience. By the close of business that day the Government Labour Bureau 
had registered over 700 men. In the first week of operation Creer claimed that he had already 
obtained applications from city employers. It was reported that in the first fortnight of 
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operation, the Government Labour Bureau had registered nearly 4,000 men and employment 
had been secured for 500 men.294 
As noted by Endres and Cook, during the first twelve months, the Government Labour 
Bureau also operated as a de-facto emergency relief department. In this role, the Government 
Labour Bureau distributed government rations consisting of meat, bread, tea, and sugar. 
Financial assistance, food and clothing parcels donated by the public augmented the rations 
supplied by the government and were distributed by the Government Labour Bureau. During 
the first twelve months of operations the Government Labour Bureau received donations that 
included £180 and the Government supplied 30,960 portions of rations.295 
In a further bid to relieve the distress of the time, Creer allowed many of the destitute 
unemployed to take shelter at night in the premises of the Government Labour Bureau. For 
those seeking shelter, Creer provided strict rules and guidelines and together with the 
assistance of the police no serious incidences occurred. In its premises in Castlereagh Street it 
was reported that in March 1892 that ‘by 10 o’clock, nearly 400 men had gained admittance 
and had made their beds wherever a vacant spot could be found. On the upper floor, a large 
loft, about 250 men where stretched on boards, those who could obtain them by using 
newspapers as blankets or mattresses, but many being without even a newspaper.’296  
The overwhelming need for shelter and relief led the Government to provide blankets, and for 
the Government Labour Bureau to be moved to larger premises. On 2 April 1892 the 
Government Labour Bureau re-opened at the Exhibition Building, Pitt Street, Sydney, with 
the main hall being used as a shelter for the homeless. Every night between 500 and 700 
people were accommodated. Despite the larger premises, the Government Labour Bureau 
struggled to accommodate the growing number of destitute unemployed and on 2 October 
1892 relocated again to larger premises at the junction of George and Pitt Streets behind No.2 
Police Station, Sydney. This building had a good sized yard that enabled them to erect a 
shelter for the unemployed. In May 1893 a night shelter was established by the Government 
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Labour Bureau at Cowper's Wharf, Woolloomooloo, on average 464 men were 
accommodated each night.297 
The first six months of operations of the Government Labour Bureau could be categorised as 
crisis management: registering men, notifying employers, job placement, distributing rations 
and relief, and providing shelter. However, it soon became apparent that the Government 
Labour Bureau suffered from both systemic and operational problems. As the Dibbs 
Government attempted to assess the workings of the Government Labour Bureau and identify 
statistical labour market information, it became increasingly clear that there were significant 
problems in their accounting procedures. Creer’s lack of experience in managing such an 
operation was evident in his record keeping which only contained basic information: number 
of men registered and sent to work, with no means of identifying the total number of 
unemployed. Furthermore, the accuracy of the information collected was also undermined as 
it did not account for those men who had gained employment through other means, or those 
men who had been assisted to work more than once, which he later claimed in the 1893 
Select Committee hearings was a common occurrence.298 
In an attempt to overcome these problems and to identify the total number of unemployed, 
the Government decided that the process of re-registration should be undertaken. This began 
on the 30 August 1892 with 2,472 new registrations and 5,152 previous registrations totalling 
7,625. The inaccuracy of their statistics was startling as the new figure represented just over 
half (56 per cent) of the previous total of men registered. Due to the inaccuracies in their 
accounting techniques and the seasonal and temporary nature of the work, it is largely 
impossible to identify the exact percentage of men who gained employment. However, Creer 
claimed that during the first six months, approximately one quarter of those registered were 
placed in employment, most often in agriculture, trades and unskilled work. Furthermore, he 
stated that after twelve months of operation the Government Labour Bureau has assisted 
8,154 men to employment and a further 1,850 gained employment indirectly through the 
Bureau. In total, he claimed that the Government Labour Bureau had gained both directly and 
indirectly employment for 10,004 men.299 
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As industrial conditions worsened during 1893 following the banking collapse, there was 
growing concern over the Government Labour Bureau’s role and its effects on labour market 
outcomes. Despite receiving positive feedback from many of the employers and employees 
who had used the Government Labour Bureau, there were many labour supporters who 
expressed their misgivings. Most notably, the ASU, which argued that the Government 
Labour Bureau was being used by certain employers to reduce wages in rural areas. In doing 
so, the union argued that men were being transported to rural areas where there was already a 
surplus of labour thus creating further industrial distress across the state. Thomas Hicks Hall, 
Secretary of the ANGLU, whose union previously advocated for a Government Labour 
Bureau, concurred with this allegation and called for its closure.300 
John Watson, President of the Trades and Labour Council, claimed that the Government 
Labour Bureau’s structure was ineffective ‘inasmuch as its powers are limited, usefulness 
curtailed by its functions being confined solely to the registration of workmen in Sydney.’301 
He argued that the men travelled to Sydney to seek employment and that the officials of the 
Government Labour Bureau neglected rural labour markets, often sending men from Sydney 
to areas with surplus labour. In regard to the fraudulent behaviour perpetrated by the private 
registry offices, Watson claimed that the operations of the Government Labour Bureau have 
failed to result in any registry office closures. However, he did concede that it has affected 
their trade. In response to these criticisms, the Dibbs Government announced that an inquiry 
would be undertaken to investigate these claims and the workings of the Government Labour 
Bureau.302 
1893 Select Committee of the Legislative Assembly into the Workings of the 
Government Labour Bureau 
On 26 April, 1893 a Select Committee of the Legislative Assembly under the Chairmanship 
of John D. Fitzgerald was appointed to inquire into the working of the Government Labour 
Bureau. Fitzgerald was an interesting choice as he was a former trade unionist and founding 
member of the Labor Electoral League. However, he was one of the Members of Parliament 
who defied LEL party lines and helped the Dibbs Protectionist Government survive a censure 
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motion over its treatment of strikers at Broken Hill. Following a LEL Conference in 
November 1893 he was then expelled from the party.303 
The Committee submitted its report on 2 June, 1893.The Committee found that the operations 
and effectiveness of the Government Labour Bureau was undermined by its centralised 
structure and limited powers. They claimed ‘that the Government Labour Bureau, in its 
present basis, is necessarily ineffective, inasmuch as its powers are limited, and is usefulness 
curtailed by the fact that its functions being confined solely to the registration of workmen 
located in Sydney.’304  
The Committee argued that the centralisation of the Government Labour Bureau in Sydney 
had a two-fold effect. Firstly, unemployed men travelled to Sydney seeking employment 
thereby creating a surplus of unemployed in metropolitan area, which often resulted in 
industrial unrest and deputations. Secondly, the lack of Government Labour Bureau offices in 
rural areas led to a systematic neglect of the state of rural labour markets and an inability to 
procure work locally for unemployed men in rural districts. Consequently, they believed that 
there was a danger of the Government Labour Bureau being used by unscrupulous persons to 
lower wages, by importing into districts already overstocked with unemployed large numbers 
of men from the Government Labour Bureau. However, they did find that there had been a 
careful and conscientious endeavour on the part of the Superintendent and Secretary to make 
the Government Labour Bureau a useful institution, but the limited scope of their powers and 
the narrow sphere of their operations greatly impeded them and rendered their efforts largely 
futile.305 
In an attempt to improve the effectiveness of the Government Labour Bureau, the Select 
Committee recommended the following: the development of a Department of Labour 
responsible to a Minister of the Crown; the expansion of the Government Labour Bureau to 
include the creation of branches in major centres; the establishment of a statistical branch to 
collect data on economic variables, particularly those affecting employment; the compulsory 
registration and licensing of private employment agencies; extending the labour bureau 
services to women, by the institution of a separate section under female control; the 
establishment of state farms to provide employment; the fostering of village settlements to 
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develop self sufficiency and employment; and the development of the principle of co-
operation as applied to the execution of public works. The committee were emphatic in their 
conclusion, arguing that if the recommendations with regard to decentralisation and local 
registration were not carried out, the Government Labour Bureau should be abolished 
altogether. However, as the following will demonstrate, many of these fundamental structural 
changes did not occur until 1895.306 
Select Committee’s Recommendations 
Since its inception the Government Labour Bureau had been under the control of the Colonial 
Premiers Department. Following the Select Committees finding into the Government Labour 
Bureau’s operations it was recommended that a Department of Labour under ministerial 
control be established. However, the Government Labour Bureau remained under the 
Colonial Premier’s control until 1895 when it was transferred to the Department of Public 
Instruction. In 1896 the Government Labour Bureau was transferred again to the newly 
established Department of Labour and Industry. This department also became responsible for 
a range of legislation, including the Apprentices Act 1894, the Factories and Shops Act 1896 
and the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1899. However, this was short lived and in 1901 the 
Government Labour Bureau was transferred to the control of the Department of Public 
Works, along with the NSW Labour Commission, which had been appointed in 1900.307  
The Select Committee found that the most significant structural problem undermining the 
effectiveness of the Government Labour Bureau was its centralised structure. In a bid to 
increase its effectiveness the Select Committee recommended a decentralised structure with 
numerous agencies and branches throughout the state. While this idea had resounding support 
in the hearings, there were others, such as Superintendent Creer, who had concerns. Creer 
argued that ‘it is questionable whether they would realize all that is expected of them by their 
advocates.’308 Creer suggested an alternative plan with a view of testing the agencies: ‘(say) 
five be opened…Newcastle, Tamworth, Bathurst or Orange, Bourke for the west and 
Goulburn for the south.’309   
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Concerned by the cost of establishing these agencies, Creer suggested that the agencies be 
conducted under the supervision of the Sergeant or Officer-in-charge of Police in each town, 
whose duty it would be to register the unemployed in each district, and supply employers 
with the labour out of those locally unemployed, and in the event of not being able to supply 
labour as may be required, to communicate with the Superintendent. However, there was 
some further opposition to this idea. In 1894 Creer held a meeting in Bathurst with the local 
unemployed where he outlined this proposal. The unemployed opposed this idea as they 
believed the establishment of this agency would serve only to attract further unemployed to 
the area.310 
Despite this opposition and Creer’s reservations, the Government persisted with this reform 
agenda and on 1 March, 1895 35 agencies were established in major towns across NSW to 
assist in gathering information about, and suggesting solutions to, unemployment within their 
districts. The branches were conducted by Clerks of Petty sessions. As agents they were 
instructed not to send any men to employment that was more than 20 miles from the branch 
without consulting the head office. This was to avoid possible conflict between adjoining 
areas. The agencies were also instructed not to interfere in regard to wages rates. Under this 
arrangement men were given tickets upon registration which they furnished each time they 
applied for work. Men travelling in the course of seeking employment were to get their ticket 
stamped at any town they passed through which has an agency to avoid men flocking to 
Sydney without attempting to find work in rural areas from where they travelled. The agents 
were to complete a report each month outlining the state of the labour market and any 
problems.311 
Creer claimed that this decentralised system enabled the Government Labour Bureau to 
acquire a better knowledge of rural labour markets. By March 1896 the total number of 
branches and agencies had risen to forty two spread across four geographic regions (refer 
Table 4.1).312 
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Regions Agencies 
Coastal Lismore, Grafton, Bega, Nowra, Newcastle, Wollongong, Kempsey 
Western Lithgow, Dubbo, Bathurst, Coonamble, Nyngan, Broken Hill, 
Mudgee, Molong, Wilcannia, Cowra, Walgett, Cobar, Forbes, 
Bourke, Orange, Hillstone 
Northern Maitland, Glenn Innes, Moree, Armidale, Narrabri, Muswellbrook, 
Tamworth, Tenterfield 
Southern Goulburn, Braidwood, Junee, Cooma, Hay, Queanbeyan, 
Cootamundra, Wagga Wagga, Jerilderie, Albury, Young. 
Table 4.1 Government Labour Bureau Regional Branch Offices313  
Creer claimed that this decentralised system enabled the Government Labour Bureau to 
acquire a better knowledge of rural labour markets. By March 1896 the total number of 
branches and agencies had risen to forty two spread across four geographic regions (refer 
Table 4.1).314 
Country agencies, whilst being found to be effective in ascertaining important labour market 
information, also had some shortcomings. The decentralised nature of the system and the dual 
roles of the Clerk of Petty Sessions also acting as a Labour Agent, proved to be problematic. 
Creer argued that the frequent changing of Clerks of Petty Sessions and the lack of 
commitment by the outgoing agent in instructing his successor, who maybe entirely new to 
the duties of labour agent, undermined the ability of the office to be effective in its role as a 
labour market intermediary. He feared as a consequence that the incoming Clerk of Petty 
Sessions did not take the interest in their work as a Labour Agent. Despite these concerns, 
Clerks of Petty Sessions remained labour agents during the period of the Government Labour 
Bureau as inexpensive option during a period of government financial restraint.315 
Following the recommendation of the Select Committee to foster village settlements to 
develop self sufficiency and employment, the Government Labour Camp at Pitt Town, which 
was also known as the Pitt Town Village Settlement, was established on 21 July 1893. This 
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village settlement was established under the Act to establish and regulate Labour Settlements 
on Crown Lands, 1893 (56 Victoria, Act No. 34). The Act authorised the declaration of 
Crown Lands not leased for other purposes to be developed into Labour Settlements. The Act 
appointed the Superintendent of the Government Labour Bureau to receive and register male 
applicants to join labour camps and to also report upon the fitness of these applicants. The 
constituents of the camp were drawn from the unemployed who were registered by the 
Government Labour Bureau. Finances came from the government who provided £25 for each 
married man and family, £20 for each married man without family and £15 per single man. 
The Government Labour Bureau was responsible for establishing and administering this 
'socialist experiment' at the former Pitt Town Common, along with similar schemes at Bega, 
Wilberforce and Randwick.316 
These co-operative farms were established in response to the 1890s economic depression, but 
tended to be short-lived. Patmore and Balnave argue that the term ‘Co-operation’ is a ‘vague 
concept' and has a wide range of meanings. They found that in the 1890s it had variable 
meanings from firstly more harmonious relations between capital and labour through more 
'amicable' industrial relations procedures and profit sharing. Secondly, they argue it also 
stood for the replacement of capitalism through worker-owned and managed production 
enterprises or the organisation of consumers in co-operative stores. They also found that the 
term was used during this time to cover a variety of land settlement schemes that arose in 
Australia during the 1890s against a background of high unemployment and 'social 
experimentation'. Australian labour historians have largely ignored the Rochdale consumer 
co-operative movement. David Walker and Ray Markey who focused on NSW in the 1890s 
both recognised the vagueness of the term 'co-operation' at that time. Walker is primarily 
concerned with the unsuccessful experiments with agricultural co-operatives, while Markey 
focused on trade unions and workers' production co-operatives.317 
By August 1893, 834 people had applied for placement in labour settlements and 345 adults 
and children had been placed.  In 1894 the Superintendent reported that the Government had 
contributed over £6,300 to the camp. By 1895 ninety families were resident there, however, 
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the Superintendent expressed doubt that half that number could be supported from the camp. 
On 16 May 1896 part of the land was withdrawn from the Land settlement area and on 17 
June 1896 the notice which had established the Labour Settlement was revoked and the Board 
of Control was dissolved. Residents were permitted to remain provided that they were self-
supporting. However, by the beginning of 1897, all of the settlers had left.318 
A Select Committee to inquire into and report upon the abandonment of the Pitt Town 
Settlement Scheme was appointed on 6 October 1896. Evidence to the Committee testified to 
the poor quality of the land, the lack of irrigation, the unsuitability of some of the settlers and 
the lack of expertise of Board Members. The settlement was converted into a Casual Labour 
Farm in which temporary work and accommodation was provided for those who were 
unemployed and homeless.319 
In 1896, the site of the former co-operative farm at Pitt Town was used as the Casual Labour 
Farm to train unemployed city workers as farm labourers. The purpose of the farm was to 
provide temporary accommodation and employment for men who were unemployed and 
homeless. Residents received meals, and were paid according to the hours of labour. Men 
seeking assignment to the farm were selected by the Government Labour Bureau and were 
required to abide by conditions and regulations. The first ten men arrived in January, 1898. 
By 30 June of that year the population was 26. After two year's operation the Manager 
reported a maximum of 30 men in residence. The men stayed for a maximum of three months 
and were required to be away for two months before re-entry to the farm. The weekly wage 
was 3/3 after deducting the value of food. 20 acres of land was cleared and the wood was 
sold, the farm had diversified to raising pigs. The Casual Labour Farm continued to operate 
under the Labour Commissioners in 1900.320  
The Select Committee also recommended the compulsory registration and licensing of 
private employment agencies. During the Committee hearings there were numerous reports of 
abuses and misrepresentations perpetrated by private employment agencies on the 
unemployed. In a bid to curb such abuses and eliminate further misrepresentations, the 
Committee recommended for their regulation. Yet despite this recommendation and the 
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evidence of such practices occurring, the Government did not attempt to enact any legislation 
to regulate this industry until 1899, and even then it was only suggested that the Minister had 
prepared a Bill, however, there was no mention of the details of the Bill or when it would be 
presented to parliament.321   
Despite the Government’s lack of commitment to regulating private employment agencies, 
Creer remained an ardent advocate campaigning for their regulation. In all the annual reports 
of the Government Labour Board from 1892 until 1900, Creer continually argues for the 
introduction of legislation to regulate this industry. In all of his reports he stated that in ‘My 
experience of these registry offices ...leads me to the conclusion that a great many abuses 
exist .... In the interest of the unemployed themselves I would strongly recommend that these 
offices should be licensed and placed under Government supervision.’322 He cites cases of 
misrepresentation whereby the unemployed upon reaching their destination by means of 
railway passes obtained from the Bureau, found that they were either not wanted or no 
authority was given for their engagement, whilst in other cases there has been absolutely no 
employment vacancy. Consequently these people are left stranded in strange places having 
spent all or a vast proportion of their money on fees and with no avenue for recompense. In 
other cases of misrepresentation huge fees have been taken from several people for a situation 
requiring only one person.323  
The newspapers of the period were also reporting the abuses and fraudulent acts being 
perpetrated by the private registries. It was reported in the Sydney Morning Herald that 
private registry offices were sending men on wild goose chases to districts in which they only 
swell the number of  local unemployed. For employers, there were also examples of 
misrepresentation with men being sent to them with ‘qualifications falsely described merely 
for the sake of agency fees.’324 
During the select committee hearings, the Government Labour Bureau was criticised for its 
sole focus on male workers. It was argued that many families relied on the female ‘bread 
winner’ and these workers were left to find employment through the unscrupulous private 
agencies. This neglect was highlighted in an article in the Sydney Morning Herald on 5 
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March 1892 whereby a private registry office located right next door to the Government 
Labour Bureau in Sydney was advertising for cooks, governesses and nursemaids, yet none 
of these were advertised at the Government Labour Bureau. In an attempt to remedy this 
neglect the Select Committee called for the establishment of a labour bureau for women.325  
Which raises the question of why during a period of increased female participation in the 
labour market, as well as in the trade unions, were women excluded from the Government 
Labour Bureau? While Creer had campaigned ardently for the regulation of private registries 
to curb abuses and fraudulent behaviour, he did not engage in debates over the establishment 
of a labour bureau for women, even though he knew that female workers were vulnerable to 
the practices of private registries. One newspaper article contends that Creer’s principles of 
temperance would have been compromised if, for example, he was called upon to furnish a 
barmaid. If this is indeed the case it does explain in some part why female workers were 
largely neglected, yet there is evidence that Creer did assist ‘several daughters and sisters of 
the unemployed’326 into positions in domestic service. However, this does appear to be more 
a case of personal favour than commitment to assisting all female workers. Interestingly, the 
placement of these women into domestic service is not recorded in the official registrations of 
the Government Labour Bureau. Despite this recommendation, and the genuine need for such 
a service, this did not occur until the later period of the NSW Labour Commissioners when 
the Female Registry, a labour bureau for women, was opened in Sydney on the 10 March 
1902.327 
The Select Committee also recommended the development of the principle of cooperation to 
be applied to the execution of public works. The principle of cooperation relied on 
cooperation between the state and local governments in the provision of public works 
programs. The Select Committee were of the opinion that the provision of public works 
would be instrumental in assisting the unemployed. For the unemployed public works 
programs were a lifeline from the destitution of the times and throughout the period they 
campaigned for the government to embark upon more public works programs. As the 
economic situation worsened the Government provided large numbers of public work 
contracts for which the Government Labour Bureau was responsible for organising the 
labour. In 1895 and 1896 large numbers of men were sent to Centennial Park, Church and 
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School Lands and other relief works and Government works: railway deviations; Botany 
Sewerage Farm; Shea’s Creek, Glebe Island and the scrub clearing at West Bogan. Although 
the official figures in the annual reports appear to be inconsistent from year to year, it is 
evident that the Government Labour Bureau sent over 6,000 men relief works during the 
period.328 
Gold Fossicking 
In a period of economic uncertainty the Government Labour Bureau’s operations involved 
another avenue of assistance: fossicking. In August 1893 the Under Secretary for Mines 
prepared a minute advocating that a number of the unemployed might make a living on the 
goldfields. The Minister for Mines and the Premier approved the Minute. As a result, the 
Government established a board consisting of Harris Woods, Under-Secretary for Mines, 
William Dowell, William Slee, Chief Inspector of Mines and Creer. This committee adopted 
the following mode – those desirous of going to the gold fields apply to the Chief Inspector 
of Mines. If the applicant is considered suitable, he is given recommendation to the 
Superintendent of the Government Labour Bureau who is empowered to grant a rail pass and 
a miner’s right, the cost is to be refunded.329 
Year Number of Men Sent 
Fossicking 
August 1893-
February 1894 
4,516 
1884-1895 10,718 
1895-1896 7,093 
Intermediate 
Period* 
1,733 
1896-1897 1,647 
1897-1898 937 
1898-1899 360 
1899-1900 318 
TOTAL 27,322 
Table 4.2 Number of Men Sent Fossicking by the Government Labour Bureau 330  
 *Intermediate Period refers to 18 February 1896 -30 June 1896 
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During the first six months 4,516 men were assisted and sent to the gold fields. Between 1897 
and 1900 there was a significant reduction in the number of men sent fossicking, this was 
largely due to the drought conditions being experienced in rural NSW. However, there were 
reports that some men had left the NSW goldfields for Western Australia. The Government 
Labour Bureau again played a major role in assisting the unemployed by sending 27,322 men 
fossicking from 1893 to 1900 (refer to Table 4.2).331  
Registrations 
The Government Labour Bureau operated a closed system of administrative matching. 
Applicants were selected on the basis of skill, experience and references. Creer administered 
the system and personally selected the candidates for each appointment. During the period, 
there was one change to the mediation procedure. Following criticism that the Government 
Labour Bureau’s system was attracting unemployed men to NSW and in a bid to ascertain the 
validity of this claim, the Reid Government in 1898 requested that all men registering must 
produce their elector’s right or some other satisfactory evidence to show that they are bona 
fide colonists. However, this became problematic for many as Creer found that hundreds of 
the men who have lived in the Colony had failed to enter their names on the electoral roll and 
thus never voted.332  
The Select Committee, concerned at the poor record keeping of the Government Labour 
Bureau, recommended the establishment of statistical branch. However, this did not eventuate 
and the record keeping remained problematic and poor throughout the period. For example, 
Creer relied on his perception of the labour market when identifying the total number of 
unemployed that he recorded in the Government Labour Bureau Annual Reports. In terms of 
numbers registered and occupations, again this appears to be estimated and incomplete as the 
occupations of these men are missing in the early and later periods. In terms of assistance, 
there is no attempt to distinguish the number of times a person was sent to employment, 
which is misleading as the majority of the placements were for short periods and men were 
assisted numerous times throughout each year. Despite these problems, the data outlined in 
table 4.3 does provide us with an understanding of both the vast numbers of unemployed 
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seeking assistance and from 1893 onwards, the occupations and industries most affected 
during the period.333 
Year Head Office  Branches  
 Registered Sent to 
Work 
Registered Sent to Work Fossicking 
1892-1893  18,600 8,154 ---------- ---------- ---------- 
1893-1894 12,145 10,349 ---------- ---------- 4,516 
1894-1895 13,575 16,380 ---------- ---------- 10,718 
1895-1896 14,062 20,576 ---------- ---------- 7,093 
Intermediate 
Period#  
3,283 5,327 1,104 143 1,733 
1896-1897 6,427 13,718 1,253 534 1,647 
1897-1898 4,167 7,817 715 288 937 
1898- 1899 3,843 7,228 686 224 360 
1899-1900 5,487 6,495 516 319 318 
1900-1901 10,639 9,654 1,613 149  
TOTAL 92,228 105,698 5,887 1,657 27,322 
Table 4.3 Government Labour Bureau Registrations 
# the intermediate period refers to was between 18th February and 30th June, 1896, this was to 
make the year assimilate with financial year.  
 
Who registered at the Government Labour Bureau? During the first twelve months operations 
approximately 18,600 men registered with Government Labour Bureau for assistance with 
8,154 sent to work. Unfortunately, there is no data of the specific occupations that were sent 
to work. What we do know however, is that the vast majority of men sent to work consisted 
of unskilled workers: station and farm hands, labourers, general usefuls etc. Skilled workmen 
also registered including; carpenters, blacksmiths, painters, wheelwrights, navies, bakers, 
bricklayers, brick makers, cooks, bridge-hands, grooms, gardeners, masons, butchers, miners, 
sleep-cutters, plumbers, sawyers, engineers, tailors, fencers, clearers etc. The report also 
notes that ‘many professional gentlemen’334 registered and were assisted to work: tutors, 
draughtsmen, artists, civil and mechanical engineers, solicitors, musicians etc. The 
Government Labour Bureau was also responsible for the placement of a large number of boys 
aged between 12 and16 years, with their parents’ consent, to assist farmers.335 
During the period of 1893-1894 the NSW’s economy continued to unravel at a rapid pace as 
the depression and banking crisis paralysed industry. Employer confidence faltered and 
unemployment spiralled. In 1893-1894 the Government Labour Board registered 12,145 men 
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and assisted 10,349 to work. In the following year the economic situation worsened and 
registrations reached 13,575 men, an increase of 1,430 on the previous period. During this 
time the Government Labour Bureau assisted 16,380 men to employment, an increase of 
6,031 on the previous period. The severe drought of late 1895 had devastating effects on the 
labour market with registrations for 1895-1896 peaking at 14,062 men. Not only did 
registrations reach unprecedented levels, so too did the number of men assisted to work.  In 
1895-1896 the Government Labour Bureau assisted 20,576 men to employment, an increase 
of 4,196 however, it is important to note that 7,093 men or 34 per cent of the total 
registrations were sent fossicking rather than into employment.336 
The period 1896-1897 represented a turning point as signs of economic recovery emerged in 
the NSW economy. By June 1897, Creer claimed that the numbers of unemployed had 
dropped dramatically to approximately 3,000 to 4,000 men in Sydney and the suburbs. 
Evidence of this recovery was also seen in the registrations for the period. Registrations fell 
over 50 per cent in the period 1896-1897 to 6,427. During this time the Government Labour 
Bureau changed its reporting period from 18 February to 30 June in line with financial year. 
Total registrations for the period of 18th February 1896 until 30th June 1897 were 9,710 men, 
still illustrating considerable decrease of 4,352. Total number of men assisted to work during 
this extended period was 19,045. In the following year the labour market appeared to improve 
slightly as registrations decreased again, but only by 324 to a total 3,843. The Government 
Labour Bureau assisted 7,228 men, a further decrease of 589. However, by 1899-1900 labour 
market conditions had deteriorated slightly with registrations increasing for the first time in 
two years, increasing by 1,634 to 5,487. During this period 6,495 men were assisted to 
employment, a decrease on the previous year of 743.337 
Labourers were the largest occupational category registering at the Government Labour 
Bureau. Labourers, being unskilled workers were particularly vulnerable in periods of 
economic depression and as the situation worsened during 1893-1894 registrations for 
labourers reached 3,285 (27 per cent of total). As the economic situation continued to worsen 
registrations for labourers continued to increase and by 1894-1895, 4,548 (34 per cent of 
total) registered and by 1895-1896 the figure had increased again to 6,152 (44 per cent of 
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total). The economic recovery of 1896-1897 appeared to improve the prospects for labourers 
as registrations fell dramatically to 2,274 men (35 per cent of total). This downward trend 
continued for the following two years decreasing to 1,954 (47 per cent of total) in 1897-1898 
and again to 1,547 in 1898-1899. As the labour market situation again worsened in 1899-
1900 registrations for labourers increased to 2,856 men, representing over 52 per cent of the 
total registrations.338 
For miners, the 1890s was a period of turmoil with industrial unrest, work reorganisation at 
BHP, falling world market prices and drought as severe depression crippled mining towns: 
Newcastle, Greta, Lithgow and Wollongong. Therefore it is not surprising that miners 
represented the second largest occupational category of men registering at the Government 
Labour Bureau. Furthermore, substantial fluctuations appear from year to year. For example 
in 1893-1894 the Government Labour Bureau registered 1200 miners (10 per cent of total) 
yet this figure had almost doubled to 2,116 by the following year (16 per cent of total) 
however, in the following years 1895-1896 the figure has returned to the previous level of 
1200 men. The economic improvements of 1896-1897 were also felt by miners as registration 
decreased to 670 men. However, it is entirely possible that some of these men had left the 
industry having gained other employment following the rationalisation of mining operations. 
The downward pattern continued for following two periods with registrations decreasing to 
518 in 1897-1898, and again to 301 in 1898-1899. Mining appears to remain stable in the 
final period of 1899-1900 with a slight increase to 303 men.339 
Manufacturing, which included metal and non-metal manufacturing, food manufacturing, 
footwear and textiles manufacturing produced the largest single industry grouping throughout 
the period. Unlike the labourers and miners, the situation for those working in the 
manufacturing sector remained relatively stable during the heightened economic depression 
of the first three years of the Government Labour Bureau’s operations.  In 1893-1894 there 
were 1278 registrations accounting for almost eleven per cent, this decreased slightly in 
1894-1895 to 1,155 registrations (8.4 per cent), increasing slightly in 1895-1896 to 1,220 (9 
per cent). With the economic recovery of 1896-1897 registrations decreased markedly to 729 
(11 per cent). While other industries in 1897-1898 experienced further falls in registrations, 
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manufacturing remained stable with 732 men. Significant improvement for manufacturing 
workers occurred in 1898-1899 as registrations fell by over half to 312 men (8 per cent). In 
the final period as had been the case in other industries, manufacturing registrations increased 
slightly to 397 men (7 per cent).340 
Similar patterns occurred in other industries. Pastoral workers: farm hands, orchard hands, 
fencers, shearers and station hands experienced high levels of unemployment during the first 
three years, accounting for around 10 per cent of total registrations. The drought of 1895 had 
disastrous effects on both pastoral workers and fossickers and became a turning point for the 
industry as registrations peaked. The final years of registrations showed a marked decrease, 
partly due to improved economic conditions but there were many reports of men leaving the 
industry. The building trades were also affected by the economic depression, as over 
speculation in the preceding boom had crippled the industry. Registrations peaked in both 
1893-1894 and 1894-1895 at 886 men. From 1895-1896 onwards there were continued 
marked reductions in the numbers of men registering to a low of 127 men in 1897-1898. This 
figure increased slightly over the final two years to 152 men.341 
Professional workers including clerks, accountants, engineers, doctors and dentists were also 
affected by the economic depression of the period. Following the banking crisis registrations 
for professional workers peaked in 1893-1894 at 422 men, representing almost four per cent 
of total registrations. There was only a minor decrease in the following period as registrations 
fell to 402 men (3 per cent). With the economic recovery spreading throughout industry 
professional workers were soon reabsorbed into the labour market and by 1897-1898 only 
131 professional men were registered. In the final two years, registrations remained relatively 
stable, a slight increase in 1898-1899 to 161 but by 1899-1900 this figure had reduced to 145 
men.342  
Criticisms 
Since its inception the Government Labour Bureau had been instrumental in easing the 
industrial distress of that time registering 81,589 men and assisted 96,044 men to work, of 
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which 27,322 or thirty three per cent of men registered were sent fossicking for gold. In a 
period of severe economic distress and uncertainty due to the financial crisis, a crippling 
drought and a building industry plagued by debt and over speculation this was a considerable 
achievement. However, despite these achievements and the changes that occurred following 
the 1893 Select Committee’s report, the Government Labour Bureau continued to receive 
criticism.343 
Wage rates remained an area of contention between the unemployed, trade unions and the 
Government Labour Bureau. While Creer claims that during the period he received many 
letters from both employers and employees applauding the work of the Government Labour 
Bureau, there were many others who claimed that the Government Labour Bureau had failed 
to safeguard wage levels and contributed to wage reductions. On numerous occasions it was 
argued that employers used the Government Labour Bureau to reduce wage rates. In one case 
it was argued that rural employers sourced carpenters from the Government Labour Bureau in 
Sydney at rates ten per cent below the current rate, while there were unemployed carpenters 
available in the area. In response to these criticisms Creer stated the Government’s policy: 
that the Government Labour Bureau only acts as a labour market intermediary ‘it acts as an 
agent between the two parties without charge, and safeguards the interests of the men in a 
way that no other labour agency does.’344 
In line with Coghlan's findings, there is evidence that employers did use the Government 
Labour Bureau to reduce wages. It was reported that both farmers in northern NSW and the 
Builders and Contractors Association met on separate occasions to set wages, usually ten per 
cent below the current rate. The Builders and Contractors Association were even harsher in 
their approach as they stated that they were not concerned by the prospect of strike action as 
the Government Labour Bureau had ‘10,000 men available’.345In other cases, it was claimed 
that the Government Labour Bureau sent men to country districts often by providing rail 
passes, at the request of employers despite the availability of local labour thereby flooding 
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the local labour market. It was claimed that these men are engaged for a week or a month at 
full wages and then cast adrift to join the local unemployed.346 
In defence, Creer claimed that he tried to avoid this occurring by relying on the local labour 
agent to give an accurate account of the state of the local labour market before sending men 
to rural areas. He argued that often, local men refuse the work due to the pay rate or because 
they have found employment without the assistance of the Government Labour Bureau. In 
one case the agent from Broken Hill claimed that he could not find enough skilled men while 
he had 90 skilled men registered only two were actively searching for employment. To fill 
this shortfall he requested that Creer send men to Broken Hill as he believed he could place 
them immediately.347 
The Government Labour Bureau was also criticised for its method for selecting men for 
employment and relief works. Under this system of administrative matching Creer personally 
selected men based on job requirements, the applicants skills and experience including 
reference from previous employers. On relief works, married men with families were give 
preference over single men. Many of the unemployed viewed these policies as unfair and 
open to favouritism. On 16 August 1895 it was reported that an unemployed deputation met 
with the Government, criticising Creer’s method of selection claiming that he favoured some 
men over others. For example, it was claimed that some men with physical weaknesses were 
given relief work over more able-bodied men. Moreover, it was felt that men were not 
classified appropriately beyond the distinction of skilled and unskilled.348 
As had been the case in the previous period, the unemployed continued to band together and 
form temporary combinations. However, largely due to the protracted industrial distress of 
the time, these temporary combinations were becoming more permanent and vocal. Creer 
stated that they were ‘fast becoming a profession .... forming leagues, unions and &c., with 
constitutions and executive officers. Contributions of 1d. and 2d. per week are made for the 
purpose for paying these officers.’349 These bodies devoted their time to criticising both the 
Government and the Government Labour Bureau’s attempts to provide relief for the 
unemployed. Their chief objective was the employment, preferably of their members, onto 
                                                           
346
 Farmers see CRE, 1.11.1898, pp. 4; Examples of rural employer’s see - SMH, 5.3.1892, pp. 5; Building 
industry see SMH, 3.6.1893, pp. 10; Men flooding rural areas see - SMH, 13.1.1897, pp. 6; T.A. Coghlan, 
Labour and Industry in Australia, pp. 2020, 2029, 2041 & 2044. 
347
 SMH, 30.6.1899, pp. 5. 
348
 SMH, 16.8.1895, pp. 6, 14.2.1896, pp. 3.  
349
 NSWPP, Vol. 58, 1898, pp. 642. 
 127  
 
relief work or into private employment in Sydney at wages of 7s per day, an objective that 
neither the government nor Government Labour Bureau could fulfil in such times.  
Trade unions were very critical about the Government Labour Bureau’s role in assisting 
employers to reduce wages and provide an alternative source of labour during industrial 
disputes. The Government Labour Bureau’s approach to industrial disputes was similar to its 
stance on wages: not to intervene. The Government was specific in its instructions that 
applicants were to be notified that a dispute was taking place and it was up to them to decide 
whether to take the job. If they did not take the position, they were not to be prejudiced in any 
future offers of employment. When such disputes occurred, Creer did notify the Government 
but was continually told to follow official policy.350 
Despite the general animosity shown by trade unions, they did provide the Government 
Labour Bureau with some constructive criticism. They believed that the Government Labour 
Bureau was an effective means of circumventing the abuses perpetrated by the private 
agencies. However, to be more effective they argued that the Government Labour Bureau 
should be in communication with private registry offices to gain information on where 
workers are required.351  
The Private registry offices were on the other hand very critical of the Government Labour 
Bureau. In one report they argued that the Government Labour Bureau had done nothing but 
demoralise men by making them lazy and rely on the government for assistance. Instead, they 
argued that if the Government Labour Bureau were abolished, the economy would revive and 
the men would find employment. This viewpoint drew upon a neoclassical belief in the 
market.352 
NSW Labour Commissioners 
Growing concern over the unemployed situation and criticisms of the operations of the 
Government Labour Bureau led the Reid Government to take further action. On 8 May, 1899 
the Governor of NSW appointed four Labour Commissioners of NSW. The role of the 
commissioners was to inquire into all matters in connection with labour not absorbed by 
private enterprise and to make recommendations to the Minister for Labour. The first 
Commissioners were William Francis Schey, Frank Brennan, Ernest Hanson and Rev. 
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William Isaac Carr Smith. Their early recommendations focussed on the appropriate relief 
work projects that could absorb the unemployed: forest thinning, bogan scrub clearing; south 
eastern railway work.353  
From 13 September, 1900 the Government Labour Bureau came under the Control of the 
Labour Commissioners. Under the new administration, all of the operations of the Bureau 
were reviewed including the system of registration and recordkeeping, making offers of 
employment, the operation of the branches and the assistance given to the unemployed. 
Finally, the title 'Government Labour Bureau' was altered. The Commissioners observed 
‘Rightly or wrongly, this term has in this State acquired a very evil reputation, and has 
become a term of reproach, oftentimes of derision. Any such feeling or expression is, 
under present circumstances, entirely unjustified; and it is sincerely hoped that with 
the passing of the opprobrious term, the old prejudice against the institution will 
gradually pass away.’354  
The office of the Government Labour Bureau was combined with that of the Government 
Labour Commissioners from 14 August, 1901 at the premises of the former Bureau opposite 
the Exhibition Building.355 
Conclusion 
In a period of cyclical unemployment the Dibbs Government established the Government 
Labour Bureau to regulate the unemployed and organise the labour market. In doing so the 
NSW labour market went from being characterised as a true market system to a co-existence 
system, with a public employment service adopting the mediation procedure of a closed 
system of administrative matching. 356 Under this system private registry offices continued to 
operate, but as this case demonstrates, the presence of a public employment service does 
curtail in part their fraudulent activities in so much as the unemployed are not bound to use 
them to find work. While there were numerous examples of private registry abuses 
throughout the period, coupled with the recommendations of the Select Committee to 
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regulate their activities, the State still failed to legislate, despite promises by the Government 
to do so.357 
In line with Commons previous findings, the Government Labour Bureau provides an 
interesting and compelling example of how a public employment service can contribute to the 
organisation of the labour market. During its eight years of operations, the Government 
Labour Bureau was largely successful in placing over 96,000 men in positions of 
employment, while also managing other labour market programs: State Farms; Village 
Settlements and gold fossicking.  While Endres and Cook have been critical of the 
Government Labour Bureau’s operations, claiming it only underwent cosmetic change and 
failed to develop innovative labour market programs, it is argued that these programs were in 
fact quite progressive and innovative for that period of time. In an economic cataclysm of 
depression, financial crisis and drought, this was quite an achievement and demonstrated both 
innovation and a genuine need for an employment service. 358 
Both Reeves and Coghlan argue that during the early years, the Government Labour Bureau 
faced considerable criticism: accused of playing into the hands of astute employers by 
allowing them to make use of it to pick up labour at less than current rates; and by supplying 
labour to take the place of striking workers. However these criticisms are unfair as they fail to 
take into account the limited capacity of the Government Labour Bureau to act. As 
Blankenburg reminds us, public employment services are peculiar in that they mediate rather 
than govern. Therefore these criticisms should be levelled at the Government as it was the 
Government’s policy that dictated that they were not to intervene in wage disputes or 
industrial disputes and act only as a labour market intermediary.359 
Furthermore, while it appears that employers did use the Government Labour Bureau as an 
alternative source of labour particularly during industrial disputes, it must be emphasised that 
their ability to do this was also in part facilitated by the depressed state of the labour market 
at the time. Creer did attempt to validate the state of rural labour markets before sending men 
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to these areas and he cannot he held responsible for employers strategies to flood the local 
labour market and reduce wages. 360  
Coghlan and Nurick had claimed that the Government Labour Bureau was only a temporary 
measure to organise the labour market yet as this chapter has demonstrated, the state did 
maintain a firm commitment to the problem of unemployment and in fact expanded labour 
market programmes. Furthermore, it’s important to remember that the State’s approach to 
labour market programs was dependent on its own financial situation. The Government 
Labour Bureau only ceased to operate in name and not in function, as it continued on until 
World War II under subsequent names. Following the Government Labour Bureau, it became 
the NSW Labour Commission in 1900.361 
While both the neoclassical and Keynesian economist’s analysis of public employment 
services have focussed on predetermined economic modelling, this example provides further 
support for the institutional economic approach. In this case the origins and operations of the 
Government Labour Bureau were shaped by socio economic and political concerns. The 
socio economic concerns included the fraudulent behaviour by private registries upon the 
unemployed, who formed temporary combinations and campaigned for the introduction of 
the Government Labour Bureau. In terms of its operation, the Government Labour Bureau’s 
functions were three-fold; relieve the distress of the unemployed; act as a channel through 
which labour passes into government employ and provide private employers with an avenue 
to engage labour in a bid to support capital development.362   
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Chapter 5 NSW Labour Commissioners  
Introduction 
The preceding chapter has overcome some shortcomings in the literature with regard to the 
origins and development of the public employment service in NSW. As previously discussed, 
the Government Labour Bureau was shaped by a number of socio-economic and political 
concerns: rising unemployment, economic uncertainty, fraudulent practices perpetrated by 
private registries, limited State finances and political pressure. However, it was also these 
issues that shaped its successor: the NSW Labour Commission.363 
By 1899 against a backdrop of increased economic uncertainty and rising unemployment the 
Reid Government faced growing criticism over role and effectiveness of the Government 
Labour Bureau. In a bid to relieve this political pressure, the NSW Labour Commission was 
established on 8 May, 1899.  Initially, the NSW Labour Commissioners role was to inquire 
into all matters in connection with labour not absorbed by private enterprise and to make 
recommendations to the Minister for Labour. However, this role was short-lived. Following 
the election of the Lyne Protectionist Government, the role of the NSW Labour 
Commissioners was significantly changed and their responsibilities were greatly enlarged to 
include control over the Government Labour Bureau, the Casual Labour Farm at Pitt Town 
and all of the branches of these agencies. Following the election of the See Government in 
March 1901, the office of the Government Labour Bureau was later combined with that of the 
Government Labour Commissioners from 14 August, 1901 under the control of the 
Department of Public Works.364 
The NSW Labour Commissioners operated as a labour market intermediary for over five 
years before being disbanded by the Carruthers Government and replaced with the State 
Labour Bureau on 31 October 1905. While the NSW Labour Commission was initially 
designed to be merely an advisory body to the Government on labour not absorbed by private 
employers, it soon undertook a functional role, and ultimately reformed the public 
employment services operations in NSW. While Endres and Cook have argued that the public 
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employment services failed to develop and innovative labour market programs, this chapter 
disputes this claim. Instead it is argued that under the NSW Labour Commissioners the public 
employment services in NSW underwent a period of structural reform which included a 
number of innovate labour market programs: the rationalisation of registry operations along 
the lines of gender and union association; the introduction of a sophisticated classification 
system which allowed a more in depth understanding of the labour market: and a female 
registry. For the first time the State had addressed the neglect of female labour and provided a 
registry office for women.365 
While Coghlan and Nurick have argued the early labour bureaus were only a temporary 
measure to organise the labour market and lacked the state’s long-term commitment, this 
chapter will continue to demonstrate, that the state did maintain its commitment to the 
problem of unemployment and expanded labour market programs. However, it is important to 
note that the state’s approach to labour market programs was largely curtailed by its own 
political paradigm, electoral cycle and the financial situation at the time. Following the 
election of the Carruthers Government in 1904, an inquiry was undertaken into the operations 
of the NSW Labour Commissioners. This inquiry recommended a raft of changes designed to 
reduce costs which included the termination of the NSW Labour Commission, the closure of 
Trades Hall and Female Registries. However, the inquiry was adamant that a public 
employment service was necessary and should continue to operate in NSW. On 1st November 
1905 the NSW Labour Commission was rebadged and repackaged and became known as the 
State Labour Bureau of NSW.366 
This chapter will begin by examining the economic, industrial and political conditions in 
NSW during the period of the NSW Labour Commissioner’s 1899-1905.  In light of this 
discussion, the origins of the NSW Labour Commissioners will be analysed. The discussion 
will then focus on the operations of the public employment services operated by the NSW 
Labour Commissioners. Finally, the criticisms, problems and reasons for its eventual 
termination will be analysed.  
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Economic and Industrial Context 
The population of NSW population continued to grow during the early twentieth century. 
Between 1901 and 1905 NSW’s population increased by ten per cent from 1,359,133 in 1901 
to 1,496,050 by 1905. The gender distribution being relatively stable and even with 712,456 
males and 646,677 females in 1901 and 794,400 males and 701,650 females in 1905. With 
the economic shift towards urban industries such as manufacturing and building there was 
continued migration to urban centres and by 1901 66 per cent of the NSW population were 
residing in cities or towns.367  
Following the severe depression of the 1890s, there was a brief return to prosperity in 1900-
1901. However, severe drought prolonged the stagnation of the economy until 1906. Such 
problems highlighted the sensitivity of the domestic economy to the fluctuations in the price 
of export staples such as wool. As Macintyre and Mitchell have argued, there was a ‘desire to 
stabilise the domestic economy and protect it from sudden shocks.’368 In 1901, primary 
products from the mines, stations, farms and forests made up 93.8 per cent of exports worth 
£49,696,000.369 
During the drought, Australia’s sheep flock fell sharply from 100 million in the beginning of 
1895 to 54 million at start of 1903. This significant reduction was not only due to the 
drought, but in part can be attributed to a long running imbalance involving the 
overproduction of wool in terms of both overseas demand and carrying capacity, especially 
the case in the dry interior of NSW and Queensland. With the breaking of the drought in 1903 
and the recovery in wool production, with improving wool prices, Australia’s wool cheque 
doubled during the 1900s. Other export prices also rose and Australia’s terms of trade 
improved appreciably.370  
The majority of the NSW population continued to be employed in primary industries: 
pastoral, mining and dairying. By 1901, 172,854 people were employed in primary industries. 
By 1901 the manufacturing sector employed 66,230 people, of which 54,556 were males and 
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11,674 females at 3,367 establishments. By 1904 the number of manufacturing 
establishments had increased slightly to 3,632 employing in total 68,036. Despite an overall 
increase on the 1901 figures of almost three per cent an analysis of the gender breakdown 
highlights a significant change in the composition of the workforce. Male participation 
decreased by two per cent to 53,457, while female participation increased by almost a quarter 
to 14,579 females. This dramatic increase in female participation can be attributed to a 
deliberate employer strategy to attract female labour so as to reduce costs. Buckley and 
Wheelwright found that manufacturing employers preferred, and relied on, female labour as 
their pay rates was half that of a male, however, they argued that this strategy ultimately led 
to the traditional trade unions recruiting females workers.371 
Federation in 1901 assisted the expansion of the manufacturing industry with the elimination 
of customs barriers between the states. This was of course the major purpose of Federation 
which improved the allocation of economic resources between the States. An early effect of 
the enlarged common market in Australia was favour towards specialisation and the more 
rapid growth and concentration of the manufacturing industry in the two dominant States, 
NSW and Victoria. Each held about one-third of Australia’s population providing greater 
relative benefits from economies of scale, thereby enabling them to compete more favourably 
for the market than the smaller States. Consequently, the manufacturing sector in smaller 
states generally grew comparatively slowly.372 
The 1890s and the turn of the century represented one of the most significant periods of 
industrial reform in NSW and Australia. Following the industrial turmoil of the 1890s, the 
NSW Government embarked upon a range of legislative reforms in an attempt to avoid and 
curtail further disputes. Following the failure of the early attempt to regulate industrial 
relations in NSW in 1892, with the Trades Dispute Conciliation and Arbitration Act, the Reid 
Free Trade Government passed a Conciliation Act in 1899. This act merely authorised the 
Minister for Labour to inquire into the causes and circumstances of a dispute and endeavour 
to bring the parties to an amicable agreement. However, the Awards were not enforceable, 
procedures slow and there had to be a strike or lock-out before this machinery could be 
invoked. The Minister only invoked the Act four times between 1899 and 1900 and its failure 
reinforced the demands for greater compulsion. The legislation also contributed to the Labor 
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Party, which held the balance of power in the legislative assembly, transferring its support 
from the Free Traders to Protectionists (later the Progressives).373 
By 1900, the newly elected Lyne Protectionist Government moved further towards 
compulsory arbitration. In June 1900, Bernhard Ringrose Wise, Attorney General introduced 
an Industrial Arbitration Bill into the NSW Legislative Assembly. He drew his inspiration 
from the New Zealand legislation, but amended the Bill most notably rejecting the 
conciliation provisions believing they were a waste of time, as disputes generally ended in 
arbitration. The Bill allowed registered trade unions to unilaterally bring employers on any 
‘industrial dispute’ or ‘industrial matter’ before a Court of Arbitration. The legally 
enforceable award could prescribe a minimum rate of wages and preference to unionists. 
Wise also borrowed the idea of a common rule from the Sidney and Beatrice Webb, British 
Fabians, allowing the Court to make the award applicable to the whole industry. This was 
designed to avoid ‘sweating’ and ensure employers covered by awards were not 
disadvantaged. Not surprisingly, there was opposition to the Bill mainly by employers and 
conservative members of the Legislative Council who rejected the Bill in November 1900.374 
The July 1901, State elections revealed strong support amongst the electorate for compulsory 
arbitration and the Lyne Government, the opposition and the Labor party included industrial 
arbitration in their electoral platform. The Government were successful at the election and 
again introduced the Bill and the Legislative Council, who concerned at appearing 
obstructive, passed the Bill, adding a sunset clause of seven years. In December 1901 the Bill 
became legislation. The 1901 Act faced major problems. Employers reduced the 
effectiveness of the Act by appealing to higher courts. Employers also frustrated the system 
by encouraging the registration of bogus unions, refusing to register their own association and 
using legal representation to slow down proceedings and increase costs. They reduced the 
impact of awards with strategies such as subcontracting and installing new labour saving 
machinery. These tactics frustrated the trade unions and labour.375 
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The outbreak and effects of the 1890s strikes also concerned the founding fathers of 
Federation. They felt that these industrial disputes, which had paralysed industry, had no 
place in a new country like Australia. This led to the growing support for a system of 
compulsory arbitration in place of the system of collective bargaining. Compulsory 
arbitration was seen as a way to avoid the economic disruption of industry, the losses of 
income, and the hardship suffered by workers and their families during strikes and lockouts. 
Furthermore, many concerned with industrial relations were impressed by the apparently 
successful system of compulsory arbitration introduced in New Zealand in 1895. Another 
important factor, which strengthened the grounds for the establishment of a legal system of 
wage determination, was the presence of ‘sweated’ labour industries, where union 
organisation was absent or weak, for example, in the clothing trades. In 1904 the 
Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act was passed. The court which it established 
began to function in the following year.376 
Political Landscape 
After many years of debate the federation of the six Australian colonies came into force in 
January 1901. This can be contributed to many factors: nationalist sentiment and a desire for 
a unified approach on defence and foreign policy (a concern highlighted by the German 
occupation of New Guinea in the 1880s) as well as need for national policy in such areas as 
banking, immigration and postal services. Bankers and merchants who did business in more 
than one colony favoured federation a means of facilitating trade and payments. Trade was a 
crucial issue and federation meant the creation of a common market free from intercolonial 
trade barriers. Merchants interested in overseas trade tended to oppose federation. Sugar 
planters in northern Queensland feared Federation because of the White Australia Policy 
associated with it; whereas miners in Queensland favoured it for the same reason. Miners 
generally supported Federation. Miners often migrated across colonial borders, their trade 
union was a federated body and they were little concerned with petty colonial rivalries.377 
Federation, achieved in 1901, had a tremendous impact on the powers and role of the 
Parliaments of the former colonies. The Parliament of NSW ceded its control over defence, 
customs and excise, coinage, postage, etc, under the new Australian Constitution, and power 
to legislate over those areas went to the Commonwealth Parliament. The many alterations to 
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the NSW Constitution since 1855 were consolidated in a new Constitution Act in 1902 and, 
following a referendum, the Legislative Assembly was reduced to 90 seats to take account of 
the narrower responsibilities and the new level of political representation which the electors 
now had through their Federal Parliamentarians. The Parliament of NSW also contributed 
substantially to the membership of the new Federal Parliament. Of the 32 representatives 
elected from NSW, 27 had previously been Members of the Parliament of NSW, including 
two former Premiers. The group included Edmund Barton, who became the first Australian 
Prime Minister and four others who also later became Prime Minsters (John Watson, George 
Reid, Joseph Cook, and W. M. Hughes).378 
The political party system underwent further changes in the decade after Federation. The old 
Free Trade and Protectionist parties had lost the issue that previously divided them with the 
establishment of the Federal Parliament and its protectionist programs, and gradually division 
emerged between Labor and non-Labor conservative parties. The last Protectionist 
Government was the Sir William Lyne Government 1899-1901. He was succeeded by Sir 
John See’s Progressive Government 1901-1904. Following See’s retirement, the Progressive 
party became divided with a reluctant Thomas Waddell becoming Premier on 15 June 1904 
till the election on 29 August 1904. The Labor party at the time was still not strong in 
suburban areas and the Progressives were in left disarray. The Carruthers conservative 
Liberal Reform Party won government in August 1904 and remained in power till 1907.379  
Carruthers who became both premier and treasurer, wanted a fusion ministry, but feared he 
would split his own party, and instead announced a cabinet on 29 August 1904, which was 
wholly Liberal. In the new parliament he required strict party discipline and kept ministers in 
touch with party members through regular meetings. He took advantage of better seasons to 
implement measures for economic recovery. He aided business by reducing public 
expenditure, reforming the civil service and cutting rail freights; he also stimulated regional 
growth with local government reform, culminating in the Local Government Act, 1906. As 
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the following discussion will illustrate, all successive governments took an interest in the 
problem of unemployment and the operations of the public employment services in NSW.380 
Origins of the NSW Labour Commissioners 
The Reid Government established the Labour Commission of NSW on 8 May, 1899.  Four 
Commissioners were appointed: William Francis Schey, Frank Brennan, Ernest Hanson and 
Rev Carr. William Francis Schey who had been an early Labor activist in Parliament was to 
become synonymous with the early NSW labour bureaus and particularly with the 
Government Agricultural Training Farm, which was later named Scheyville in 1905. Schey 
was a former trade unionist, previously secretary of the Amalgamated Railway and Tramway 
Service Association. His long-term association with the NSW railways provided him with 
both the platform and support to enter politics. Schey’s political career began after his was 
elected as a free trader to the Legislative Assembly in 1887 for Redfern. However, he proved 
an unreliable supporter of Sir Henry Parkes and was defeated in February 1889. However, he 
won a by-election in June 1889 and held the seat as a Protectionist until 1891.381 
Schey had been an ardent advocate within Parliament for railway workers. He strongly 
supported the Government Railways Act of 1888, which he believed would remove many 
abuses. This was also welcomed by Chief Commissioner E. M. G. Eddy. However, they 
clashed in 1889 over the responsibility for a fatal Bathurst railway accident. Schey opposed 
Eddy's proposed sickness and pension fund and bitterly attacked him in parliament. In 1894 
Schey won the seat of Darlington for Labor. He then held the seat as a Protectionist in the 
next year, and was defeated as an Independent in 1898.382 
It was during the 1890s that Schey also became an ardent advocate for the unemployed, 
campaigning for the creation of a public employment service. As a Parliamentarian he 
championed the cause of the unemployed, often citing abuses by private registries while also 
regularly meeting with unemployed deputations. In his later role as Chief Commissioner his 
major achievement is considered to be the administration of the Government Agricultural 
Training Farm, Scheyville, which provided training in farm work for the unemployed.383 
However, it was in his role as Chief Commissioner and later Director of the State Labour 
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Bureau, that he proved himself a capable administrator and was largely effective in creating a 
sophisticated public employment service.384 
The other Labour Commissioners also had previous experience with the labour movement 
and the unemployed. Frank Brennan was prominent in the labour movement. He was one of 
the leaders of the eight hour day movement, and leading member of the Tinsmiths’ Society. 
Ernest Hanson was a senior member of the Department of Charitable Institutions, which was 
responsible for the management of all hospitals, infirmaries, orphan schools and charitable 
institutions receiving grants from the State. Rev William Isaac Carr Smith was an Anglican 
Minister who was interested in social injustice, he regularly preached to the unemployed in 
the Domain and set up a mission for the city poor.385 
 Initially, the role of the Labour Commissioners was to inquire into all matters in connection 
with labour not absorbed by private enterprise and to make recommendations to the Minister 
for Labour. Following the election of the Lyne Protectionist Government, responsibility for 
the Labour Commission was transferred from the Department of Public Instruction to the 
Department of Public Works on 1 July 1900. On 13 September, 1900 the role of the Labour 
Commissioners was significantly enlarged when they were given control over the 
Government Labour Bureau, the Casual Labour Farm at Pitt Town and all of the branches of 
these agencies. Following the election of the See Government, the office of the Government 
Labour Bureau was later combined with that of the Government Labour Commissioners from 
14 August 1901, at the premises of the former Bureau opposite the Exhibition Building in 
Sydney.386 
The Labour Commission of NSW, like its predecessors was born out of political necessity. 
The unprecedented economic depression of the 1890s coupled with devastating effects of the 
drought had paralysed industry and while there had been signs of improvement by the mid to 
late 1890s, the situation had worsened by the close of the century and the Government was 
again compelled to act. As unemployment continued to rise, the Government faced increasing 
political pressure and criticism from the unemployed. Anger and desperation by the 
                                                           
384
 NSWPDLA, Vol. 44, 1890, pp. 144 & 189, Vol. 56, 1892, pp. 4814 & 4977-5010; NSWVPLA, Vol. 50, 
27.8.1891, pp. 116; SMH, 132.1892, pp. 8; R. M. Audley, 'Schey, William Francis (1857 - 1913)', pp. 535-536. 
385
 K.J. Cable, ‘Smith, William Isaac Carr (1857-1930)’, Australian Dictionary of Biography’, Vol. 11, 
Melbourne University Press, 1988, pp. 671; SMH, 2.8.1921, pp. 8; NSW Blue Book Public Service List 1901, 
Government Printer, Sydney, pp. 9. 
386
 NSWVPLA, Vol. 6, 1901, pp. 369 & 378; NSWGG, No. 876, 14.9.1900, pp. 7144-7145 , No. 901, 21.9.1900. 
pp. 7371; SMH, 7.6.1899, pp. 4. 
 140  
 
unemployed also gave further rise to the issue and claims of political patronage. The 
unemployed claimed that undue political influence affected the selection of men for both 
employment and public works. Ministers complained of the number and regularity of 
deputations from members of the unemployed, who ardently begged them for assistance. The 
Reid Government created the NSW Labour Commission in a bid to diffuse the political 
tension by providing an alternative body for the unemployed to petition whilst also 
attempting to curtail any opportunity for political patronage.387 
While it can be argued that the Reid Government created the NSW Labour Commissioners in 
an attempt to gain political credibility over an area of increasing political vulnerability, it was 
initially the Lyne Government and later the See and Carruthers Governments that actually 
reformed the public employment service system. Following the election of the Lyne 
Government, and after gaining responsibility for the labour bureau operations the NSW 
Labour Commissioners were instructed to undertake a raft of reforms which included 
establishing an Intelligence Branch where a register containing the particulars of those 
seeking employment was to be maintained.388 
The four NSW Labour Commissioners’ selected by the Reid Government continued to serve 
following the election of the both Lyne and See Government’s: William Francis Schey, Frank 
Brennan, Ernest Hanson and Rev. William Isaac Carr Smith. Schey was appointed Chief 
Labour Commissioner from May 1900 until the Labour Commissions cessation in 1905. 
Following which, he was appointed Director of the State Labour Bureau and continued on in 
that post until 1912. Following the resignation of Ernest Hanson on the 7 December 1900 due 
to work pressures in his role at the NSW Treasury, the board was reduced to three members. 
On 13 November 1901 Rev. W.I. Carr Smith, however, also resigned. He was replaced by the 
Joseph Creer, former Superintendent of the Government Labour Bureau, on 15 November 
1901. The See Government retired Creer from the NSW Labour Commission on 17 February 
1904. Creer was 72 years of age at the time of retirement. Following Creer’s retirement the 
NSW Labour Commission was reduced to two consisting of Chief Commissioner Schey and 
Commissioner Frank Brennan, both of whom were actively involved in the operations of the 
labour bureau.389 
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Operations 
The NSW Labour Commissioner’s initial operations were confined solely to the selection of 
men on public relief works, while the Government Labour Bureau continued to operate 
autonomously. Following the election of the Lyne Government, the role of the NSW Labour 
Commissioners was substantially enlarged in August 1900 to include responsibility for the 
Government Labour Bureau and the administration for the Casual Labour Farm at Pitt Town 
and all of the branches of these agencies. Furthermore, following the election of the See 
Government, the public employment services were further rationalised with new registries 
divided between union and non-union labour, focussing on either general employment 
vacancies or employment vacancies on government relief works. This was a significant 
period of structural change and reform in the management and operations of the NSW public 
employment service.390  
Part of this structural change involved an attempt to create efficiencies and cost savings in the 
administration of the unemployed. Firstly, the office of the Government Labour Bureau was 
combined with that of the NSW Labour Commissioners from 14 August, 1901 at the 
premises of the former Bureau opposite the Exhibition Building in Sydney. Secondly, the 
office of the Superintendent of the Labour Bureau was abolished and Creer retired. Chief 
Commissioner Schey was now responsible for the management of the Government Labour 
Bureau and its branches and agencies, as well as the administration of the Casual Labour 
Farm. The immediate effect was a cost saving of £681 per annum in salaries and £175 in rent 
of office premises, the numerical strength of the staff being reduced by the elimination of the 
Superintendent as well as dispensing with three temporary clerks.391  
Beyond achieving cost savings, the NSW Labour Commissioners were empowered to reform 
the public employment services. The reform agenda was heavily influenced by criticism of 
the Government Labour Bureau. The most notable proposed change was the establishment of 
an Intelligence Branch, which was to collect and collate data on the state of the labour 
market. Further proposed changes included a new classification system for the unemployed, 
specialised registries for women and servants, the establishment of labour depots, industrial 
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farm settlements, assisted settlement blocks and the acceleration of public works to provide 
employment.392 
It was argued that pivotal to the structural reform program for the public employment service 
was the establishment of the Intelligence Branch. This branch was to collect and collate data 
on the state of the NSW labour market and the analysis to be then distributed to the Clerks of 
Petty Sessions in a bid to assist both the unemployed in seeking employment and the 
Government in formulating policy. Despite the importance given to this proposal and the 
constant reference to its impending establishment, it failed to eventuate as a separate 
institution during this period. Despite this, it appears that the Dawes Point Registry, which 
was the head office for the NSW Labour Commissioners, in fact became the de-facto 
Intelligence Branch as it collated the data from the branches and the other registries. More 
importantly this data provided the earliest attempt at a comprehensive statistical analysis of 
the NSW labour market.393 
The most significant long-term structural change that occurred under the NSW Labour 
Commissioners was the introduction of the new registration system. The NSW Labour 
Commissioners undertook a review of the operations of the system of classification of the 
unemployed, the method of assigning the unemployed to positions, financial assistance and 
rations, and the system of registered people reporting to the office.  During this review the 
NSW Labour Commissioners identified a number of significant problems in the registration 
system. Firstly, the system failed to classify men by skills and experience in allocating 
employment. Instead all men were placed on equal footing until they had passed through the 
ballot for places in any work that was announced. Secondly, the method for selecting men 
through the ballot system was also problematic as the Superintendent had the discretionary 
power to reject any man found incapable of doing the work, either before, or after the 
ballot.394 
The ballot system drew the most criticism, particularly from the public and the press. Under 
this system, large numbers of men assembled in the yard often resulting in outbreaks of 
violence with the weaker men being over powered by the stronger men and ‘self-respecting 
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and orderly working men leaving in disgust.’395 It was also found that some men had 
numerous tickets all under different names. Many argued that the time spent by men at these 
assemblies was wasted and could have been better spent searching for employment. 
Furthermore, it was also feared that ‘such assembling of men gave an opportunity to agitators 
for addressing them on political subjects.’396 
A further problem with the old system was the overly bureaucratic and cumbersome method 
for registering applicants. When registering, each applicant was required to produce an 
elector’s right, particulars of age, dependents and occupation. Details were then recorded on a 
sheet that the applicant signed and an abstract of these details was given to the applicant on a 
card. The sheets of details were bound in volumes with over one hundred of such volumes 
containing 1,000 registrations many of whom were found to be out of date. Despite the 
collection of these details, little or no attention was given to these cards when the allocation 
of work took place.397 
To overcome these problems the NSW Labour Commissioners abolished the ballot system 
and replaced it with a rotation system, whereby each applicant would be offered work in his 
turn. Secondly, as the existing registers contained over 90,000 names entered over an eight 
year period, the NSW Labour Commissioners were unable to ascertain the employment status 
of these men therefore they decided to embark on a process of re-registration. Under this new 
system the NSW Labour Commissioners attempted to procure accurate unemployment 
statistics.398 
In terms of mediation procedures the labour bureau operated as a closed system of 
administrative matching: matching registered applicants with registered vacancies. Schey at 
the Dawes Point Branch and Brennan at the Trades Hall personally selected applicants based 
on the requirements of the job and the applicant’s skills and past work experience including 
references from previous employers, thus attempting to create a job-person match. Using 
means such as circulars, advertisements and press coverage, the branches of the Labour 
Bureau advised employers of its major functions in assisting them to fill vacancies.399 
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To ensure a more fair and efficient system, the NSW Labour Commissioners developed a 
new classification system that would assist the closed system of administrative matching 
(refer Table 5.1). Under this system men were classified to one of six classes. Class A 
referred to trained professionals for example solicitors, doctors and other skilled white collar 
workers. Class B referred to skilled first class tradesmen. Class C referred to the manual 
labouring class. This class was further divided into three C1 being clerical, C2 being 
mechanics and artisans and C3 unskilled labourers. Unskilled labourers were later sub-
divided into three further classes according to physical strength. Under this new system the 
NSW Labour Commissioners decided that men in classes A, B and C could be absorbed on 
public works for example harbour works, tunnels, railway works and road works. Men in 
Class D it was argued would be suitable for the Butty-gang System, with the gangs being as 
small as possible to reduce friction.400  
Classification Definition 
A Professional – Solicitors, Doctors and other highly skilled white collar 
workers.  
B Mechanical and Artisans - Mechanics, miners, and others skilled tradesmen 
who, owing to fluctuations in their particular trades or vocations, are 
sometime out of work 
 
C Manual Labour Class - Surplus labour classified by industry, comprising 
those who may have learned particular trade or occupations in a which are 
from time to time overmanned  
C1 –clerical  
C2 – mechanics and artisans 
C3 – unskilled labourers 
 
D Men who, though willing are physically unfit to compete with able-bodied 
workers. This class is added to at times by the discharge of the least efficient 
workers from various occupations when trade is dull. 
 
E The aged and infirm who are totally unfit to do a day’s work 
 
F The “Industrial Sediment” consisting of criminals , loafers, and social 
wreckage, who, under present circumstances, are a burden on the community, 
and tend to drag down to their own level members of the genuine working 
class. 
 
 Table 5.1 NSW Labour Commissioners Classification System401 
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Those unsuitable for work were classified in Classes E and F. The NSW Labour 
Commissioners believed that more could, and should, be done for these men. For the men in 
Class E who were crowded in asylums, the Labour Commissioners proposed to divide them 
into single and married, and allow the married to live together in small cottages, while 
keeping the barrack system for the single men. Furthermore, they suggested that these men be 
provided with a sufficient area of land to encourage market gardening and to keep small farm 
animals. For men in Class F they argued more could be done with a view of reformation 
rather than punishment. The argued that the Acts covering vagrants should be strictly 
enforced and these men should be placed in Compulsory Labour Colonies, controlled by 
officers of the Government.402  
The new classification system came in to force on the 1st July 1901. Under the new system, 
men registering were required to produce an elector’s right as identification. Following an 
interview with a classification officer, where they were questioned regarding their skills and 
experience they were assigned to one of the five classes. The applicant was required to supply 
details: age, birthplace, dependents and previous employment. These details were recorded on 
a numbered card. This card also contained provisions for recording all subsequent dealings 
with the man including offers of work, acceptance or refusals, periods of employment, 
character and ability reports advances and refunds. At the end of the interview the applicant 
was required to sign the card to certify its correctness, subsequent information would again 
be signed and the signatures cross checked. A small pocket card, bearing a corresponding 
number, and containing name, address, age and occupation was given to the applicant. A 
duplicate of the small card was placed in a specially devised and divided cabinet, in order of 
date of registration. Cards were divided into cabinets for each class. These cards formed the 
basis of the rotation system for the allocation of relief work and private employment.403  
Unlike the old system whereby men gathered in the yard of the labour bureau waiting for 
employment offers, men were notified of employment by either postcard or telegram. If the 
men failed to respond, other men in their turn were then notified, until the requested number 
of unemployed men was available for the work. Within the office, the cabinets were divided 
for men eligible and waiting work; those at work (so far as known); and those who failed to 
report monthly as required; the cards being reassigned as necessary. Thus the cards of the 
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men who are sent to work are placed alphabetically in the ‘At Work’ division. When the men 
report off work and are waiting for further employment, their card is returned again to the 
eligible division, but placed behind all those men awaiting work. The cards of men who 
refuse work when offered or fail to respond to notices sent to them are similarly treated, any 
legitimate excuse being accepted; in which case the cards are placed in the front of the 
eligible division to await the next call for work. At the end of each month, the cards of those 
who made no effort to report during the month were removed from the eligible section and 
were placed in alphabetical order in the ‘non-reported’ division.404 
The NSW Labour Commissioners believed that this system ensured greater fairness and 
equity in the provision of employment, while avoiding large groups of men waiting in the 
yard which had often resulted in violent and noisy deputations. For men in rural areas, it was 
argued that they were no longer required to travel to Sydney as they were able to register 
through a local branch or agency.  Preference was also given to the local unemployed in rural 
areas, and married men over single men in certain cases. Classifications were changed upon 
application, where experience and skills could be justified.405 
A further significant structural change to occur during this period was the reorganisation and 
rationalisation of the registry operations. Aimed at employment services, these reforms 
resulted largely in the bureaucratisation and rationalisation of the public employment 
services. Registries were established to cater for either union or non union men who focussed 
on applications for employment or for relief work. Previously, all men had registered for 
consideration for both employment and relief work at the Labour Bureau’s main office, 
which had been relocated to Dawes Point under the control of Chief Commissioner Schey. 
By December 1901, the Government had opened a second registry for trade unionists at the 
Trades Hall, under the charge of Commissioner Brennan. Non-unionists continued to register 
at the Dawes Point office. The Government believed that this rationalisation was essential 
due to the animosity between union and non-union labour.406  
By the beginning of 1902 the See Government felt that NSW Labour Commissioners should 
focus their attention more on employment vacancies rather than just government works. 
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Subsequently, the State Labour Board was established in January 1902 to deal only with 
applications for government relief works. The State Labour Board consisted of the five heads 
of branches of the Public Works Department, their function being to select men for the public 
works programs. The President of the Board was the Commissioner and Engineer-in-Chief 
for Roads and Bridges. From 1 March 1902, the Government also transferred the control of 
the Trades Hall Registry to the State Labour Board, but Commissioner Brennan remained in 
charge.407  
It can be argued that much of the reform agenda was largely experimental and in some cases 
short-lived. However, it is important to emphasise that the short term nature of these reforms 
does not equate to a lack of innovation, quite the opposite as their willingness to adopt these 
reforms does indicate a willingness to innovate and experiment. After two years of operation 
the See Government abolished the State Labour Board on the 31 January 1904. The 
registrations made at that office were transferred back to the Dawes Point office, and the 
Trades Hall Registry was again placed under the control of the Labour Commissioners. 
During this period, the Labour Commissioners continued to be responsible for casual labour 
farm; registration of female domestic servants; registration of unionists at Trades Hall for 
employment; and the registration of non-unionists at Dawes Point for employment and the 
general management of the unemployed question.408  
The NSW Labour Commissioners also attempted to reform the operations of the labour 
bureau’s forty two country branches and agencies. Under the existing arrangements, the day 
to day operations of the branches and agencies were managed by the Clerks of Petty Sessions. 
The NSW Labour Commissioners believed that this arrangement was ‘unsatisfactory as the 
staff does not have the time or capabilities to deal with the unemployed.’409 In an attempt to 
improve the effectiveness of the agencies and branches, Schey proposed that the Clerks of 
Petty Sessions should be replaced with Road Superintendents. The justification being two-
fold: firstly the men apply to the Superintendent for work anyway as they select the men for 
the works, and secondly, with this previous experience they were more than qualified to 
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classify the unemployed. In places where there was no Road Superintendent they proposed 
that the officer locally in charge of the police should be appointed Labour Agent as per the 
New Zealand system. Despite calls for this reform it also failed to materialise and throughout 
the period the branches continued to be managed under the same arrangement.410 
The Labour Commissioners of NSW also became responsible for the Casual Labour Farm in 
September, 1900. The purpose of the farm was to provide temporary accommodation and 
employment for men who were unemployed and homeless. Residents received meals, and 
were paid according to the hours of labour. The Government Labour Bureau selected the men 
seeking assignment to the farm. However, the Labour Commissioners were soon concerned 
over the operations of the Casual Labour Farm. From their initial inspection they found that 
the Casual Labour Farm suffered from significant problems: only 160 acres of the 2140 acres 
had been cultivated; the 20 acre orchard was neglected; it had poor soil quality; inadequate 
irrigation; and unhygienic living accommodation. Schey initially recommended the sale of 
the farm with the proceeds to be used to purchase another site; however, no Crown Land 
suitable for the purpose was found within a similar distance from Sydney. Left with no 
alternative the Labour Commissioners set about improving the farm.411  
In its first year under the Labour Commissioners a greater efficiency was reported with the 
number of men in residence doubling and the living accommodation much improved. During 
1901 the Principal of the Hawkesbury Agricultural College inspected the farm with a view of 
providing further recommendations for improvement. He recommended that the pig-raising 
be further developed and there be diversification into dairying, poultry farming and that bee-
keeping be attempted. In the following years, under the Labour Commissioners, productivity 
and efficiency increased and the numbers of men being sent to work on the farm grew from 
30 in 1900 to 54 men in residence at 30 June 1906.412  
Female Registry 
A long term criticism of the early public employment services in NSW had been its neglect in 
assisting female workers. The See Government was concerned by both this criticism and the 
increasing number of reports, in both the press and Parliament, of the abuses being 
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perpetrated by private registry offices on female workers. These reports claimed that female 
workers faced ‘exorbitant charges and heartless treatment’413 and were vulnerable to a 
‘system of extortion.’414 In a bid to overcome this neglect and provide some form of 
protection for female workers the Government Female Registry Office was opened on 10 
March 1902. The registry office was located on the corner of Market and Castlereagh Streets, 
Sydney and opened its doors on 10 March 1902, almost ten years to the day after the 
Government Labour Bureau commenced operations.415 
The Government Female Registry office was managed by a Lady Superintendent, who 
registered all the unemployed females, received all employers, introduced prospective 
employees and transacted all the usual business of a registry office. The Female Registry 
Office operated in much the same as its male counterpart except for two significant 
differences: it operated on a smaller scale with one office in Sydney and it did not advertise 
its services, relying instead on informal networks. Despite these limitations, as Table 5.2 
highlights, it achieved considerable results: by 1904 4,255 females had been registered, 5,863 
applications received by employers and 3,561 females had been placed in employment. By 
1905 the Government Female Registry reported it had 4,000 females registered and were 
filling 111 engagements per month.416 
  
Year Number Registered Employer 
applications 
Number sent to work 
March 1902-30 June 
1902 
1,113 1,092 747 
1902-1903 1,685 2,315 1,357 
1903-1904 1,457 2,456 1,457 
Total  4,255 5,863 3,561 
Table 5.2 Female Registry Operations 1902-1904 
The response to the Government Female Registry was positive, from both employers and 
employees. The lady Superintendent claimed:  
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‘it is pleasing to be able to report that in the majority of cases every satisfaction has 
been given to employers, there being few complaints; while judging by the fact that 
employees retain their positions, they too are satisfied with their employment and 
remuneration’.417  
However, the Female Registry was not without its own problems and critics. It was argued 
that the Sydney location of the office attracted many unemployed females to the city, many of 
whom who were reluctant to accept positions in rural or remote areas. In other cases it was 
reported that some of the females accepted positions but failed to report for work, or in other 
cases only stayed for a few days and left without notice. Complaints of incompetence were 
also received, and where substantiated, the women concerned were removed from the 
register, and refused any further assistance. Despite these problems, the Female Registry 
Office provided an important service and filled an important void in the labour market, 
protecting vulnerable females from the unscrupulous practices of the private registries.418 
In the 1904 Inquiry into the Operations of the State Labour Bureau, all witnesses agreed that 
the Female Registry filled a void in the labour market, safeguarding female workers from the 
private registries and should be continued. However, the Government was concerned with the 
costs of the operation. One suggestion was that employers should be charged a fee. However, 
the Charles Lee, MLA Secretary for Public Works, felt that employers would not be prepared 
to pay and that this would require the registry to bear a further cost by advertising. In support 
of the Female Registry, John Norton, MLA Independent Member for Surry Hills, claimed 
that since the establishment of the office there have been very few complaints of females 
having been robbed by private registry offices charging exorbitant fees. He argued that the 
Government office acts as a check on the private sector. Despite evidence to the contrary, 
Charles Lee, the Secretary for Public Works, claimed that he ‘has no hesitation in saying that 
the expenditure in connection with the Registry Office for Females is not justified by the 
results, and he recommends that the institution be closed.’419 On 31st January 1906 the 
Female Registry, which had been maintained for 4 years, was closed.420  
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Private Registry Offices 
The unscrupulous acts perpetrated by private employment agencies on the unemployed 
continued to occur during this period despite the continued operation of the public 
employment service. Abuses perpetrated by these agencies were regularly cited in both the 
press and in the NSW Labour Commissioners Annual Reports. Common abuses included:-
charging exorbitant fees; promised employment not forthcoming; refunds not being given; 
encouraging employees to leave their jobs for non-existent or short-term positions; 
employees sent to jobs that they are unsuitable for; sending people to the country areas on 
false representations leaving them stranded and bearing the cost of returning to Sydney. The 
NSW Labour Commissioners argued that the ‘complaints are rife.’421 The Sydney Labour 
Council also ardently campaigned for the regulation of private employment registries 
regularly petitioning parliament citing these abuses and calling for regulation of the 
industry.422 
Victims of the private registry offices, while able to commence legal proceedings rarely did, 
as they usually did not have the means or ability to prosecute. However, there were some who 
did commence proceedings. In North Sydney Police Court in April 1904 a private registry 
owner named G.G., (unfortunately the full name was not revealed by the newspapers) was 
charged with fraudulently appropriating sums of £4, £3 3 s., and £3 respectively, moneys 
which had been paid to him by the unemployed seeking work for securing various positions, 
which he failed to do. The Court fined him £6, with 29s. costs, or in default, two months 
imprisonment with hard labour on each account. In another example, a man alleged that he 
twice paid one registry office £6 for procuring positions in different parts of the country. 
Again this operator was fined by the Court. Unfortunately, these cases were very rare and in 
most cases the owners of these private registry offices continued to perpetrate these crimes.423 
The NSW Labour Commissioners, following in the footsteps of former Superintendent Creer, 
continued to campaign to the NSW Government for the compulsory licensing of private 
employment agencies. In substantiating their campaign, the NSW Labour Commissioners 
cited successful examples of similar legislation operating in New Zealand and the United 
States, whereby agencies are licensed, often paying a bond to the Government to ensure 
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proper conduct and operating with a fixed scale of fees. The NSW Labour Commissioners 
argued that the regulated coexistence system in both New Zealand and the United States led 
to the elimination of these abuses.424  
The NSW Labour Commissioners also cited more dramatic legislative reform that occurred in 
France in 1904 in a bid to highlight the lengths other Governments had gone to in eliminating 
private registry abuses. In France, the Government revoked the previous legislation, which 
had required all private employment agencies to be licensed, as they felt this did not curtail 
the abuses. Instead they banned private registry operations leaving only the public 
employment services to continue. Despite presenting this extreme example to the 
Government, the NSW Labour Commissioners argued for a more moderate approach which 
included the registration of all private employment agencies, compliance with a scale of fees 
fixed by law and the enforcement of refunds of fees when employment is not obtained. Again 
as was the case in the previous period the NSW Labour Commissioners were told by 
successive NSW Governments that the Minister for Public Instruction and Industry had 
drafted a Bill for this purpose, with the intention that it will ‘soon become statute’.425 
However, such Bill was never presented to Parliament during the time of the NSW Labour 
Commissioners. 
Who Registered? 
The new registration system was designed to gain a more sophisticated analysis of the labour 
market through the examination a number of labour market variables: skill, age, offers of 
work and willingness to accept different work. However the new system suffered from a 
number of flaws. Firstly, the aggregate nature of the categories disguised market fluctuations 
affecting the various industries. For example, the building industry employed first and second 
class tradesmen, as well as skilled and unskilled labourers, and therefore industry fluctuations 
are not obvious in the aggregate data. Secondly, a further limitation of the new system was 
that it was only used in the Dawes Point Office, which acted as Head Office. Therefore, the 
data only captures those persons who registered at this office, which the annual reports 
suggest were largely unskilled non-union labour. It was commonly claimed that the skilled 
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tradesmen registered at the Trades Hall Registry. However, as table 5.3 illustrates, over 75 
per cent of total registrations occurred at the Dawes Point office. 
Year Head Office Country Branches 
Registered Sent to Work Registered Sent to Work 
1901-1902 3,634 5,151 1,252 238 
1902-1903 2,854 6,498 218 65 
1901-1903 Trades 
Hall* 
2,990 *unknown .... .... 
1903-1904 Dawes 
Point 
3,995 15,731 22 11 
1903-1904 Trades Hall 758 1,156 .... .... 
1904-1905 Dawes 
Point 
1,883 4,317 31 46 
1904-1905 Trades Hall 306 1,556 .... .... 
Total 16,420 34,409 1,523 360 
Table 5.3 NSW Labour Commission Registry Operations 1901-1905426 
*Total registrations at the Trades Hall Registry from its inauguration on 4 December 1901 to 
30 June 1905 were 4,054. Data for the Trades Hall Registry for the years 1901-1903 numbers 
sent to work not published. 
 
In mid 1903, in an attempt to assess the state of the labour market, Schey undertook an 
annual investigation of registrations. From this examination he found that out of the 
cumulative total of 15,390 men, over 75 per cent, being 11,763 men had not had any contact 
with the labour bureau during the previous twelve months. To update their records and to get 
an accurate assessment of the state of the labour market, they began the process of re-
registration. This was commenced on 1 October 1903. The total number on books at 30 June 
1904 was 3,995.427 
In the first year of operation 1901-1902, 3,634 people registered at the Head Office of which 
new registrations accounted for 62 per cent of the total (refer to Table 5.4). Branch 
registrations appear high at 1,252, but this was due to the introduction of the new registration 
system and largely represented those persons previously registered. While the total numbers 
of Head Office registrations appeared to decrease in the second year of operations in 1902-
1903 to 2,854, the proportion of new registrations increased, being 74 per cent of the total. 
The NSW Labour Commissioners argued that this year represented the lowest number of new 
registrations since the opening of the Government Labour Bureau in 1892 and was in part 
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attributed to the inauguration of the other two other places of registration - the Trades Hall 
Registry and State Labour Board, which registered predominantly first class tradesmen.  
In the following twelve months, 1903-1904, new registrations had decreased to 1,482, almost 
38 per cent of the total 3,995. Of the remaining 2,513 men registered, 918 were transferred 
back from the State Labour Board upon its closure therefore not considered as new 
registrations. By the period 1904-1905, which marked the end of the drought, there was a 
dramatic improvement in the state of the labour market as total Head Office registrations 
decreased dramatically by 47 per cent to 1,883, the lowest level in the history of operations, 
despite an increase in new registrations to 55 per cent.428  
Year Old Registrations* New Registrations Total For Year 
1901-1902 1391 2243 3634 
1902-1903 740 2114 2854 
1903-1904 2513 1482 3995 
1904-1905 88 998 1883 
Total 5529 6837 12366 
Table 5.4 Dawes Point Registrations429  
* Transfers largely represent the chronic unemployed except from 1904-1905 following the 
re-registration process from 1 October 1903 to 30 June 1904.430  
 
Classification A B C1 C2 C3 Total 
1901-1902 83 385 942 2089 135 3634 
1902-1903 36 225 741 1737 115 2854 
1903-1904 41 136 930 2714 174 3995 
1904-1905 23 443 561 816 40 1883 
 183 1189 3174 7356 464  
Table 5.5 Dawes Point Registration by Classification431 
The classifications of those who registered at the Dawes Point office are outlined in Table 
5.5. As had been the case in the previous periods, highly skilled workers belonging to 
Category A represented the smallest proportion of registrations during the period. For the 
total period Category A represented 1.5 per cent of all registrations. Registrations in this 
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category decreased throughout the period from a high of 83 men registered or 2.3 per cent in 
1901-1902, to a low of 23 men registered, or 1.2 per cent in 1904-5.432   
Category B represented first class tradesmen, who, for much of the period until January 1904, 
predominantly registered at either the Trades Hall Registry or at the State Labour Board for 
government works. Despite the existence of these other registries, Category B represented 
almost 10 per cent of total registrations for the period. However, registrations in the category 
fluctuated from 385 men or 11 per cent in 1901-1902, to a low of 136, or just over 3 per cent 
in 1903-1904, before reaching a high of 443 men, representing over 23 per cent of total 
registrations. While general improvements were seen in the labour market in 1904-1905, the 
final hike in this category was due to the closure of the State Labour Board and the transfer of 
responsibility for the Trades Hall Registry back to the Labour Commissioners.433 
The overwhelming majority of men registering during the period belonged to manual labour 
class: Category C.  Category C represented almost 90 per cent of all registrations in the 
period 1901-1902 and this increased slightly the following period 1902-1903 to almost 91 per 
cent before peaking at 95 per cent in the period 1903-1904. There was some improvement for 
the manual labouring class in the final period 1904-1905, as registrations for Category C had 
decreased markedly to 75 per cent. This decrease was largely due to the improvement in the 
pastoral and mining sectors following the end of the drought.434 
Within Category C, those registered as C2 skilled labourers represented the largest proportion 
of registrations. Due to the aggregate nature of the classification system, occupations 
registering in this category varied greatly in skill and covered all industries including metal 
workers, mining, building, pastoral and manufacturing. For the period 1901-1902 those in 
Category C2 represented 59 per cent of all registrations, this increased slightly in the 
following year 1902-1903 to 60 per cent, with a further increase in 1903-1904 to 67 per cent, 
before decreasing in 1904-1905 to 43 per cent following an improvement in the labour 
market with the breaking of the drought. C1 clerical registrations remained a fairly stable 
comprising approximately one quarter of total registrations throughout the period. Unskilled 
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labourers registered in Category C3 represented the smallest proportion of the manual 
labouring class at 4.2 per cent of Category C registrations.435 
Under the new classification and registration system highly skilled workers classified in 
category A and B were offered the opportunity to register their willingness to accept 
labouring work. In the early period of 1901-1902, of the 468 men registered in Category A 
and B, 335, or about three-quarters registered, were willing to accept labouring work of any 
kind. It was argued that this is indicative of two things: firstly, that a better and more 
independent class of tradesmen had registered with the other registries, and secondly, there 
was a real desperation amongst the unemployed to gain work. By 1902-1903 this desperation 
appears to have abated as only 83 out of 261 men, or one quarter of those registered in 
Category A and B were willing to accept labouring work of any kind. However, despite a 
decrease in overall numbers, by 1903-1904, out of the 177 men registered in Category A and 
B, 95 or 53 per cent registered were willing to accept labouring work of any kind. In the final 
period despite a further increase in total numbers only 86 out of 466 men registered in 
Category A and B were willing to accept labouring work. This was clearly indicative of the 
improvement in the labour market and the closure of the State Labour Board.436 
In terms of the type of work offered through the labour bureau, it was overwhelmingly 
manual labour. Skilled workers in Class A and Class B received few offers of employment in 
their occupation. In 1901-1902 only 2 out of 83 men registered in Class A (clerical and 
professional) could be offered positions to which they were accustomed. In class B (first class 
tradesmen) of 385 men registered, only 86 were offered work in their trade, and in the 
majority of cases the work was only for a couple of days. The following year showed little 
improvement. In 1902-1903 of 36 men registered in Class A (clerical and professional) only 
3 could be offered positions to which they were accustomed. In class B (first class tradesmen) 
of 225 men registered, only 51 were offered work in their trade. The situation continued in 
1903-1904 with only 3 men out of 41 men registered in Class A (clerical and professional) 
being offered positions to which they were accustomed. In class B (first class tradesmen) of 
136 men registered, only 37 were offered work in their trade.  Throughout the period, both 
registrations and offers of employment for Class B were greatly affected by the Trades Hall 
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Registry and State Labour Board, where all tradesmen required for public works were drawn. 
It may be added that in both classes A and B only about half of the men accepted manual 
labour.437 
Age 1901-1902 1902-1903 1903-1904 
Under 20 years 167 (4.5%) 105(4%) 73 (2%) 
20-30 years 1,194(33%) 960(34%) 724(18%) 
30-40 years 995(28%) 750(25%) 1093(27%) 
40-50 years 746(20.5%) 617(22%) 1186(30%) 
50-60 years 375(10%) 332(12%) 704(18%) 
Over 60 years 157(4%) 90(3%) 215(5%) 
 3634 2854 3995 
Table 5.6 Age of Men Registering at the Labour Bureau (1904-1905 data was not 
published)438 
In terms of the age of men registering at the labour bureau, the bulk was between 20 and 50 
years (refer to Table 5.6).  Throughout the period these categories experienced minor 
variations. In the period 1903-1904 there was a slight increase in the over forties category. 
This increase is likely to be in part due to the closure of the State Labour Board, which had 
previously registered all first class tradesmen. Following the end of the drought in the 1903-
1904, a period of considerable improvement was reported in the mining and pastoral sectors, 
all of which relied on physically strong male workers. This improvement can in part explain 
the reduction in the numbers registering in the under 20 year’s age group and the 20-30 years 
category.439 
Overall, the Labour Commissioners were successful in registering at the Dawes Point Labour 
Bureau 12,366 men who had been sent on 31,697 work assignments. In a depressed economy 
this was quite a significant result. Furthermore, the Trades Hall Registry was also successful 
during the period, registering 4,054 men. Despite the missing early data on the number of 
men sent to work by the Trades Hall Bureau, we do know that for the later period of 1903-
1904 they had registered 1,064 men and they had then sent 2,712 men on various work 
assignments. Clearly, the labour bureau operations were very successful in assisting a great 
number of the unemployed in a period of economic uncertainty.440  
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The rationalisation of the labour bureau registry operations was designed to provide a more 
sophisticated approach to assisting the unemployed. Schey argued that rationalisation by 
classification allowed a targeted use of resources i.e. the manual labouring class registering at 
Dawes Point and the skilled first class tradesmen at the Trades Hall, as well as the State 
Labour Board, thereby ensuring that both employers and the unemployed were aware of the 
distinction between the labour bureaus. Despite the time consuming nature of the closed 
system of administrative matching which continued during the period, it was argued that the 
newly rationalised system facilitated each registry’s operations. However, the system was not 
without its critics and by 1904 questions were being raised about its operations.441 
1904 Inquiry into the Operations of the State Labour Bureau with View of 
Reformation 
The election of the Carruthers Liberal Reform Government on 30 August 1904 heralded a 
period of government reform. Of particular interest to the Government, were the NSW 
Labour Commissioners and the public employment services under their control. In a bid to 
analyse the public employment service, Premier Carruthers instructed the Public Service 
Board to conduct an inquiry into their operations with a view of reforming the system. The 
inquiry began on 2 November 1904 and continued with intervals to 9th June 1905 and was 
closed to the public.442 
The inquiry was charged with investigating the ‘nature and operations of different branches 
of the Labour Bureau to the supply of labour to Public Works and the opinion respecting the 
Labour Bureau and its capacity for supplying labour held by private employers and others 
interested in its operation.’443 Of particular interest were notable criticisms: men sourced 
through the State Labour Bureau were inferior; employers and Government departments did 
not like, or use, the State Labour Bureau; its centralised structure attracts the unemployed to 
Sydney; unfairness of the rotation system; the existence of political patronage and whether 
there was a need for a Trades Hall Branch.444 
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The most common criticism by both private employers and the representatives of 
Government Departments responsible for selecting men was that the labour supplied through 
the State Labour Bureau was inferior, as the best tradesmen registered at either the State 
Labour Board or Trades Hall Registry, while many others applied directly to the contractor. 
W.A. Smith, Metropolitan Engineer, Public Works Department (Former Vice President of the 
State Labour Board) stated that contractors won’t use the State Labour Bureau and instead 
sourced their labour from previous employees. L.A.B. Ward, Rivers Water Supply and 
Drainage Engineer, concurred, arguing that contractors would not apply to the State Labour 
Bureau ‘because the best class of labour is that which does not go near the Labour Bureau, 
but goes on to the works and asks for employment.’445  
W.L. Vernon, NSW Government Architect, and W. Hutchison, Railways and Tramways 
Inspecting Engineer, argued they required skilled artisans and tradesmen which were not 
available at the labour bureau. F.H. Small, Assistant Engineer, Department of Public Works, 
who was overseeing new central railway station, stated he only engaged men by contract and 
did not see purpose of the labour bureau believing employers can source their own labour.446 
Private employers claimed that they knew little of the State Labour Bureau’s operation and 
those who did ‘expressed themselves decidedly, and some very strongly, in its disfavour.’447  
The rotation system also received considerable criticism from both private employers and 
Government departments. Vernon and Hutchison vehemently opposed this system arguing 
that rather than receiving the man most qualified for the position you received the next man 
in the system, who they claimed, was often incapable of undertaking the work. The NSW 
Labour Commissioners strongly supported the system believing that without this system you 
would have the same problems as before: ‘nepotism, bribery, and other objectionable 
features.’448 The employees themselves also agreed claiming that the rotation system avoided 
the pitfalls of favouritism and political patronage. While the Board was sympathetic to this 
view they agreed with criticism and advocated for its cessation, believing that the possible 
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problems would be overcome through responsible management and the trustworthiness of 
superintending officers of the Government.449 
As had been the case previously, many believed that the centralised operations of the State 
Labour Bureau encouraged the unemployed to travel to Sydney in search of work. While the 
rural branch structure was designed to alleviate this problem, it did little to dispel this 
criticism. There were no dedicated labour bureau officers in rural branches, as the Clerks of 
Petty Sessions were charged with this responsibility however, they had multiple duties and 
limited resources to support them. The small number of rural registrations highlighted these 
problems. L.A.B. Ward, the State Engineer in charge of Rivers Water Supply and Drainage, 
claimed that on one occasion he had 50 first class tradesmen present themselves at Cataract 
Dam, but he had to tell them to go to Sydney, fifty miles away, to register at the Labour 
Bureau office and then comeback. Ward claimed that the centralised structure resulted in 
labour market shortages in rural areas.450  
Many claimed that there was political patronage and favouritism in selection for work. Two 
general labourers, John Kenneally and David Arnot, appeared before the Board claiming that 
favouritism was rife, particularly on Government works due to the foreman’s power to hire 
and fire. They both argued that they believed that MPs, aldermen and other such persons 
influenced the supervisors. Both claimed to have witnessed such practices. In response to 
these complaints, John Hartley, foreman at the Rocks Resumption Works and formerly at the 
works at Centennial Park, stated that while at Centennial Park, he had received about eight 
letters from MPs and other individuals and while at the Rocks he received four or five letters. 
He stated that ‘no man had in consequence of the letters been put to work’.451 However, he 
did concede that some of the men who had brought letters had been put on afterwards, but not 
as a result of the letters. He claimed that it was just a coincidence that a further selection of 
men would occur in the immediate period following the letters.452 The NSW Labour 
Commissioners argued that the operations of the Government Labour Bureau had been 
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affected by political and Departmental influence but they believed these practices were not in 
‘operation now, to the extent they had been.’453  
Elected to undertake Government reform, including reducing expenditure, the Carruthers 
Government were concerned over the Trades Hall Registry. Questions were raised in the 
inquiry over its role and the costs involved in its operation. There were certainly mixed 
feelings about the Trades Hall Registry. Former NSW Labour Commissioner Rev. W.I. Carr 
Smith stated that while he was not sure that Trades Hall branch was necessary, it did a 
considerable amount of work. Representatives from the building industries stated that they 
found the Trades Hall Bureau useful, stating that before it opened as a registry, they sourced 
labour informally through the caretaker at the Trades Hall. Others claimed that they sourced 
unskilled labour through this branch and skilled labour from other sources.454 
Those in favour of the continuation of the Trades Hall Registry included James McGowen, 
the Labor Leader of the Opposition, who stated that it  
‘is inexpensive and has done a good job, If it were closed it would be bad … in every 
way, for the men now registering there would join the ranks of the unemployed, 
parade the streets, assemble at the Statute, and agitate to an extent that would give rise 
to much trouble.’455  
Archdeacon Langley, a prominent member of the Anglican Church who worked with the 
unemployed, argued that due to the ill feeling between unionists and non-unionists it was a 
good thing to have them separated. Those who felt that the Trades Hall Registry should be 
disbanded included some of members of the unemployed who argued that it forced men to 
join trade unions to gain better employment opportunities. A.W. Green, Boarding-out Officer, 
State Children’s Relief Board, stated that the State Labour Bureau should be concentrated in 
one office assisting all members of the unemployed irrespective of whether the applicant is a 
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unionist or non-unionist. John Davies, Under Secretary for Public Works, called for its 
closure.456 
In their defence, the NSW Labour Commissioners argued that since their involvement in the 
labour bureau operations they had been instrumental in organising the labour market. In 
particular they argued that they had assisted a great number of men in finding employment 
with private employers, many of whom they claim are in favour of its operations. They 
believe that they have ‘markedly restrained men who were prone to engineer agitations’457 
and argued that if the labour bureau was to be closed, it would lead again to ‘fiery agitations.’ 
458
 
After seven months of questioning and deliberation, the Public Service Board inquiry issued 
the following recommendations. Firstly, they argued that all the evidence indicates that is 
necessary to maintain a public employment service of some kind to deal with the ever-
recurring question of the unemployed. Secondly, that the present labour bureau, although a 
great improvement on the organisation previously existing, can without impairing its 
efficiency, be still further reduced in the direction of substituting one Commissioner, or more 
properly, one Director, for the two Commissioners.  They did state that this was not a 
reflection on the Commissioner, but an effort to improve economies of scale. Thirdly, they 
recommended that the Trades Hall branch be disbanded, as the larger employers did not use it 
and further costs would be saved.459  
The Board also recommended that legislation be passed to provide for the regulation and 
inspection of private registry offices. Following this being passed into legislation then the 
Registry Office for Females be abolished. They also called for abolition of the rotation 
system, except for relief work. They believed that labour bureau officers should be allowed to 
select from a list which men they may think suitable for the work required to be done. To 
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overcome the possible problems with the rotation system they believed that the principal 
officers of the Government should take a more active role in the selection of their men.460 
Following the recommendations of the Public Service Board Inquiry, the Carruthers 
Government abolished The NSW Labour Commission on 31 October, 1905. The State 
Labour Bureau of NSW was appointed to carry on the functions of the NSW Labour 
Commission. On the 1st November 1905 Schey was appointed Director of Labour and 
Brennan, Assistant Director. In an attempt to cut costs, Broughton O’Conor, the Minister for 
Labour and Industry decided to close the registry which had been maintained at the Trades 
Hall for three and a half years, as of 31 July 1905. In a further cost cutting measure, the 
Female Registry, which had been maintained for 4 years, was closed on the 31 January 
1906.461 
Conclusion 
In a period of cyclical unemployment, the Reid Government established the NSW Labour 
Commissioners, initially to advise the Government on all matters in connection with labour 
not absorbed by private enterprise, and to make recommendations to the Minister for Labour. 
Following the election of the See Government, the NSW Labour Commissioners role was 
enlarged significantly to include a complete reform of the public employment service 
operations in NSW. During its term, the NSW Labour Commissioners undertook significant 
structural reform of the public employment services of NSW, which included the 
rationalisation of registry operations along the lines of gender and union association; and the 
introduction of a sophisticated classification system which allowed a more in depth 
understanding of the labour market. For the first time, the State had addressed the neglect of 
female labour and provided a registry office for women.462 
The NSW Labour Commissioners continued to operate as a co-existence system adopting the 
mediation procedure of a closed system of administrative matching. Under this system, 
private registry offices continued to operate, but as this case demonstrates, the presence of a 
public employment service does curtail, in part, their fraudulent activities in so much as the 
unemployed are not bound to use them to find work. This was demonstrated with the success 
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of the Female Registry, which despite its considerable achievements was later closed by the 
Carruthers Government, as part of an election pledge to reduce costs. While there were 
numerous examples of private registry abuses throughout the period, coupled with the 
recommendations of the Public Service Board to regulate their activities, the State again 
failed to legislate, despite promises by successive Governments to the contrary.463   
In line with Commons previous findings the NSW Labour Commission provides an 
interesting and compelling example of how a public employment service can contribute to the 
organisation of the labour market. During its five years of operations, the NSW Labour 
Commission was largely successful in placing over 34,409 men in positions of employment, 
while also placing 3,561 women into employment, as well as managing other labour market 
programs such as the Casual Labour Farm. In a period of economic uncertainty, drought and 
limited State financial resources, this was quite an achievement and demonstrated a genuine 
need for an employment service. 464 
While Endres and Cook have argued that the public employment services failed to develop 
innovate labour market programs, this chapter disputes this claim. Instead, it is argued that 
under the NSW Labour Commissioners, the NSW public employment services underwent a 
period of structural reform which included a number of innovative labour market programs: 
the rationalisation of registry operations, along the lines of gender and union association; and 
the introduction of a sophisticated classification system, which allowed a more in depth 
understanding of the labour market: and a Female Registry. While some of these reforms 
were only short lived they do demonstrate a willingness to experiment and innovate.465 
Coghlan had claimed that the early NSW labour bureaus were only a temporary measure to 
organise the labour market that lacked long-term commitment from the state. Yet as this 
chapter has continued to demonstrate, the state did maintain a firm commitment to the 
problem of unemployment and expanded labour market programmes. Furthermore, it’s 
important to emphasise that the State’s approach to unemployment and other labour market 
programs was dependent on its own financial situation and electoral cycle. The NSW Labour 
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Commission only ceased to operate in name and not in function, as it continued on until 
World War II, under subsequent names: The State Labour Bureau of NSW followed by The 
State Labour Branch and finally, The Labour Exchanges Branch. The following chapter will 
examine and analyse the successive public employment service: the State Labour Bureau of 
NSW.466 
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Chapter 6 The State Labour Bureau of 
NSW 
Introduction 
The State Labour Bureau of NSW was appointed to carry on the functions of the NSW 
Labour Commission. On the 1st November 1905, former Chief Labour Commissioner Schey 
was appointed Director of Labour and former Labour Commissioner Brennan, appointed as 
Assistant Director. Despite the closure of both the Trades Hall and Female Registry, both 
Schey and Brennan continued to build on their previous labour bureau work assisting the 
unemployed.467 
Coghlan and Nurick have claimed that the early labour bureaus were only temporary 
measures and lacked long term commitment however, as this chapter will attest the State did 
remain committed to assisting the unemployed. Despite claims by Endres and Cook that the 
early labour bureaus failed to adopt innovative labour market programs, it is argued that 
during this period they did continued to introduce and adopt, innovative labour market 
programs and practices: The Casual Labour Farm, later known as the Government Training 
Farm and the Training Farm for City Lads, the development of a new classification structure 
and the extension of the rural branch structure to include 200 police officers. Furthermore, 
despite the rationalisation of the registry operations both Schey and Brennan continued to 
actively campaign for legislative change to improve the conditions for the unemployed and 
for the regulation of private registry offices.468  
As previously discussed, the Government Labour Bureau and the NSW Labour Commission 
were shaped by a number of socio-economic and political concerns: rising unemployment, 
economic changes and uncertainty, fraudulent practices of private registries, limited State 
finances and political pressure. It was also these concerns that shaped its successor, the State 
Labour Bureau. While economic prosperity allowed for a more fluid labour market it also 
enabled Schey to propose more ambitious plans for an extensive labour bureau branch 
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network across the state. However, as the following will demonstrate not all his plans came to 
fruition and those that did were largely curtailed again by the states’ own financial position 
and electoral cycle.469 
This chapter will begin by examining the economic, industrial and political conditions in 
NSW during the period of the State Labour Bureau 1905-1912. Attention will then turn to the 
operations of the State Labour Bureau. Finally, the criticisms and problems will be analysed.  
Economic and Industrial Context 
NSW continued to experience significant population growth during this period. Between 
1906 and 1911 NSW’s population increased almost ten percent from 1,526,139 in 1906 to 
1,648,746 in 1911. In terms of gender there were significant differences: the male population 
only increased 5 per cent, from 814,139 in 1906 to 858,850 in 1911, while the female 
population increased 11 per cent, from 721,697 in 1906 to 789,896 in 1911.The economic 
shift toward urban industries, such as manufacturing, also led to a marked increase in female 
participation in the labour market.470 
Unlike the previous era of prolonged economic stagnation, the period 1907-1913 represented 
a return to economic prosperity, with a growth rate comparable with the boom of the 1880s. 
This economic boom had a number of follow on effects: an improvement in Australia’s credit 
worthiness in the London money market; which also led to a resumption of large scale export 
of British capital and labour to Australia, particularly, between the years 1911-1914. During 
this period 234,000 migrants arrived, compared with 100,000 between the years 1891-1911. 
However, it is important to note that this period of prosperity was punctuated in 1907-1908 
and again in 1911-1912 when drought conditions returned to parts of the State.471   
The pastoral industry remained a pivotal and growing part of the NSW economy. Despite 
minor periods of drought, wheat crops still managed to double between 1901 and 1914. Wool 
remained the largest export accounting for 42.6 per cent of all exports, worth £11,704,409 in 
1911. Traditionally, the bulk of the wool export had been sent to the United Kingdom 
however, by this time the NSW pastoralists were now exporting to other European countries. 
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For example, in 1881 the United Kingdom purchased 98.8 per cent of the wool stock 
however, by 1911 this had dropped dramatically to 29 per cent, with Germany and France 
now purchasing 26 per cent each.472 
The mining sector remained an important part of the NSW economy however; it suffered 
from a number of problems during this period. Mining production decreased slightly from a 
value of £10,459,296 in 1907 to £9,758,006 in 1911. Consequently the labour force decreased 
15 per cent from 43,758 men in 1907 to 37,017 men in 1911. This decrease can be attributed 
in part, to the gold mining sector where the labour force had decreased 38 per cent from 
7,468 in 1907 to 4,650 in 1911. Other factors included an explosion that occurred at the 
Stanford-Merthyr Colliery in the Maitland district in 1906, where lives were lost and 400 
miners lost their employment .At Broken Hill, early in 1906, severe fires broke out in some of 
the mines which led to over a thousand miners and others being thrown out of work. The 
drought in 1907-1908 also affected the mines and restricted operations. In early 2008, it was 
reported in Broken Hill that over 2,000 men had lost their jobs. The 1909-1910 coal strike 
also caused significant industrial upheaval. In 1907-1908 there was also a slump in world 
metal prices. However, the industry also expanded with the new iron and steel works of W. 
Sandford Limited, at Lithgow and the establishment of the Commonwealth Oil Company, in 
the Capertee and Wolgan Valleys.473  
Manufacturing remained an important and growing sector of the NSW economy. The number 
of factories increased dramatically during the period. In 1906 there were 3,861 factories 
employing 77,822 people this increased in 1911 to 5,039 factories employing 108,664 people. 
The value of the goods being produced also increased dramatically, from £34,796,169 in 
1906 to £54,346,011 in 1911. The location of manufacturing establishments outside the 
Sydney metropolis easily outnumbered those located within that area. For example in 1906, 
1,952 establishments were located outside of Sydney compared to 1,415 located within the 
metropolis. By 1911, a process of centralisation had become evident with numbers almost 
equal with the metropolis having 2,510 factories and the remained of the state having 2,529. 
As had been the case previously, factories remained relatively small with the majority in both 
                                                           
472
 K. Buckley & T. Wheelwright, No Paradise for Workers, pp. 225; The Official Year Book of NSW 1912, 
1913, pp. 7; NSWVPLA, Vol. 2, 1912, pp. 191. 
473
 NSWPP, Vol. 1. 1906, pp. 1008; The Official Year Book of NSW 1912, pp. 271-274; NSWPP, Vol. 2, 1911-
1912, pp. 608. 
 169  
 
the metropolis, 29.6 per cent in 1911 and rural areas, 39.3 per cent in 1911, employing less 
than 10 people.474  
Within the manufacturing sector, the clothing and textile industry employed the largest 
number of people being 26,504 in 1911 up from 19,650 in 1906, who were predominantly 
female.  The increase in female participation was largely due to the fact that women’s wages 
were half that of male wages. In the NSW boot-making industry a parallel trend was also 
occurring, though with less displacement of male labour. Female labour comprised 35 per 
cent of the workforce in 1910 compared with 19 per cent of a much smaller workforce in 
1891. In the NSW boot-making industry, women accounted for 19 per cent of the workforce 
in 1906 and by 1910 this had increased to 35 per cent.475  
Political Landscape 
This was a period of relative political stability, the two-party political system that emerged 
following Federation continued, with the political distinction being between the conservative 
Liberal Reform Party and the Labor Party. Sir Joseph Carruthers remained Premier and 
Treasurer winning the September 1907 election, before resigning a month later in October 
1907. During his premiership he was responsible for many of the early changes which 
include the closure of the Trades Hall Registry and the Female Labour Bureau and the 
renaming of the NSW Labour Commissioners to the State Labour Bureau.476 
Following Carruthers resignation, Charles Ward became Premier on 2 October 1907. Wade 
was seen as an energetic and active legislator. Wade’s political undoing came following the 
1909-1910 coal strike where he appeared to favour the mine-owners and lost significant 
community support.  In spite of his good legislative record, Wade was defeated at the general 
election, by the James McGowen led Labor Party on 21 October 1910.477  
James McGowen became the first NSW Labor Premier. It is claimed that McGowen's 
personal characteristic of honesty and judiciousness were reassuring to the public, playing a 
major part in his electoral success. As well as being Premier, he was also Colonial Treasurer 
during most of 1911 and Colonial Secretary from December 1911.  During 1913, McGowen 
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attempted to settle a gas workers' strike by threatening to replace them with non-union labour, 
thereby sealing his own political fate. This action alienated his own party and Holman, his 
Deputy, deposed him as leader in June 1913. Holman appointed McGowen Minister for 
Labour and Industry which he served as until January 1914. As the following discussion will 
illustrate, the relative political stability of the period was in many ways mirrored in the 
operations of the State Labour Board. During the period Schey received support from both 
sides of the political divide, remaining as Director of Labour.478  
Operations 
As previously noted the Carruthers Government, following the recommendations of the 1905 
Public Service Board inquiry into the Operations of the NSW Labour Commissioners, 
abolished the NSW Labour Commission and replaced it with the State Labour Bureau on 31 
November, 1905.  On the 1 November 1905 former Chief Labour Commissioner William 
Francis Schey was appointed Director of Labour while Frank Brennan former NSW Labour 
Commissioner was appointed Assistant Director. During the Public Service Board inquiry 
both Schey and Brennan were viewed favourably by the unemployed, members of the Public 
Service Board and employers all of whom argued in favour of their future involvement in the 
State Labour Bureau, so it was not surprising they were re-appointed. As the following will 
attest, the most significant change to come during this period was the rationalisation of 
registry operations with the closure of the Trades Hall and the Female Registry.479 
As had been the case in the previous period, the State Labour Bureau continued to operate as 
a labour market intermediary, with a free registry office in Sydney, supplemented with forty-
two branch offices in principal centres of the state. In terms of mediation procedures, the 
State Labour Bureau continued to operate as a closed system of administrative matching. 
Schey and Brennan personally selected applicants, based on the requirements of the job, the 
applicant’s skills and past work experience, including references from previous employers, in 
an attempt to create a job-person match. Using means such as circulars, advertisements and 
press coverage, the State Labour Bureau advised employers of its major functions in assisting 
them to fill vacancies. Men seeking employment continued to register directly with the State 
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Labour Bureau, they were then assigned a classification, based on their skills and 
experience.480 
The State Labour Bureau continued to operate as a defacto-welfare department, which was 
very much in line with both Schey and Brennen’s personal ethos. They were particularly 
sympathetic to the concerns of the unemployed and actively tried to assist them. Schey 
proudly declared that “much trouble has been taken to bestow personal and sympathetic 
attention on every person.” 481 This individualised attention was evident in the State Labour 
Bureau’s continued management of the Casual Labour Farm and from 1905 the Training 
Farm for City Lads. Railway and steamer fares were also issued on credit, repayments being 
made after a lapse of one month or longer, according to the circumstances, and payment also 
accepted, where considered necessary, by instalments. Similarly, rabbit-traps, tents, blankets, 
and some other things were advanced on satisfactory guarantee of repayment. The State 
Labour Bureau also assisted men who went fossicking for gold.482 
During this period, Schey attempted to make the reporting functions of the State Labour 
Bureau and its agencies, more comprehensive and sophisticated. Schey required monthly 
reporting by all forty-two Clerks of Petty Sessions, who were agents of the State Labour 
Bureau. These monthly reports included information on all local registrations and 
placements, the state of the local labour market, wages ruling, and any new avenues for 
labour. From time to time, they also had to frame special reports on any subject cognate to 
industrial matters in their area. Schey then compiled all of this information into his own 
monthly report for the Premier and Minister for Public Works. In a bid to promote the work 
of the State Labour Bureau these monthly reports were also distributed to the press. Schey 
was also very active in writing additional reports for the press and publications concerning all 
matters of labour concern.483  
Despite the call for monthly reporting, not all branch and agencies were as supportive as 
Schey would have liked. Schey believed that the multiple duties required of the Clerks of 
Petty Sessions meant that the work of the State Labour Bureau was often neglected. In terms 
of reporting, he felt many of the Clerks of Petty Sessions often failed to attempt to write a 
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report and if they did, it was a brief account for that month. Schey had long argued for the 
New Zealand system, which saw the Police Officers in large towns responsible for the labour 
bureau operations. From 1908 Schey was given his wish when the Government announced 
200 police officers across the State were appointed to act as Labour Agents reporting any 
labour vacancies. To minimise the workload Schey provided them with a standardised form, 
which they would complete each month and forward to the State Labour Bureau office in 
Sydney.484 
The State Labour Bureau’s policies regarding industrial disputations and wage rates remained 
consistent with the preceding period. Schey was adamant that ‘no interference had at any 
time been made with the wage rates, the efforts of the Bureau being directed to bringing idle 
labour into communication with those who need work.’ 485 He claimed that whenever any 
trouble has occurred, for example, strike, lock-out, or disturbance of any kind, the State 
Labour Bureau remained ‘strictly aloof....preserving an entirely neutral attitude until such 
differences came to an end.’486  
The State Labour Bureau continued to be responsible for the Casual Labour Farm, which had 
been part of the NSW public employment service since its inception in 1896. The Casual 
Labour Farm was located 34 miles from Sydney at Pitt Town. The State Labour Bureau sent 
men there who were deemed to be destitute and unable to maintain themselves. In exchange 
for their labour at the Casual Labour farm, they were given lodging, food and a small 
allowance usually not exceeding 3s. per week. A feature of management of these farms was 
that no officer except a manager was found to be necessary.487 
By 1910 the Casual Labour Farm became known as the Government Training Farm, Pitt 
Town. The success of the operations of the Casual Labour Farm can be seen in table 6.1, 
which highlights the financially self sufficiency of the farm. While the early figures for the 
farm were not published, it appears that the produce sold from the farm, more than covered 
the costs.488 
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Year Cash paid into Treasury to 
cover the maintenance of the 
Casual Labour Farms 
Surplus Credit Balance 
1905-1906 £2,800 £3,600 
1906-1907 £3,254 £3,600 
1907-1908 £4,187 £3,700 
1908-1909 £4,419 £3,816 
1909-1910 £3,254 £4,917 
1910-1911 £4,714 £5,716 
Table 6.1 Casual Labour Farm Payments and Credit489 
The State Labour Bureau was also responsible for a new scheme designed to alleviate city 
youth unemployment. On 1st November 1905, the Training Farm for City Lads was opened, 
located at Randwick 5 miles from the city. Under this scheme, city boys would spend one 
month attending the Labour Farm at Randwick daily for initial instruction, followed by a 
supervised program of two months duration at the Casual Labour Farm where they gained 
practical experience in farming, dairying, piggery and poultry work. The young men (most 
were aged between 14 and 16) were accommodated in separate dormitories from the men that 
worked the Casual Labour Farm. Schey reported that demand for the 'graduates' was high, so 
popular were the graduated he claimed that demand for them had outstripped supply by 
1908.490 
In 1910, the training scheme was renamed the Government Agricultural Training Farm. In 
1912 the Government Casual Labour Farm was closed and the Training Farm for City Lads 
occupied the whole of the property. The farm consisted of 2,150 acres with living facilities 
for the young men, Farm Manager's residence, a killing room, butchers shop and a Post 
Office and became known as Scheyville. The farm was divided into paddocks for different 
purposes and consisted of a dairy, piggery, sheep section, farm section, orchard, vegetable 
garden sawmill and a millet broom making plant. There were also blacksmiths’, saddlers’, 
wheelwrights’, carpenter's and tinsmith's shops. In early October 1912, the Manager reported 
that 361 youths had passed through the scheme during the year, going onto placement in 
various places within the State. In February 1913 the name of the farm was officially named 
                                                           
489
 NSWPP, Vol. 1, 1906, pp. 1005, Vol. 2, 1907, pp. 252, Vol. 2, 1908, pp. 806, Vol. 2, 1909, pp. 648, Vol. 2, 
1910, pp. 4, Vol. 2, 1911-1912, pp. 606. 
490
 NSWPP, Vol. 1, 1906, pp. 1005, Vol. 2, 1907, pp. 252, Vol. 2, 1908, pp. 806, 
 174  
 
as the Government Agricultural Training Farm, Scheyville. The farm was closed during 
World War I.491  
In 1907 the Commonwealth Government decided to repatriate a number of distressed 
Australians stranded in South Africa, from the Boer War.  The State Labour Bureau acting in 
its capacity of providing emergency relief assisted the NSW contingent. In total 622 people 
arrived in Sydney, of which there were 350 males, 84 women and 188 children. On arrival 
the majority were provided with temporary accommodation at the expense of the NSW 
Government. Of the 350 men, 282 registered at the State Labour Bureau, the remaining men 
believed they could support themselves. The remaining 173 men were given rail and steamer 
tickets to various parts of the State, with 88 people going to definite employment found 
through the Labour Bureau and 85 people to districts where they had either friends or were 
personally known, and considered they had good prospects of finding work. Of the others, 33 
were accommodated at the Casual Labour Farms for various periods, while 76 found work 
through their own efforts.492 
Proposed Government Regulation –Private Registry Offices and the 
Unemployed Labour Bill  
In early 1906, encouraged by the Premier Carruthers and the Minister for Public Works, 
Charles Lee, Schey drafted two pieces of legislation aimed at assisting the unemployed. One 
was for the regulation of private registry offices and the other related to centralising the 
management of the unemployed, titled the Unemployed Labour Bill. However, as the 
following will illustrate, despite the encouragement from the Government and the trade 
unions, and Schey’s own enthusiasm, neither pieces of draft legislation were enacted during 
this period.493 
Throughout this period private employment registries continued to commit unscrupulous acts 
on the unemployed. Schey regularly reported many of these abuses to the Government. The 
complaints included the extortion of large fees for information, collusion between the registry 
operator and the employer and the complete fabrication of an advertised position. Schey cited 
one example, where a young man had applied for a barman’s position advertised by a private 
employment registry, he was told he would be perfect for the role and was obliged to pay 15s. 
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to gain both the address and letter of introduction. The applicant thought it was expensive, 
but he was desperate and therefore paid the money and went to the pub and started work. On 
the completion of his shift, the employer gave him 7s. 6d. and told him that he was no longer 
required, stating he had only wanted a man for the day. On the following Monday he returned 
to the registry office and requested a full or partial refund due to the short-term nature of the 
role. However, the registry operator refused to provide a refund and the man was left out of 
pocket.494 
The Sydney Labour Council also actively campaigned for the regulation of private registry 
offices. In 1906, they appointed a committee to investigate the matter. They found that the 
conduct of private registry offices was of a dubious nature stating that as little or no capital is 
required to enter the trade, it offers great opportunities for the unprincipled business person. 
As there are no safeguards for the registry office constituents, the man or women wanting 
work are bound to accept the agent’s terms through sheer necessity. The employer accepts the 
applicant sent by the agent, whose sole object is to get that applicant into work for a sufficient 
time, to enable the agent to draw his first wages until the commission has been paid. They 
claimed that ultimately there two sets of human beings almost at the mercy of a third, who 
may or may not be fair and honest, but is too often unfair and dishonest. The Sydney Labour 
Council supported Schey in his quest for the regulation of private registry offices.495 
Despite long term calls for the regulation of these private registry offices and the numerous 
examples of their unscrupulous practices cited in the media, the Government still failed to 
legislate. This lack of legislative action remained a constant source of frustration for Schey. 
Since being appointed as a NSW Labour Commissioner in 1900, Schey had called upon the 
various Governments to act. In early 1906, at the request of the Minister for Public Works, he 
drafted a Bill outlining the regulation of private employment agencies, which included a 
reasonable scale of fees. The Bill was discussed in the Parliament, with both sides of the 
Parliament agreeing that some form of regulation was ‘urgently needed.’496However, despite 
this apparent enthusiasm and support the Government still failed to pass the legislation.497 
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In early 1906, at the encouragement of Premier Carruthers, Schey drafted a second piece of 
legislation titled the Unemployed Labour Bill. This Bill was based upon the Unemployed 
Workmen’s Act of Great Britain 1905. However, it is important to note that there were 
distinct differences between Schey’s Unemployed Labour Bill and the Unemployed 
Workmen’s Act 1905. The British legislation focused on improving the flow of labour market 
information through the formation of municipal committees, whose role was to assist the 
unemployed in finding employment. This Act became the precursor to the Labour Exchanges 
Act in 1909, which established a network of public labour exchanges offices across Britain. 
The Unemployed Labour Bill, like the British legislation, was not aimed at the abolition of 
the unemployed, as Schey considered that to be impractical. Instead its provisions were 
confined to the amelioration of distress caused by unemployment, the detection and 
deterrence of the loafer, and the regulation and systemisation of all efforts to deal with the 
unemployed generally.498 
The Unemployed Labour Bill outlined provisions for a program of municipal public works 
for the unemployed. Unfortunately, information on who would be responsible for funding this 
program was not specified. Part 3 outlines provisions for the establishment and maintenance 
of labour farms, where unemployed persons whose requirements are not met by the works 
already provided for, may be sent, and under State control, to earn by their labour, shelter, 
food and clothing. Part 4 provided for the foundation of compulsory labour establishments as 
an alternative to gaol. The courts could commit ‘loafers and vagrants’ to these 
establishments, for periods, not exceeding twelve months. Part 5 detailed how inmates of 
Government Asylums, if declared fit, by the Medical Officer, may be compelled to perform 
labour, or be removed to a labour farm; and from there, if recalcitrant, to a compulsory labour 
establishment. Despite Schey’s concern over assisting the long-term unemployed, the 
Government failed to enact this legislation.499  
Registrations 
The classification system that had begun under the NSW Labour Commissioners in 1900 
continued to be applied during this period. Class A referred to trained professionals for 
example solicitors, doctors and other skilled white collar workers. Class B referred to skilled 
first class trades men. Class C referred to the manual labouring class being further divided 
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into three sub categories: C1 being clerical and professionals; C2 being mechanics and 
artisans and C3 unskilled labourers.500 The reporting system also continued as before with 
men being required to report at the Labour Exchange office once a month. Despite the 1905 
Public Service Board recommending the abolition of the rotation system Schey continued to 
use this method throughout this period.501 
There were some minor changes that occurred during this period. Previous labour market 
variables including age, and the applicant’s willingness to accept alternative or lesser skilled 
work, were no longer reported, or if so, were no longer published. The Trades Hall Branch, 
which predominantly registered first class tradesmen, closed during this period. This closure 
affected Category B, by giving it a significant increase on previous years. Another note 
worthy point, is that the numbers for unskilled labourers appear to be artificially low on 
previous data, despite Schey claiming in all the Annual Reports of the period that the ‘bulk of 
the men registered consist of unskilled labour.’502 This appears to be due to the nature of the 
classification system itself as it is most likely men cited previous industry experience as a 
skill and were classified in accordingly to the division. For example, builder’s labourers 
would have been captured under C2 Manual Labouring Class Mechanical and Artisans. As 
before, the data remained relatively crude as the classification system did not allow for the 
identification of occupational or industry distinction.503 
Year Re-Registrations New Registrations Net Registrations for 
the Year 
1905-1906 361 1,257 1,618 
1906-1907 249 2,316 2,565 
1907-1908 187 3,840 4,027 
1908-1909 609 2,800 3,409 
1909-1910 327 3,393 3,720 
1910-1911 792 2,599 3,391 
1911-1912 333 2,363 2,696 
TOTAL 2,858 18,568 21,426 
Table 6.2 Summary of Registrations – Dawes Point504 
Dawes Point registrations are outlined in Table 6.2. In the first year of operation 1905-1906 
1,618 people registered at Dawes Point, of which new registrations accounted for 78 per cent 
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of the total. In the following period 1906-1907, and despite improved economic conditions, 
registrations increased to 2,565 of which new registrations accounted for 90 per cent of the 
total. Further deterioration in the labour market was evident in 1907-1908, as registrations 
peaked at 4,027, with new registrations accounting for 95 per cent of the total. This in a small 
way can be attributed to the 600 people repatriated from South Africa, who Schey reported as 
being a ‘poor lot ... many elderly and partially incapable men, clerks and shop assistants, 
waiters and barmen, and other occupations already well supplied.’505   
Improvements in the labour market were evident in the year 1908-1909, as total registrations 
had decreased by 15 per cent to 3,409, with new registrations contributing to 82 per cent of 
the total. In the following year 1909-1910, despite a return to general prosperity, total 
registrations had increased to 3,720, new registrations being 91 per cent. In 1910-1911 total 
registrations had decreased to 3,391, new registrations being 77 per cent. In the final period 
1911-1912 total registrations had decreased significantly to 2,696 however, new registrations 
still remained high at 88 per cent. The consistent high levels of new registrations can also be 
attributed to the British migrants arriving in NSW during the period.506   
Year Head Office Country Branches 
Registered Sent to Work Registered Sent to Work 
1905-1906 Dawes 
Point 
1,602 3,934 37 35 
1905-1906 Trades 
Hall* 
16    
1906-1907 2,565 3,639 24 24 
1907-1908 4,027 3,237 37 24 
1908-1909 3,409 3,299 20 21 
1909-1910 3,720 3,883 26 24 
1910-1911 3,391 3,277 6 6 
1911-1912 2,696 3,341 5 4 
Total 21,426 24,610 155 138 
Table 6.3- Labour Bureau Registry Operations 1905-1912507  
Branch registrations outlined in Table 6.3 remained disappointing during the period. These 
poor results only supported Schey’s criticism that the multiple duties required of the Clerks of 
Petty Sessions, meant that the work of the State Labour Bureau was often neglected. For the 
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seven year period, the Branches only recorded 155 registrations and sent only 138 men to 
work. Moreover, from 1908 following the appointment of the 200 police, Branch 
registrations decreased dramatically from a peak of 37 in the years 1905-1906 to 5 
registrations in 1911-1912. It appears that Schey's plan to expand rural operations backfired, 
as the Clerks of Petty Sessions neglected their labour bureau duties further, following the 
appointment of the police. Furthermore, it appears that the Police also failed to take this role 
seriously.508   
The classifications of those who registered are outlined in Table 6.4. Category A, consisting 
of the highly skilled workers remained the smallest proportion of registrations during the total 
period. For the total period Category A represented 2.5 per cent of all registrations. 
Registrations in this category decreased throughout the period, from a high of 136 men 
registered or 5 per cent of the total in 1906-1907, to a low of 28 men registered or 1 per cent 
of the total in 1911-1912.509     
Year A B C Total 
1905-1906 79 687 836 1602* 
1906-1907 136 1,337 1092 2565 
1907-1908 97 1,776 2154 402 
1908-1909 92 1,832 1485 3409 
1909-1910 69 1,771 1880 3720 
1910-1911 48 2,037 1306 3391 
1911-1912 28 1,811 857 2696 
TOTAL 549 11,251 9,610 21,410 
Table 6.4 Dawes Point Registrations by Classification – (*This total does not include Trades 
Hall Registry) 
Category B represented first class tradesmen. In the first month of the year 1905-1906 these 
men predominantly registered at the Trades Hall Registry however, this only accounted for 
16 men. While Category B had represented almost 10 per cent of total registrations in the 
preceding period, it became the largest category during this period. However, registrations in 
the category fluctuated from 687 men or 44 per cent in 1905-1906, to a high of 2,037 men 
which represented 60 per cent in 1911-1912, before decreasing slightly in absolute numbers 
to 1,811 in 1911-1912, which represented 67 per cent of the total registrations. The increase 
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in first class tradesmen may be due to the high numbers of British migrants that arrived 
during this period.510     
The most significant changes that occurred during the period were in Category C, the manual 
labouring class. Category C, which had previously represented the majority of registrations, 
now represented 45 per cent of all registrations during this period. However, there were 
fluctuations. Category C represented 52 per cent of all registrations in the period 1905-1906 
before peaking in 1907-1908 to 54 per cent representing 2154 men. This peak can be 
attributed to the drought that affected the pastoral and mining sectors of the State. As general 
economic prosperity returned at the end of the period 1910-1911, registrations decreased to 
1306 or 39 per cent, before dropping further in the period 1911-1912 to 832 men or 32 per 
cent.511 
Within Category C (refer to Table 6.5) the most significant change occurred in the 
subdivisions. Those registered as C1 clerical, represented the largest proportion of 
registrations. Registrations in this category peaked at 1,163 in 1909-1910 being 31 per cent of 
the total, before steadily decreasing to 793 in 1911-1912. C2, which had previously been the 
largest sub-category of the manual labouring class, also fluctuated, but decreased markedly 
throughout the period. C2 peaked at 1,368 in 1907-1908 period, being 34 per cent of the total, 
but consistently fell in the following years from 21 per cent of the total or 731 registrations in 
1908-1909 to 2 per cent or 63 registrations in 1911-1912. Due to the aggregate nature of the 
classification system, the occupations registering in this category varied greatly in skill and 
covered all industries including metal workers, mining, building, pastoral and manufacturing. 
In the later periods from 1909 onwards, Schey had claimed that first grade labourers had been 
in good demand and were often scarce. In C3, unskilled labourers accounted for 0.5 per cent 
of the total. Schey claimed throughout the period that unskilled labourers were always 
plentiful and often only registered for charitable purposes, rather than to gain employment.512 
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Classification A B C1 C2 C3 Total 
1905-1906 79 687 232 568 36 *1602 
1906-1907 136 1,337 336 738 18 2,565 
1907-1908+ 97 
 
1,776 759 1,368 27 4,027 
1908-1909 92 1,832 748 731 6 3,409 
1909-1910 69 1,771 1,163 705 12 3,720 
1910-1911 48 2,037 1,108 190 8 3,391 
1911-1912 28 1,811 793 63 1 2,696 
TOTAL 549 11,251 5,139 4,363 108 21,410 
Table 6.5 Dawes Point Registrations by Classification including sub-classification513 
+includes Repatriated Australians 
 
Overall the State Labour Bureau was successful in registering 21,426 men, who were sent to 
24,610 places of work. Despite the disappointing rural branch results, in a period of mixed 
economic fortunes, this was quite a significant achievement. Clearly, the State Labour Bureau 
operations were very successful in organising the labour market by assisting a great number 
of the unemployed and employers. 
State Labour Bureau – Supporters and Critics 
The State Labour Bureau, despite its considerable success in classifying, registering and 
sending nearly 25,000 people to work over a seven-year period, was not without its critics. 
However, most of these criticisms were not new and had been levelled at previous labour 
bureau operations. A recurring criticism was that the centralised structure of the State Labour 
Bureau and the poor branch operations resulted in the unemployed travelling to Sydney 
seeking employment. Schey endeavoured to strengthen the branch operations through the use 
of police officers in 200 towns, but as the registrations reflect, this failed to help. Schey often 
cited developments in other countries in an attempt to gain dedicated labour bureau offices in 
regional NSW. For example, he referred to the proposed British Exchange system and the 
German system where dedicated labour branches operated throughout the country. Despite 
the poor branch results, Charles Lee, Secretary for Public Works, claimed that the existing 
network with the Sydney Labour Bureau, forty two agencies and 200 police officers was 
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‘capable of meeting all requirements.’514 Despite this response, Schey continued to advocate 
for a decentralised network of office.515  
The Dawes Point Registry office and its registration system, also received criticism. On 28 
July 1909, it was claimed in Parliament and later published in the Sydney Morning Herald, 
that the State Labour Bureau was understaffed and overly bureaucratic in its method of 
registration. It was claimed that 3,000 men were waiting outside the State Labour Bureau to 
register but there were only 3 members of staff. Furthermore, as it took fifteen minutes to 
register men were waiting three to four days to register.516  
In defence, Schey claimed that the State Labour Bureau has been largely successful in 
assisting the unemployed and reducing their discontent. He argued that the previously regular 
unemployed disputations, held at the Queens Statue opposite Parliament House, had largely 
ceased since 1905. Schey cited a conversation he had with a former leader of the unemployed 
who claimed that it was ‘impossible to get them together ...they would rather go and work for 
their tucker at Pitt Town Farm.’517 For Schey this was confirmation that he was assisting the 
unemployed and that both the State Labour Bureau and the Training Farm for City Lads were 
effective.518   
Following McGowen’s decision to undertake a Departmental reorganisation, the State Labour 
Bureau was transferred to the administrative control of the Minister for Labour and Industry 
on 22 March 1912. The State Labour Bureau was absorbed by the Department of Labour and 
Industry and became known as the State Labour Branch of that Department in 1912, although 
this title was not used in official publications until 1 July 1913. Schey remained Director of 
the State Labour Bureau until his death on 18 July 1913. The personalised attention given by 
Schey to the unemployed was evident in the tributes published following his death. The State 
Labour Bureau continued to operate as before, albeit with a new name, and without its long 
serving Director.519 
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Conclusion 
In a period of economic prosperity the Carruthers Government established the State Labour 
Bureau to continue with the work of the NSW Labour Commission. Under the control of the 
former Chief Commissioner Schey, the State Labour Bureau continued to operate in a co-
existence system adopting the mediation procedure of a closed system of administrative 
matching. Under this system, private registry offices continued to operate, but as this case 
demonstrates the presence of a public employment service does curtail, in part, their 
fraudulent activities in so much as the unemployed have a choice whether to use them or not. 
While there were numerous examples of private registry abuses throughout the period, 
coupled with Schey’s recommendations for their regulation, the Government, despite claims 
to the contrary, failed to legislate for their regulation during this period.520  
In line with Commons previous findings, the NSW State Labour Bureau provides an 
interesting and compelling example of how a public employment service can contribute to the 
organisation of the labour market. During its seven years of operation, the State Labour 
Bureau was largely successful in registering 21,426 and placing over 24,610 men in positions 
of employment, as well as managing other innovative labour market programs: Casual 
Labour Farm later known as the Government Training Farm, and the Training Farm for City 
Lads. As well as campaigning for legislative change through the regulation of private registry 
offices and the Unemployed Labour Bill, Schey also attempted to expand the rural branch 
structure with the assistance of 200 police. However, this attempt to create an innovative 
labour market solution to rural labour markets failed as there was no improvement in branch 
operations, quite the opposite. While Schey wanted a more dedicated approach, with 
individual labour bureau offices, such plans were impossible largely due to the states own 
financial position and the Government’s own political agenda. However, in a period of both 
economic boom and uncertainty the State Labour Bureau achieved considerable success and 
again demonstrated a genuine need for a public employment service.521 
Nurick and Coghlan claimed that the early NSW labour bureaus were only a temporary 
measure to organise the labour market and lacked long-term commitment from the state, yet 
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as this chapter has continued to demonstrate, the state did maintain a firm commitment to the 
problem of unemployment and expanded labour market programmes. Furthermore, it is 
important to emphasise that the State’s approach to unemployment and other labour market 
programs was dependent on its own financial situation and electoral cycle. The State Labour 
Bureau only ceased to operate in name and not in function. Following McGowen’s 
departmental reorganisation it became known as the State Labour Branch and was transferred 
from the Department of Public Works to the Department of Labour and Industry. The 
following chapter will examine and analyse the operations of State Labour Branch, which 
continued to operate until 1942.522 
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Chapter 7 State Labour Branch 
Introduction 
The State Labour Branch of the Department of Labour and Industry was appointed in 1912 to 
carry on the duties its predecessor the State Labour Bureau of NSW. The State Labour 
Branch was renamed in 1917 and became known as the Labour Exchanges Branch of the 
Department of Labour and Industry. During an exceptional period in history with World War 
I and II and the Great Depression the public employment service continued to operate in 
NSW, registering in excess of 2 million workers. In a period of severe economic instability 
this was a remarkable achievement. While previous writers such as Nurick and Coghlan have 
claimed that early labour bureaus were only a temporary measure to relieve unemployment, 
this chapter will demonstrate that the public employment service continued to operate with 
the support of the state in NSW, for over fifty years before being transferred, as a part of war-
time measures, to the Federal Department of Labour and National Service in 1942.523 
During this exceptional thirty-year period, the NSW public employment service underwent 
considerable structural change and further decentralisation. This included the development of 
a network of dedicated labour exchanges offices, a sub-agent network in rural and remote 
locations, the establishment of a Women’s Employment Agency, later absorbed into the 
Labour Exchanges and the regulation and licensing of private employment registries. This 
process of decentralisation was designed to ameliorate unemployment across the state, 
particularly, in rural and remote areas, previously neglected by the Labour Bureau’s.524 
As previously discussed, previous public employments services have been shaped by a 
number of socio-economic and political concerns: rising unemployment, economic changes 
and uncertainty, fraudulent practices of private registries, limited State finances and political 
pressure. It was also these concerns that shaped the Labour Exchanges Branch. In its thirty-
year period of operation, the Labour Exchanges Branch operated as a labour market 
intermediary initially, in a free coexistence system. However, following the regulation of 
private employment registries in 1918, the public employment service then operated in a 
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regulated coexistence system. Mediation procedures of closed administrative matching 
continued to be used throughout the period.525   
This chapter will begin by examining the economic, industrial and political conditions in 
NSW during the period of the 1913-1942. Attention will then turn to the operations of the 
State Labour Branch. Finally, the criticisms and problems will be analysed.  
Economic and Industrial Context 
Between 1913 and 1942, the NSW economy was affected by a number of significant factors: 
severe drought, World War I, Post War Recovery following World War I, the Great 
Depression and World War II. All of which impacted upon the state’s economic fortunes. 
While World War II ushered in a period of economic expansion, World War I heralded a 
period of economic contraction, with a fall in Gross Domestic Product and later stagnation.526  
World War I’s failure to stimulate economic expansion was due in part, to Australia’s 
isolation and remoteness from the battlegrounds of Europe. Furthermore, enlistment created 
labour shortages, disrupting the state’s labour intensive industries. Other factors also 
contributed to this period of economic contraction. The severe drought of 1914-1915 led to a 
fall in GDP. This greatly reduced rural output, notably wheat production, and was bad for 
trade in general. Dry conditions also adversely affected the harvest of 1918-19 and 1919-20. 
Another major factor underlying the fall in output in 1914-1915 and the stagnation during the 
remaining years of the war, was an initial decline and then a very slow increase in the number 
at work.527 
After World War I, it emerged that re-integrating thousands of returned servicemen into 
society was a problem of unparalleled dimensions. The returning military personnel had 
changed dramatically due to both the experience of war and their advancement in age. The 
men wanted to return to work, but many of their jobs had disappeared due to technological 
change or had changed significantly. Women workers who had taken male jobs were easily 
displaced, but this was not the case for male workers occupying the jobs previously filled by 
returned soldiers, which resulted in intense competition for jobs. To provide immediate post 
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war employment the NSW government embarked on a new program of capital works. 
Projects included the Sydney Harbour Bridge in 1925, the building of the Sydney city circle 
railway line, which involved vast excavations of Hyde Park in Sydney, and the electrification 
of Sydney and suburban network.528 
The Depression, set off by the October 1929 Wall Street stock market crash, hit the NSW 
economy with great severity. The first signs of a major depression appeared in 1927, as the 
supply of overseas capital began to dry up. The impact of the international collapse on 
Australia was immediate and savage. The coincidence of a sharp fall in export prices and the 
stoppage of overseas borrowing in 1929 superimposed on an economy already weakened by 
domestic recession, sent income and employment into an uncontrolled tail spin from which 
they did not begin to recover until the early months of 1932. Gross National Product in 
current prices fell by 9 per cent in 1929-1930, followed by a further 18 per cent in 1930-
1931, and then a further 7 per cent in 1931-1932.529  
The NSW Government, which had borrowed heavily for public works, also had the highest 
level of public expenditure in Australia, due to social services payments. In 1930 the budget 
rapidly went from a surplus to a deficit, greater than all the other Australian states put 
together. Accompanying this economic collapse, of course, was great social disruption and 
distress. Many struggled on part-time work, or depended on charity or the dole. For 
thousands, unemployment also meant eviction, with shanty towns of homeless people 
springing up in many areas. It was a crisis that governments throughout the world did not 
seem to know how to deal with. In April 1931 the Government Savings Bank of NSW 
collapsed and in December 1931 it was transferred to Commonwealth Bank.530 
Unemployment which had averaged at 8 per cent during the 1920s rose to 10 per cent in 1929 
and then climbed steeply to 18 per cent in 1930 before peaking at 28 per cent in 1932. NSW 
was the most severely affected of the states by the Depression, though unemployment was by 
no means uniform. In some areas, such as the dairying districts in the north and south coast 
there was chronic poverty, but unemployment was relatively low. Inland railway towns such 
as Goulburn, Bathurst, Albury, Dubbo and Cootamundra had a buffer against unemployment. 
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The worst hit area with persistent unemployment was the troubled Hunter Valley 
coalfields.531 
While the 1930s depression was more severe than the one of the 1890s, recovery was much 
faster, as they did not have to contend with the repeated droughts of the 1890s. However, 
NSW’s economic prosperity remained tied to the primary sector. The effects of the economic 
depression were evident as value of production in rural industries decreased 47 per cent in 
1928-1929 from £74,594 to £42,202 at the height of the depression in 1930-1931. The value 
of production increased in the following period and by 1940-1941 had almost reached pre-
recession levels at £67,743. In terms of the numbers employed in rural industries, there was a 
contraction from 142,378 persons employed in 1911 to 123,451 in 1931-1932. In the 
following period the levels again increased to 130,070 persons, which was just below the 
1911 level.532 
Employment in the agricultural sector was also affected by the outbreak of war and the 
economic depression, as well as the introduction of new labour saving machinery, which led 
to a gradual reduction in the labour force. In 1912-1913 the Agriculture industry employed 
59,840 people on 3,737,269 acres, with the value of machinery used being £4,633,800. By 
1920-1921 there had been a reduction in the numbers employed by almost 17 per cent to 
49,866 over 4,468,342 acres with the value of machinery used increased to £7,120,381. This 
patterned continued, and by 1927-1928, there were a further decrease of almost 18 per cent to 
42,293 people employed, over 4,994,515 acres with the value of machinery increasing further 
to £10,849,513.533 
The manufacturing sector, which had continued to grow throughout the period, also suffered 
setbacks during the economic depression. The manufacturing workforce grew by 51 per cent 
from 120,400 persons in 5,456 factories in 1913 to 182,660 people employed at 8,362 
factories in 1928-1929. At the height of the depression the manufacturing workforce 
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decreased by 30 per cent to 126,355 people employed at 7,397 factories. The industry soon 
recovered and by 1939-1940 employment had increased to 264,751 at 9,919 factories.534 
During this period, the mining sector faced considerable problems due to industrial 
disputation coupled with both falling prices and demand. Between 1912 and 1932 exports 
fell, coal production was reduced by almost half and its value declined at much the same rate. 
The decline in coal exports and in demand for heavy metal products like galvanised iron and 
wire led to a shut-downs lasting for months at a time. Oil and petrol burning cars were 
replacing coal-fired steam trains. In response mine owners tried to force wages cuts and when 
miners refused the mines were closed. This led to a period if industrial disputation throughout 
the industry in the years 1919-1920.535 
Employment fluctuated in the coal mining industry. In 1921 there were 143 coalmines in 
operation employing 20,973 people, with an output valued at £9,036,474. By 1932, while 
there had been an increase in the number of mine operations to 169 mines, the labour force 
had contracted by 32 per cent to 14,126 people with the value of output decreasing by 54 per 
cent to £4,076,108. By 1940, the situation had improved marginally with 151 mines 
operating, employing 16,888 people with output valued at £6,393,541536 
Despite these problems, the mineral mining industry fared better overall, during the period. In 
1921 they employed 25,612 people at 493 mines with an output valued at £10,191,975. At the 
height of the depression 431 mines were in operation employing 18,370 people with an 
output valued at £5,706,552. By 1941 the economic fortunes for mineral mining had 
improved with 553 mines operating, employing 22,481 people with a value of output 
increasing to £13,488,023.537 
The last years of World War I and the immediate post war years were a period of both 
political and industrial turmoil. A major strike occurred in 1917 centred on the railways and 
tramways. The strike spread quickly and before long all coal handling was considered 
‘black’, this affected a great many industries. The strike of 1917 involved some 76,000 NSW 
workers and lasted 82 days. In 1919-1920, there was another unprecedented strike wave that 
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included maritime workers and Broken Hill miners. Wartime conditions strengthen the 
industrial unions, which preferred direct action anyway having become disappointed by the 
NSW Labor Government.538 
Political Landscape 
Since Federation, NSW had experienced a period of relative political stability. However the 
outbreak of war led to periods of political instability and heightened tensions between the 
Federal and State Labor Party. The First World War had mostly been a matter for the Federal 
Government, though in NSW it had led to some resentment over the enhanced powers of the 
Federal Government, who from 1915 had been collecting income taxes.  A second 
contributing factor was the issue of conscription for military service. In NSW there was 
concern that conscription would exacerbate labour shortages for some industries. This was a 
particular concern for those in primary industry, who feared labour shortages at crucial times, 
such as during the wheat harvest. Conscription also raised civil liberties concerns and there 
was also growing discontent with the sacrifices of the War.539 
Following McGowen’s resignation William Holman became Premier of NSW on 30 June 
1913. Holman’s leadership of the NSW Labor Government was undermined by his support 
for conscription in 1916. Holman’s insistence on supporting Prime Minister Hughes’ call for 
conscription led to his expulsion from the Labor party. Holman and other Labor supporters of 
conscription, joined with the Liberals to form the Nationalist Party. Holman continued in 
office forming a Nationalist coalition with the Progressives, led by George Beeby, who was 
to become Minister for Labour and Industry. Holman remained in power until he was 
defeated in the April 1920 NSW elections, by the Labor Party led by John Storey.540 
Storey came to power promising child endowment, the electrification of suburban railways 
and the completion of the city’s underground railway. Storey, however, died in office on 5 
October 1921 and was succeeded by James Dooley. However, Dooley’s term was short lived 
as the Government was defeated on 13 December 1921, after the Speaker Daniel Levy stood 
down which led to Dooley’s resignation 20 December 1921. George Fuller leader of the 
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Nationalist Party refused to form a ministry without full support from the Progressives. The 
resulting Nationalist-Progressives Government formed on 20 December, 1921. However, the 
Fuller Government only lasted seven hours, as Fuller resigned due to hostility from some 
dissident members of the Progressive party. Labor returned to power with Dooley as leader 
before being defeated at the general election in April 1922 by a coalition of Nationalists and 
Progressives.541  
Sir George Fuller returned to office on 13 April 1922. Fuller’s Government provided the 
sound and economical administration that had been promised at the 1922 elections, which 
was overtly conservative. However, the public had grown tired of fiscal restraint and the 
Government was unable to prevent a swing to Labor at the general elections of June 1925. 
Labor led by the charismatic Jack Lang, campaigned on a programme of social welfare and 
growth and won the election by two seats.542  
Jack Lang was to become the most controversial Premier of NSW, and the only one to be 
dismissed from office. Lang was twice Premier of NSW. In his first term office in June 1925 
he became both Premier and Treasurer. His first term brought many significant innovations, 
including child endowment, widows' pensions, increased workers' compensation rates, 
reversion to the 44-hour week, abolition of secondary school fees, and votes for all in local 
government elections. In the October 1927 NSW elections, the Labor Party lost its narrow 
majority to a Nationalist-Country Party coalition led by Thomas Bavin.543  
Lang’s second term, which coincided with the worst years of the Great Depression, followed 
his victory over Bavin in the October 1930 elections. Lang’s initial program was to maintain 
wages and to use loans to fund public works, create jobs and generate prosperity. However, 
his plan was frustrated by the Federal Government and the NSW Legislative Council. The 
Supreme and High Courts also blocked his second attempt to abolish the Legislative Council. 
His 1931 ‘Lang Plan’ of inflation, which reduced interest rates and loans re-negotiation, was 
rejected by the Federal Scullin Labor Government. Lang then refused to pay loan interest and 
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the Commonwealth commenced legal action. The NSW Labor party split into State Labor 
(supporting Lang) and Federal Labor (supporting Scullin). Reluctantly, Lang later agreed to 
the Premiers’ Plan to cut government expenditure, but he did little to implement it. The split 
in Labor ranks worsened and precipitated an early Federal election in December 1931, which 
was won easily by the United Australia Party led by the Federal Labor Government’s former 
Treasurer and Labor ‘rat’, Joseph Lyons.544 
The issue quickly now came to a head between the State and Commonwealth Governments 
with the new Federal Government moving to take over NSW tax revenue. Lang still refused 
to conform to the Commonwealth requirements and ordered State public servants to refuse to 
cooperate with the Commonwealth. On 19 March 1932, Lang opened the Sydney Harbour 
Bridge, but this great public show of hope and achievement was to be his last. While 
hundreds of Bridge workers joined the ranks of the unemployed in NSW, now with the worst 
level of unemployment in Australia, Lang continued his unorthodox attempts to raise funds. 
On 13 May, Sir Philip Game, the Governor of NSW, determined that Lang was acting 
unconstitutionally, and dismissed his Government.545  
The Opposition Leader, Bertram Stevens, was appointed Premier and in the ensuing June 
1932 state election, Stevens won decisively. The bitterness and the split in the ranks ensured 
that Labor had no chance of winning the next two state elections in 1935 and 1938. The 
conservative United Australia Party-United Country Party coalition governments which 
followed Lang did little to improve economic conditions. They were fortunate, however, in 
that they took office in 1932, at the peak of the Depression and were in Government as the 
economy slowly improved.546  
Bertram Stevens retained the Premiership for seven years, managing major reform of the 
Legislative Council, largely maintaining social services and increasing the budget deficit, by 
providing modest relief programs and promoting private enterprise-based economic recovery. 
By the eve of World War II, in 1939, unemployment had fallen considerably, but there were 
still many out of work and little enthusiasm for government policy. Only Labor disunity had 
kept the Government in office at the 1938 election. There was also growing dissension within 
Government ranks and Stevens lost the leadership in 1939 to Alexander Mair who remained 
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Premier until he was defeated by a reunited Labor party in 1941. Following the election the 
United Australia Party began to fragment like the Labor Party had previously.547  
As the previous discussion has illustrated this was a period of political and economic 
instability and tension. Despite the numerous changes of government and the increasing 
levels of economic uncertainty, the public employment service in NSW continued to grow 
and expand labour market programs until the Depression. As the following discussion will 
illustrate, the Governments of the time remained committed to assisting the unemployed by 
establishing an extensive network of public employment service offices designed to assist the 
organisation of the labour market.  
State Labour Branch Operations prior to the Outbreak of War 1912-1914 
Following the McGowen Government’s departmental reorganisation, the State Labour 
Bureau was transferred from the Department of Public Works to the administrative control of 
the Minister for Labour and Industry on 22 March, 1912. The State Labour Bureau was 
renamed the State Labour Branch of the Department of Labour and Industry in 1912. This 
reorganisation signalled one of the most significant shifts in Government policy and 
commitment towards the public employment service. The McGowen Government embarked 
upon a period of structural reform aimed at organising the labour market and ameliorating 
unemployment which included the decentralisation of the public employment services. This 
reform agenda was initially outlined in the Labour Exchanges Bill. While this Bill was never 
enacted, the Holman Government successfully implemented its central elements during the 
period of World War I.548  
The Labour Exchanges Bill was drafted in early 1913 by Schey and Ambrose Carmichael, the 
Labor Minister for Labour and Industry. The Bill outlined measures, which would authorise 
the establishment for a network of State Labour Exchanges, an unemployment insurance 
scheme for workers and the regulation of private registry offices. The Government was 
concerned with issue of labour supply and demand. They argued that work is irregular due to 
the industrial effects of ‘seasons, climates, new labour-saving devices, new consolidations of 
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capital, financial panics, crop failures, plagues strikes and war’549 and that employment is 
intermittent due to the failure of the state to organise and control its domestic labour market. 
The Government believed that the measures outlined in the Bill would bring a sense of order 
to the labour market thereby making the supply of labour more fluid and protecting and 
supporting those most vulnerable in the labour market, who were most likely to suffer from 
intermittent work.550  
Despite McGowen’s enthusiasm, the Bill was not brought into the Legislative Assembly 
during the 1913 session, partly due to other pressing parliamentary concerns. On the 6 August 
1914, concerned with the impending industrial crisis due to the outbreak of war in Europe, 
The Holman Government introduced the Labour Exchanges Bill to Parliament. The 
Government decided to reconsider the Bill, due to its controversial character. A motion to 
introduce the Bill, modified in form, but not in principle, was included in the outstanding 
business of the House, but there is no record of it being brought to notice in the House again. 
Regardless of this legislative setback, the Government continued to pursue its agenda and in 
the following period was successful in achieving of two of its aims: a network of Labour 
Exchanges and the regulation of private registry offices.551  
Schey, who had played a pivotal role in drafting the legislation, remained Director of Labour 
until his death on 18 July 1913. Schey was replaced by his former Assistant Director Frank 
Brennan. His appointment marked a further name change as he became the Superintendent of 
the State Labour Branch of the Department of Labour and Industry.552 The functions of the 
labour bureaus continued on as before except they were now enshrined in the Industrial 
Arbitration Act 1912:  
‘To bring together intending employers and persons seeking employment; to make 
known the number of employed and unemployed in the State; to encourage minors 
and others to undertake training in skilled employment; to provide industrial and 
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agricultural employment for vagrants and others unsuited for ordinary employment; to 
carry out any other duties prescribed.’553 
Operations Outbreak of War 1914-1919 period of experiment 
The outbreak of World War I caused considerable problems in the labour market and led to a 
raft of significant structural changes for the State Labour Branch. The existing centralised 
structure: Sydney head office and the quasi network of forty-two clerks of Petty Sessions and 
200 police officers acting as Agents was replaced, by a decentralised structure consisting of 
dedicated offices, in both the metropolitan and rural areas and a network of rural sub-agents. 
Part of this reform agenda also included a number of experimental labour market programs, 
which were later re-absorbed into the centralised structure: Women’s Employment Agency 
and a self registration system. Another defining feature of this period was the regulation of 
private employment agencies. As the following will demonstrate these structural changes 
proved effective and largely shaped the ongoing operations of the public employment service 
in NSW.554  
Self-Registration System and Travel to Employment 
Within a few days of the declaration of war and notwithstanding the withdrawal of the 
Labour Exchanges Bill, John Estell, the Minister for Labour and Industry, with a view to 
mitigating the effects of dislocations in industries established a self-registration system for 
persons unemployed in September 1914. The self-registration system was based upon the use 
of post-free letter-cards. The Minister was particularly concerned that the unemployed did not 
have an adequate and effective means of communication with the Department. He was 
concerned that this could lead to a waste of surplus labour at a critical time of war. The self-
registration system was administered by the State Labour Branch and operated at the same 
time as the existing Dawes Point Labour Bureau.555 
The self-registration system was an early example of a co-ordinated approach to 
unemployment between the State and Federal Governments. Arrangements were made by the 
Minister, through Premier Holman and the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth, that letter 
cards should be made available to the public in all post-offices across the State, and that such 
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letter-cards should, when filled in and posted, be conveyed by the post-offices for delivery at 
the Department of Labour and Industry. The cards were to contain all the relevant 
information regarding the applicant including name, address, skills and experience.556 
The NSW Department of Labour and Industry met the costs for the self-registration scheme, 
with the cards being personally addressed to the Minister. The purpose of this was twofold. In 
the first place, the Minister wished it to be understood that he himself was personally 
interested in procuring work for all who might need it. Secondly, it was his view that 
whatever decentralisation of control that might come in the future course of the public 
employment system, the needs of the moment were for centralisation of a very complete 
character. A corresponding system was also established for employers to notify the 
Department of any vacancies. In addition to placing boxes of cards for the use by employers 
at post-offices, the Department also sent boxes of cards to large employers encouraging them 
to report vacancies to the Department557 
In terms of mediation procedures, the self-registration system operated also as a closed 
system of administrative matching. State Labour Branch staff personally selecting applicants 
based on the requirements of the job and the applicant’s skills and past experience, including 
references from previous employers, in an attempt to create a job-person match. The self 
registration system cards were colour coded between female and male applicants and 
contained all relevant information relating to their employment history and skills, positions 
offered, and employer feedback. Employer cards contained details of the industry, contact 
person, address and were categorised by industry. The cards were updated daily and analysed 
against offers for employment. All correspondence between the employer and employee was 
transacted though the Department. The Department claimed that the self-registration system 
proved to be very successful in enabling them to determine on a monthly basis the state of the 
labour market, but it appears unclear how successful they were in assisting them into 
employment.558  
The self registration system operated for almost three and a half years before being abolished 
in 1917, when the Dawes Point Branch was amalgamated with the State Labour Branch. 
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During its operation, it successfully registered 63,407 people (Refer to Table 7.1). However, 
due to parallel operation with the Dawes Point Labour Bureau it was believed that there was a 
proportion who registered with both agencies. The poor results in terms of employer 
applications and numbers of those sent to employment seem consistent with the Dawes Point 
Registry results of the time. Despite this, the self registration system provided an important 
avenue of communication to residents in rural and remote areas in a period of uncertainty, 
whilst also allowing the Government to gain an understanding of the labour market.559  
Year New Registrations Employer 
Applications 
Sent to 
Employment 
October-
December 
1914 
15,687   
1915 24,345 4,553 3,671 
1916 9,063 7,034 5,204 
1917 14,312 8,419 5,134 
Total 63,407 20,006 14,009 
Table 7.1 Self Registration Office Operations 1914-1917 (From January 1917 was known as 
Labour Exchanges) 
Another area of policy that was amended during this period was related to advances given to 
men travelling to employment through the labour bureaus. The State Labour Branch 
continued to authorise advances for persons seeking employment in remote or distant 
locations. Advances were authorised for fares, tools of trade, and similar work related 
expenses and were to be deducted from the forthcoming wages. By late 1914, John Estell, the 
Labor Minister for Labour and Industry, expressed concern over the State Labour Branches 
use of advances for men travelling to known sites of industrial disputation. The policy 
relating to men being sent to known sites of industrial disputation had remained unchanged 
since the Government Labour Bureau 1892: men were notified of the existence of the strike 
or lock-out and were entitled to either accept, or reject, the work without any recrimination or 
prejudice. Men who had previously accepted the work had been given the advance however, 
the Minister in line with his Labor ethos, now felt that this was inappropriate and instead 
outlined a new policy:  
“Where persons who seek advances of fares to enable them to travel to reach work out 
of the district in which they ordinarily reside and where an industrial dispute is 
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occurring, the Department will decline to grant such advances to them, but will not 
refuse them the information available as to work offering.” 560  
Women’s Employment Agency 
The impending outbreak of war also led to the establishment of the Women’s Employment 
Agency, on 4 May 1914. Female workers had been neglected since the closure of the Female 
Registry on 31 January, 1906. Like its predecessor the Female Registry, the Women’s 
Employment Agency was also established to provide protection from the fraudulent practices 
of the private registries, but it was also designed to organise the labour market for the 
impending war effort. Estell, the Minister for Labour and Industry, claimed that the 
Government had anticipated the need for a more organised and coordinated labour market 
during a period of war.561 He claimed that female workers had been neglected and while he 
believed that the prospects for young and presentable women was, ‘generally speaking, good,  
the labour market for middle-aged and older women was habitually depressed’.562 
The Women’s Employment Agency opened on 4 May, 1914, at 231 George St North, 
Sydney. The Agency advertised itself as a facility for women workers of all kind. In terms of 
mediation procedures, the Agency operated as a closed system of administrative matching, 
personally selecting applicants based on the requirements of the job, the applicant’s skills and 
past work experience, including references from previous employers, in an attempt to create a 
job-person match. Using means such as circulars, advertisements and press coverage they 
notified employers of their services and employees of their vacancies.563 
The Women’s Employment Agency was well received by both the unemployed and 
employers, as seen in Table 7.2. During the first three and a half years of operation 1914 to 
1917 the Women’s Employment Agency were successful in registering 14,999 female 
workers, receiving 11,897 applications from employers and sending 9,396 women to 
positions of work. The discrepancy between the numbers of women registered and the offers 
of employment was due to the inexperience and lack of skill on the part of the applicants. It 
was also claimed that tural and remote locations were also difficult to fill. A further problem 
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cited was the difficulty in placing older women, or those who have children, particularly in 
positions of domestic service.564 
Year New Registrations Employer 
Applications 
Sent to 
Employment 
May-
December 
1914 
2,067 394 652 
1915 3,626 2,957 2,454 
1916 3,998 4,145 3,153 
1917 5,308 4,401 3,137 
Total 14,999 11,897 9,396 
Table 7.2 Women’s Employment Agency Registrations May 1914 – December 1917565 
Between 1914 and December 1917 the Women’s Employment Agency operated as an 
independent agency before being incorporated into the Central administration of the Labour 
Exchanges, becoming known as the Women’s Department of the Labour Exchanges Branch, 
relocating to the Labour Exchanges head office at 72-78 Elizabeth Street Sydney. All 
corresponding information relating the registrations and work of that office was no longer 
distinguished in reporting instead the registration data was included in the branch totals.566 
Structural Change: Decentralisation and Amalgamation of the Public Employment 
Service 
August 1914 not only heralded the outbreak of World War I, it also marked the beginning of 
a period of structural change that would shape the operations of State Labour Branch until it 
was eventually transferred during World War II. Following the establishment of the 
Women’s Employment Agency, Estell, Minister for Labour and Industry, instigated further 
reforms aimed at organising the labour market by attempting to ameliorate unemployment, 
particularly in rural areas. The previous centralised system that had consisted of a Sydney 
Head office, located at Dawes Point, augmented with a network of forty two clerks of Petty 
Sessions acting as Agents and 200 Police Sergeants was disbanded. In August 1914 it was 
replaced with a decentralised structure consisting of a new Departmental Head office of the 
State Labour Branch at 72-78 Elizabeth Street, Sydney, a branch office at the Sydney Dawes 
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Point Registry and a new network of dedicated regional Labour Exchange Offices located in 
principal centres across NSW.567 
The distinguishing feature of this reform agenda was the decentralisation of the public 
employment service operations with the establishment of dedicated regional Labour 
Exchanges. A long-term criticism of the labour bureaus had been their neglect of rural 
workers due to the centralised operations in Sydney which encouraged men to travel to 
Sydney in search of work. The Sydney operations were also criticised for not having an 
understanding of rural labour markets. Schey had long held this view. He had argued that the 
multiple tasks of the Clerks of Petty Sessions meant that they often neglected their labour 
bureau duties and failed to provide regular local labour market information. Schey, prior to 
his death, had long been an ardent advocate for dedicated labour bureau offices and a regional 
network.568  
The program for decentralisation began in August 1914 with the opening of four dedicated 
labour bureau offices: Broken Hill, Orange, Woonona (Illawarra) and Newcastle. These 
offices co-operated with the State Labour Branch Office and were responsible for both the 
self –registration system and local functions: assisting and registering the local unemployed, 
assisting local employers and sending men to employment. The rural network continued to 
grow throughout the war with new offices opening in Lithgow and Lismore in February 
1915, Tamworth and Wagga Wagga in February 1917, Goulburn and Wollongong in 1918.569 
During early 1917 the office of the State Labour Branch underwent a further and final name 
change following its amalgamation with the Dawes Point Labour Bureau. The new office 
became known as the Labour Exchanges Branch of the Department of Labour and Industry, 
and was located at 72-78 Elizabeth St, Sydney. Under this arrangement the Labour 
Exchanges Branch became responsible for all the Labour Exchanges operations in NSW, 
including the Women’s Department. The Superintendent of the State Labour Branch became 
known as the Director of Labour Exchanges.570  
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Following this amalgamation, there was an expansion and rationalisation of the metropolitan 
Labour Exchange network. In 1918 four new offices opened, of which three became 
specialised vocational offices: Central Railway Station Labour Exchange specialised in 
assisting mechanics, artificers and their helpers and assistants; Circular Quay Labour 
Exchange was for labourers; Rawson Chambers Pitt Street Labour Exchange assisted the 
mechanic trades; and Balmain Labour Exchange was for general operations. The Department 
argued that the rationalisation of these registries would provide a more dedicated and 
effective means in assisting the unemployed.571  
By late 1918, as the industrial distress worsened, George Beeby, the Nationalist Minister for 
Labour and Industry, approved a scheme to further extend and decentralise the Labour 
Exchange operations in rural NSW. The scheme involved the appointment of sub-agents in 
principal country towns. These sub-agents were generally selected from stock and station 
agents. The sub-agents were to act as feeders to the regional Labour Exchange offices. Sub-
agents were to work closely with both employers and the unemployed and received a fee of 
2s, payable upon each successful engagement. The sub-agents were not entitled to make any 
charge to employees or employers for services rendered in connexion with employment. In 
1919, fifty sub-agents had been appointed who throughout the year were responsible for 
1,577 engagements. The Department felt that these results were disappointing, but blame was 
portioned in part, to the drought. The Department went on to argue that it believed that closer 
co-operation in the future would generate a greater amount of business.572 
To promote the new expanded and decentralised labour bureau offices the Government 
embarked on an extensive and targeted advertising campaign. In addition to newspaper 
advertisements and regular circulars, the Department instigated targeted campaigns to 
promote the services of the various exchanges. Following the opening of the Women’s 
Employment Agency advertisements were placed in railway cars and in the ladies saloon of 
the Manly ferries. The State Labour Branch distributed regular newsletters to subscribers of 
the New South Wales Industrial Gazette and employers outlining their services and offices. 
The Department also sent newsletters outlining the services provided by the rural Labour 
Exchanges to 16,000 subscribers of the Agricultural Gazette. In 1917 to promote the opening 
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of the Tamworth and Wagga Wagga Labour Exchanges, the Department distributed 17,000 
circulars to the local areas.573 
Returned Soldiers and Sailors Registry 
By 1915, the Holman NSW Government had begun discussions with the Hughes 
Commonwealth Government to develop a scheme for assisting returned soldiers back into the 
labour market. Highlighting the national character of the issue the Holman Government 
proposed a coordinated scheme modelled on the NSW Labour Exchanges, with both tiers of 
government sharing the costs involved of the administration and advertising. The scheme 
included a dedicated Sydney office, who received assistance from the regional Labour 
Exchange network. In 1916, the Returned Soldiers’ Employment Bureau opened in Young 
Street, Sydney. This office worked in close contact with the Central Labour Exchanges 
office. Discharged soldiers registered with the Sydney office and if they wished to reside in 
regional areas, their registration would be transferred to their local Exchange, who would 
then assist them.574  
In 1919 the Returned Soldiers and Sailors Employment Act was enacted which stipulated 
preference of employment be given to returned soldiers and sailors by all employers 
throughout the state, including the Crown, Railway Commissioners, Sydney Harbour Trust 
and other Governmental and municipal authorities. The act also provided for the 
reinstatement of employment to returned soldiers and sailors. Returned soldiers were 
registered as returned men, and given preference in employment opportunities. Employers 
while being generally supportive were compelled to comply with these arrangements. 
Employers were bound by the Act to notify any vacancies to the Labour Exchange located 
within 20 miles of their organisation and if there was no Labour Exchange within 20 miles, 
they were to notify the Repatriation Committee ho would notify the Returned Soldiers’ 
Employment Bureau.575 
Regulation of Private Employment Registries  
Despite the Holman Government’s failure to gain passage for the Labour Exchanges Bill in 
1914, they remained committed to reforming the labour market. After successfully 
establishing a network of Labour Exchanges offices they turned their attention to the 
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regulation of private employment registries. After almost thirty years of campaigning for 
their regulation by past heads of the NSW public employment service and after almost twenty 
years of promises from various State Governments the legislation was finally enacted in 
1918. In announcing the Government’s intention to regulate private registries George Beeby, 
Minister for Labour and Industry, argued that the fraudulent practices perpetrated of the 
private registries upon the unemployed had distorted the labour market, regulation was 
necessary to assist the functioning of the labour market.576 
Under Part X of Industrial Arbitration Amendment Act No. 16, 1918, gazetted on 2nd August 
1918, private employment registries were to be licensed, and applications for the licenses 
were to be made to the Department of Labour and Industry. The license fee was £2 and it was 
non transferable. Under the Act, the license had to be exhibited at the place of business. The 
scale of fees chargeable was prescribed in the regulations, and the licensed agents were 
required to provide receipts. The License was valid for two years, following which they could 
apply to have it renewed. Every conviction against a licensee in the Court of Petty Sessions 
would be entered upon the license upon a third conviction within a three year period from the 
first conviction the license would then be cancelled.577  
The numbers of licenses issued between 1919 and 1933 is displayed in the table 7.3 and 
appendix 2. It is important to note that the data regarding the number of licenses granted and 
the locations of these private registry offices is problematic. For example no licenses were 
issued during the year of 1931 however, the data resumes in 1932 but there is no explanation 
for what occurred during that missing period, particularly in regard to the licenses that 
expired or were renewed. A further problem is in the early period the data fails to identify the 
location of the private registry offices. Finally, without explanation, no data is published after 
December 1933.578  
Regardless of these problems, the published data does provide an interesting insight into the 
industry. Overwhelmingly, the majority of private registries were located within the Sydney 
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metropolitan area. In terms of the total number in operation they remain relatively stable up 
to the mid 1920s before peaking at 100 in August 1929, just prior to the Depression. During 
the Depression there appears to be a contraction in the industry as there are only 61 licenses 
operating in February 1931. In the following period 1923 to 1928, there is a sharp increase of 
150 per cent from 1923 to 1928; these agencies are predominantly located within the Sydney 
metropolitan area. Agencies located in rural areas remain relatively stable for the most part 
but decrease from a peak of 20 in 1926 to 15 in 1928.579  
Year License Granted License Expired License Renewed 
1918 (Aug-Dec) 68   
1919 39 58 3 
1920 13 65 39 
1921 34 67 51 
1922 22 53 51 
Table 7.3 Private Employments licenses Granted. Expired and Renewed 1918-1922580 
Details the agencies that were found to have breached the Act, including nature of the breach 
and punishment, are outlined in Appendix 1. It is interesting that of the thirteen prosecutions 
only one resulted in a cancelled license. In another case an agreement was reached prior to 
the case being heard in court and costs being paid which gives rise to the possibility of there 
being more breaches of the Act being settled informally. A further interesting point is that 
only one agency prosecuted was located outside of Sydney, which gives rise to the notion that 
high levels of competition between the agencies in Sydney increased the likelihood of 
fraudulent behaviour occurring. It is clearly evident that the Act and the State’s action in 
upholding it proved a deterrent for the more unscrupulous practices that had characterised the 
industry thereby providing the unemployed with much longed for and needed protection.581 
Two amendments were made to the Act during this period. On the 18 May 1923 the 
Industrial Arbitration Act, Part X, Regulation No. 20 was passed. This stipulated that the 
licensee must issue a receipt for any monies received for every registration and engagement. 
The receipt was to be written in duplicate, with the original being given to the applicant and 
the copy to be held in the records of the agency.  The Act was again amended on 9 September 
1925 to include Section 96 of the Industrial Arbitration Act. Under this provision, private 
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employment agents were required to be kept updated registers and all original letters for a 
period of two years. The section further required that both the registers and the letters be open 
to examination and inspection of an officer, appointed by the Minister.582 
Sub-agents and Specialised Labour Exchanges 
Following the First World War and to counter the challenges of industrial uncertainty, the 
NSW Labour Exchanges underwent further structural change. Further decentralisation 
occurred with the expansion of the sub-agent network and the opening of further dedicated 
and specialised labour exchange operations.  
In a bid to combat the rising industrial distress of the time the Department continued to 
expand the network of sub-agents who were mostly stock and station agents, across the state. 
The number of sub-agents increased from fifty in 1919 to 138 in 1921. In the following years 
it appears that only those sub-agents that transacted any business in the month were recorded 
and sometimes there was no reference at all the subagents in the monthly reports published in 
the NSW Industrial Gazettes. Therefore it is difficult to identify the actual number of agents 
that existed in anyone time period or identify the total number of transactions. For example in 
1928 only 27 sub-agents were recorded, while 65 agents were recorded in July 1931 and 138 
sub-agents in 1937.583  
By 1937 the Government had again expressed concerns over the system of sub-agents and 
deemed the scheme ineffective. As the agents were not full-time Labour Exchange officers, 
the Government believed they were distracted by their own business concerns and not 
focussed on their labour market obligations. In November 1937, the Government transferred 
the system of Labour Exchange sub-agents to the responsibility of the NSW Police. It was 
reported that by 1939 there were over 400 country centres being administered by the Police. 
In practical terms this meant that the police in rural and regional towns were once again 
responsible for the labour exchange work, this arrangement continued until the 
Commonwealth Government’s National Service Office absorbed the NSW Labour 
Exchanges in 1942.584 
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In a bid to meet the increasing needs of the labour market, a number of specialised dedicated 
Labour Exchanges were opened during the 1920s post World War I period. On 7 January 
1925 the Waterside State Labour Exchange was opened to deal with waterside labour. 
Originally established on the dockside at 8 Hickson Road, Sydney, its operations were 
transferred two months later to the Circular Quay branch of the State Labour Exchange. In 
the coal lumping industry, at the request of the Collier Owners and Coal Stevedores' 
Association, the Sydney Wharf Labourers' Union, and the Port Jackson Coal Workers' 
Association, a State Labour Exchange for coal-lumpers was opened on 10 August 1925, at 
Macquarie Building, 5 Phillip Street, Sydney.585  
By the outbreak of World War II, it was claimed that the Labour Exchange network had 
registration depots, as either dedicated offices or police sub-agents, in every municipality and 
shire throughout the State. Beyond the specialised offices and labour sub-agent networks, 
only one new Labour Exchange, for general registrations, was opened at Parramatta in 1928, 
this was to serve the growing metropolis. The outbreak of World War II led to further labour 
shortages, most notably for skilled workers and the Government again opened a Labour 
Exchange at the Trades Hall Sydney on 8 August 1941, for the registration of tradesmen and 
other skilled workers.586 
The outbreak of World War II also led the Government to again reassess the network of 
Police acting as sub-agents. The police had initially acted in this role from 1908 until August 
1914 when they were disbanded in favour of the regional network of Labour Exchange 
offices, before again being reinstated in November 1937. G.C. Gollan Minster for Labour and 
Industry and Social Services, as it had become known in 1940, felt that in a period of 
industrial distress and dislocation that the current arrangement for Police acting as sub-agents 
was an inappropriate use of resources and centralisation was again required. Between 1940 
and 1942 the Minister cancelled a number licenses in areas that had transacted minimal 
business. Appendix 2 details towns and dates the State Labour Exchange sub-agents were 
cancelled.587  
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Registrations 
So who registered with the Labour Exchanges? During its 30 years of operation, the NSW 
Labour Exchanges registered 2,339,928 male and female workers, received 1,178,302 
applications from employers and sent 1,250,111 people to employment. Included in this total 
figure were the 31,371 ex-soldiers who registered during the post war period of 1920-1926, 
of which 18,854 people found employment through the Labour Exchanges.588  
In analysing this data it is important to remember that the Labour Exchanges operated over 
30 year period during exceptional circumstances: World War I, the 1920s, the Great 
Depression, the Recovery from the Depression and World War II. As table 7.8 demonstrates 
the numbers of registrations continued to increase during the period, before peaking in the 
period of the Great Depression. The period prior to the outbreak of World War 1, 1912-1913, 
represented the quietest period for the Labour Exchanges accounting for only 0.3 per cent of 
total registrations. Registrations increased during World War I to 6.5 per cent of the total, 
before increasing further during the 1920s period to 20 per cent of the total. Registrations 
peaked during Great Depression at 32.2 per cent of the total. In fact, the Labour Exchanges 
registered more people in that four-year period than they did in the previous seventeen years. 
The second largest number of registrations occurred in the period of post Depression 
recovery 1933- 1938. The labour market saw marked improvements in the years following 
with registrations steadily decreasing to the outbreak of World War II.589 
The Labour Exchanges were successful in sending 1,250,111 people to employment (refer to 
table 7.4). In the pre war period 1912-1913, the Labour Exchanges appear to be particularly 
successful, however, the length of each employment is unfortunately not known. The 
discrepancy in the numbers between those sought by employers and sent by the Labour 
Exchanges during the war was largely due to labour shortages for skilled workers. This was 
also the case in the period of the 1920s. However, during the period of the Great Depression 
the discrepancy is due to the Labour Exchanges supplying the labour on the Government’s 
public works programs. During the period of the post Great Depression recovery, there was 
an increase in numbers of employees sought by employers, which had increased by over 36 
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per cent on the previous period. Unfortunately, the numbers sought by employers was no 
longer published in the period of World War II.590 
 
Period 
Registered 
for 
Employment 
Sought by 
Employers 
Sent to 
Employment 
Pre-War:1912-1913 6,621 N/A 7324 
WW1: 1914-1919 150285 143403 91396 
The 1920s: 1920-
1928 456249 344759 305721 
The Great 
Depression: 1929-
1932 766301 292380 310288 
Recovery from the 
Depression 1933-
1938 726160 397760 424515 
WW2: 1939-1941 234312 N/A 110867 
Total 2,339,928 1,178,302 1250111 
Table 7.4 Summary of Registrations by Period591 
The classification method that had been developed by the Labour Commissioners in 1900 
continued to be used throughout the period. However, following the outbreak of World War I 
more attention was given to the industry, than skill, in terms of reporting and analysing the 
labour market. Subsequently from 1915, registrations were recorded according to industry, 
with the exception being labourers who remained the largest category throughout the period. 
However, the data was only collected and published until 1932. Despite this, it provides an 
insight into the labour market during that time. Table 7.5 provides an explanation of the 
occupations assigned to each industry category.592 
Labourers continued to be the largest category with over 70 per cent of all registrations 
during the period. Labourers were generally employed intermittently and in periods of 
economic depression and industrial dislocation, they soon found themselves unemployed. 
During the First World War registrations for labourers remained fairly steady fluctuating 
between 2,575 in 1916 and 7025 in 1919, before almost trebling a year later in 1920 to 
19,852 registrations. During the 1920s registrations continued to steadily increase before 
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rising sharply in 1928 to 62,101. Registrations peaked in 1931 at 227,634 registrations. 
Labourers were hit hardest during the four years of the Great Depression between 1929-1932 
as 675,171 labourers registered, representing almost 70 per cent of total number of labourer 
registrations for the total 18 year period.593 
Those employed in the Domestic and Personal service category recorded the second largest 
number of registrations for the period. Between 1915 and 1932 115,490 people registered 
representing just over 8 per cent of total registrations. This category again remained stable 
between 1915 and 1917, before increasing sharply in 1918 and 1919 to 6,092 registrations. 
Between 1919 and 1928 registrations continued to be fairly stable before almost doubling 
from 6,261 in 1927 to 12,265 in 1928. For those working in this industry the Great 
Depression of 1929-1932 created significant industrial dislocation, with registrations for the 
four years 1929-1932 being 49,066 which represented 42 per cent of the total number 
domestic and personal registrations for the 18 year period.594  
Registrations for rural workers represented the third largest category with 78,747 people 
registering, being almost 6 per cent of the total. Labour shortages during the early period 
explain the low numbers of registrations in 1916, where registrations only totalled 781. The 
return to drought conditions in 1918, led to a marked increase to 1698 registrations. This 
upward trend continued and by 1920 registrations had reached 4,737. During the 1920s 
registrations did remain stable between 4,000 and 5,000 before doubling in 1929 to 10,018. In 
all other industries, the four-year period of the economic depression represented a peak in 
registrations. However, in the case of rural workers, registrations decreased by over half to 
4894 in 1930, with a further decrease in 1931 to 3,929 in 1931 before increasing sharply to 
6,733 in 1932. For rural workers, unlike other industries, their economic fortunes were tied to 
the weather and could be completely undermined during periods of drought.595 
The manufacturing industry represented the fourth largest industry with 69,882 registrations 
or 5 per cent of the total. Prior to the economic depression this category fluctuated between 
1,359 in 1916 and 3,769 in 1928. However, during the Great Depression in 1930 registrations 
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peaked at 10,017. Between 1929 and 1932, 30,398 people registered in this industry, this 
represented over 30 per cent of the total registrations for this sector during the total period.596 
Industry Registrations 1915-
1932 
Occupations 
Building Trades 49,234 Bricklayers, Builders Labourers, Carpenters, 
Masons, Painters, Plasterers, Plumbers, Slaters, 
Stonemasons, Plumbers And Gasfitters 
Domestic And 
Personal 
Services 
115,490 Club And Boarding House Employee, Domestic 
Helpers, Hairdressers, Hospital Attendants’ And 
Nurses, Hotel Employees, Laundry Employees 
And Restaurant Employees 
Engine Drivers 
Etc 
5,256 Engine Drivers And Firemen 
 
Labourers 977,943 General Labourers And Hangers 
Manufacturing 69,882 Included Sub Categories Bricks, Cement And 
Pottery/ Clothing And Textiles/ Food And 
Drinks/ Furniture And Woodworking/ Iron 
Trades, Metals, Machines/ Leather, Hides 
Mining, 
Mineral 
Treatment, 
Quarrying And 
Smelting 
8,249 All Mining, Coal, Metalliferous And Quarrying 
Workers 
Miscellaneous 35,412 Watchmen, Caretakers, Cleaners, Lift 
Attendants’, Messengers, Others, Prison 
Warders, Telephonists 
Professional 
And Shop 
workers 
23,565 Canvassers, Clerks, Shop Assistants, Surveyors, 
Teachers, Commercial Travellers, Governesses, 
Draftsmen, Civil Engineers 
Public Utility 
Services 
1,253 Government Railways And Tramways Being 
Traffic Branch, Loco And Stores, Engine 
Driving, Engineering, Permanent Way/ Water 
Supply And Sewerage Employees, Gardeners, 
Municipal Shire Workers 
Rural Workers 78,747 Farm, Dairy, Station And Orchard Workers, 
Shearers, Shed Hands, Harvesters, Station 
Cooks 
Transport Land 27,959 Carters, Chauffeurs, Livery Stable Employees, 
Storemen And Packers 
Transport Sea 2,922 Coal Lumpers, Ship Painters And Dockers, 
Shipping Seamen & Stewards, Wharf Labourers 
Total 1,395,912  
Table 7.5 – Registrations by Industry 1915-1932 including Occupations597 
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Industrial dislocation was also apparent in the other industries. In the building industries 
registrations totalled 49,234 representing 3.5 per cent of the total. For these workers the 
economic depression signalled a major crisis with registrations for the period totalling 
23,375, this represented 47 per cent of the total registrations for the building industry over the 
total period 1915-1942. Those workers categorised under Miscellaneous were also severely 
affected during the period, with registrations totalling 35,412. Again the Great Depression 
had a severe impact on these workers with registrations during the four-year period totalling 
19,685, which represented over 55 per cent of the industry total for the entire period.598  
Transport workers were also affected, with registrations for land and sea transport workers 
totalling 30,881 for the period. In the mining industry registrations totalled 8,249 representing 
less than 1 per cent of the total. For professional and shop workers registrations totalled 
35,412. In this category industrial dislocation occurred twice: firstly in the post war period 
with registrations peaking at 4,383 in 1920 and secondly, during the economic depression as 
registrations reached 9,485, which represented over 40 per cent of the total registrations in 
this sector for the total period 1915-1942. Engine drivers remained relatively stable with 
registrations totalling 5,256. However, registrations in this category did peak in 1929 at 627. 
Public Utilities remained fairly stable throughout the period, recording the lowest number of 
registrations.599 
Year New Registrations Sent to Work 
August to 
December 
1912 
1,102 1,797 
1913 5,519 5,527 
1914 11,363 10,654 
1915 10,057 9,230 
1916 7,539 8,078 
January to 
August 1917 
5,626 3,358 
Total 41,206 38,644 
Table 7.6 Dawes Point Registry August 1912-August 1917 
The registration data of the various labour exchange registries that operated between 1912 
and 1942 are outlined in Tables 7.6 and 7.7 and appendices 6, 7 and 8.While the registration 
data had in previous periods been published in annual reports and calculated from July to 
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June, in this period the data was published monthly and has been calculated from January to 
December. During the period of the First World War two registries operated alongside each 
other: Dawes Point Registry and the Self-registration system. Appendix 8 is a comprehensive 
table which includes all the operations for the registries between 1912 and 1941 including the 
Women’s Employment Agency which operated from 1914 -1917. The breakdown of that 
table which identifies the registry and gender is held in the appendix. However, it is 
important to note that at different periods not all variables were captured: gender, employer 
applications or the numbers of persons sent to employment. Despite this, the data available 
highlights the extensive work undertaken by the registries in assisting both the unemployed 
and employers.  
Year New Registrations Employer 
Applications 
Sent to 
Employment 
October-
December 
1914 
15,687   
1915 24,345 4,553 3,671 
1916 9,063 7,034 5,204 
1917 14,312 8,419 5,134 
Total 63,407 20,006 14,009 
Table 7.7 Self Registration Office Operations (From December 1917 was known as Labour 
Exchanges) 
Outbreak of War: Manpower regulations and National Service Offices   
The outbreak of World War II marked the end of the NSW Government’s provision of public 
employment services. The NSW public employment service, which had operated 
uninterrupted for fifty years since 1892, was absorbed under the Commonwealth 
Government’s National Security Act 1939-1940 Manpower Regulation in March 1942.  
Following the outbreak of war, the Commonwealth Government under section 64 of the 
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900, created the Department of Labour and 
National Services. This department became responsible for administering the National 
Security Act 1939-1940.  This Act was amended on 31 January 1942 to incorporate 
Manpower Regulations for organisation of the labour market.600The object of the Manpower 
regulations was to  
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‘secure that the resources of man-power and woman-power in Australia shall be 
organized and applied in the best possible way to meet the requirements of the 
Defence Force and the needs of industry in the production of munitions and the 
maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of the community.’601  
In complying with the provisions of the Act, the Commonwealth established National Service 
offices throughout Australia. Under the Act the obligation was laid upon employers, not 
exempted by the Minister, to engage all workers through these offices and unemployed 
persons were also required to register at these offices. Any person registered as unemployed 
was to be sent to work, suitable to his capacity, by the Manpower authorities but it was 
stipulated that there must be suitable accommodation available and award wages and 
conditions observed. From 1 April 1942 the functions of the NSW Labour Exchanges were 
transferred to Federal Department of Labour and National Service which were named 
National Service Offices.602 
Conclusion 
Following the McGowen Government’s departmental reorganisation, the State Labour 
Bureau was transferred and renamed the State Labour Branch of the Department of Labour 
and Industry, before becoming known as the Labour Exchanges Branch of that Department. 
Under the control of the Department of Labour and Industry the labour bureaus continued to 
operate, initially in a free co-existence system, but following the regulation of private 
employment registries in 1918, the NSW labour market became a regulated co-existence 
system. Under this system private registry offices were required to be licensed, follow a 
schedule of fees and provide receipts. Breaches of these regulations resulted in fines, and in 
one case, license cancellation. The public employment service continued with the mediation 
procedure of a closed system of administrative matching. This chapter has demonstrated how 
the presence of a public employment service does curtail, in part, the fraudulent activities of 
the private registries, in so much, as the unemployed are not bound to use them to find work 
and if they do choose to use them, they have an avenue for recourse.603  
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During this exceptional thirty year period, the NSW public employment service underwent 
considerable structural change and decentralisation. This included the development of a 
network of dedicated labour exchanges offices, a sub-agent network in rural and remote 
locations, the establishment of a Women’s Employment Agency, later absorbed into the 
Labour Exchanges, and the regulation and licensing of private employment registries. This 
process of decentralisation was designed to ameliorate unemployment across the state, 
particularly, in rural and remote areas, which had been previously neglected by the labour 
bureau’s.604 
As had been the case with its predecessors, the NSW Labour Exchanges and its labour market 
programmes, were shaped by a number of socio-economic and political concerns: outbreak of 
war, labour shortages, economic depression, rising unemployment, economic changes and 
uncertainty, fraudulent practices of private registries, limited State finances and political 
pressure. The establishment of the Women’s Employment Agency was a deliberate step to 
organise a labour market dislocated due to the outbreak of war. In a period of economic 
uncertainty and labour market shortages the Holman Government legislated for the regulation 
of private employment agencies. In doing so, they provided an important safety net in ailing 
labour market. The expansion of dedicated labour exchanges was an attempt to organise the 
labour market to support post-war recovery. However, the onset of the economic depression 
curtailed the State’s finances and resulted in a halt in any further labour market programs.  
As Commons had found in his analysis, the NSW Labour Exchanges Branch provides an 
interesting and compelling example of how a public employment service can contribute to the 
organisation of the labour market. During its thirty years of operations the Labour Exchanges 
Branch was largely successful in registering 2,339,928 men and placing over 1,250,111 men 
in positions of employment. Through the use of a dedicated network of Labour Exchange 
offices that were supplemented by a network of sub-agents, this was an incredible 
achievement in a period of war, depression and drought.605 
Coghlan and Nurick claimed that the early NSW labour bureaus were only a temporary 
measure to organise the labour market and lacked long-term commitment from the state, yet 
as this chapter has demonstrated, the state did maintain a firm commitment to the problem of 
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unemployment, and in fact, expanded labour market programmes. The eventual transfer to 
the Federal Department of Labour and National Service was not an example of the State 
abrogating its role instead it was a wartime measure designed to coordinate the national 
labour market. The public employment service in NSW only ceased to operate in name and 
not in function, as it became known as National Service Offices in 1942, before being 
absorbed into the CES following the end of World War II in 1945.606 
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Chapter 8 Conclusion 
 
This thesis had two main aims. Firstly, it aims to provide an historical understanding of the 
development of public employment services in NSW. The public employment services have 
been largely ignored or misunderstood by labour historians. Secondly, drawing upon this 
historical analysis, this thesis aims to inform and contribute to current debates within the 
literature. In Australia recent debates have been dominated by the prevailing neo-classical 
economic orthodoxy, which asserts that public employment services are both ineffective and 
inefficient.  
In regard to providing an historical understanding of the NSW public employment service, 
this thesis has broadened the existing historical literature by highlighting both the socio-
economic and political factors that have both led to, and shaped, the development of public 
employment services in NSW. Chapter three outlines the origins and development of the first 
public employment service in NSW: The Casual Labour Board. The evidence challenges the 
existing literature and clears up the confusion over the origins of the NSW public 
employment service. Reeves, Endres and Cook had claimed that NSW established the first 
labour bureau in 1892, while Coghlan stated that it was 1894. However, as this has chapter 
illustrated, the labour bureau alluded to by these writers was the Government Labour Bureau 
established in 1892, but more importantly and missing, from the historical literature was the 
fact it had a predecessor: The Casual Labour Board.607  
The Casual Labour Board was the first attempt by the State to establish a public employment 
service in NSW. Faced with high unemployment, unemployed deputations and industrial 
unrest, Colonial Premier Parkes, established the Casual Labour Board as an attempt to 
regulate the unemployed and organise and the labour market. In this case the origins, effects 
and the ultimate demise of the Casual Labour Board can be attributed to a number of socio 
economic and political concerns. These concerns included the agency of the unemployed 
which coupled with political pressure, led to the introduction of the Casual Labour Board. 
However, claims of corruption and misappropriation of funds led to a Parliamentary Select 
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Committee inquiry into its operations. Parkes, the political pragmatist, swiftly terminated the 
Casual Labour Board, in a bid to limit the political damage. Ultimately, it was the state’s 
precarious financial situation and the Government’s own political problems that ultimately 
led to its termination.608  
As outlined in Chapter 4, the origins and operations of the Government Labour Bureau were 
also shaped by a number of socio economic and political concerns. The socio economic 
concerns included the industrial distress of the time, the agency of the unemployed¸ and the 
fraudulent behaviour perpetrated by private registries, all of which resulted in heightened 
political pressure and ultimately led to the introduction of the Government Labour Bureau. It 
is important to emphasis the role of the unemployed in banding together campaigning for the 
labour bureau because without their efforts the labour bureau may not have been established 
at that time, or even at all. Influenced by the New Zealand public employment service, the 
Dibbs Government established the Government Labour Bureau in an attempt to organise the 
labour market. While both Nurick and Coghlan had argued that this early labour bureau was 
only a temporary measure and lacked the state’s long term commitment, this thesis shows 
that the state did remain committed to the public employment service and in fact expanded 
labour market programs.609   
Both Reeves and Coghlan have argued that during the early years the Government Labour 
Bureau faced considerable criticism: accused of playing into the hands of astute employers by 
allowing them to make use of it to pick up labour at less than current rates and by supplying 
labour to take the place of strike breakers. However, these criticisms are unfair as they fail to 
take into account the limited capacity of the Government Labour Bureau to take action. As 
Blankenburg reminds us, public employment services are peculiar in that they mediate rather 
than govern. Therefore these criticisms should be levelled at the Government, as it was the 
Government’s policy that dictated that they were not to intervene in wage disputes or 
industrial disputes and to act only as a labour market intermediary.610 
Chapter Five outlined the period of the NSW Labour Commissioners. Like its predecessors, 
the origins and development of the NSW Labour Commission was also shaped by socio-
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economic factors and political concerns. While initially established in an advisory capacity 
following the election of the See Government, the role of NSW Labour Commissioners was 
enlarged and included the reformation of the public employment service operations in NSW. 
This structural reform included the rationalisation of registry operations along the lines of 
gender and union association; and the introduction of a sophisticated classification system, 
which allowed a more in-depth understanding of the labour market. For the first time the 
State had addressed the neglect of female labour and by providing a registry office for 
women, aptly named the Female Registry.611  
The State Labour Bureau examined in Chapter Six was also shaped by a number of socio-
economic factors and political concerns. Unlike the early and later periods, NSW experienced 
relative economic growth during most of the period, before a return to drought conditions. 
Following the election of the Carruthers Government, the public employment service, which 
had been expanded in the previous period, were rationalised with the closure of the Trades 
Hall and Female Registry. Despite Schey’s called for further expansion with dedicated labour 
bureau offices in regional areas, the State was unable to undertake such initiatives due to its 
own precarious financial situation. Despite this, the state remained committed to the public 
employment service and did expand labour market programs by adopting a low-cost strategy 
when it appointed 200 police officers from across the State to act as labour bureau agents.612 
In Chapter Seven, electoral change again heralded a period of structural change to the NSW 
public employment service. As had been the case with its predecessors, the newly renamed 
State Labour Branch, later renamed the NSW Labour Exchanges, and its labour market 
programs were also shaped by a number of socio-economic and political concerns: the 
outbreak of war, labour shortages, economic depression, rising unemployment, economic 
changes and uncertainty, fraudulent practices of private registries, limited state finances and 
political pressure. The establishment of the Women’s Employment Agency was a deliberate 
step to organise a labour market dislocated due to the outbreak of war. In a period of 
economic uncertainty and labour market shortages the Holman Government legislated for the 
regulation of private employment agencies. In doing so the Government provided an 
important safety net in an ailing labour market. The establishment of dedicated labour 
                                                           
611
 NSWVPLA, Vol. 6, 1901, pp. 369 & 378; SMH, 7.6.1899, pp. 4; NSWGG, No. 876, 14.9.1900, pp. 7144-
7145, No. 901, 21.9.1900, pp. 7371.   
612
 NSWPP, Vol. 1. 1906, pp. 1008, Vol. 2, 1907, pp. 255, Vol. 2, 1908, pp. 810, Vol. 2, 1909, pp. 651, Vol. 2, 
1910, pp. 8, Vol. 2, 1911-1912, pp. 611; NSWVPLA, Vol. 2, 1912, pp. 194. 
 219  
 
exchanges in rural areas was an attempt to organise the labour market in a period of post-war 
recovery. However, the onset of the Great Depression resulted in a halt in any further labour 
market programs.613  
Nurick and Coghlan claimed that the early NSW labour bureaus were only a temporary 
measure to organise the labour market and that they lacked long-term commitment from the 
State however, as this thesis has demonstrated the State remained committed to the public 
employment service for over fifty years. While the public employment service underwent 
numerous name changes, its role as a labour market intermediary remained constant. 
Furthermore, the eventual transfer to the Federal Department of Labour and National Service 
was not an example of the State abrogating its role, as it was a wartime measure designed to 
coordinate the national labour market. Therefore it is argued that the public employment 
service in NSW only ceased to operate in name, and not in function, as it was transferred to 
the control of the Federal Government’s National Service Offices in 1942, before later being 
absorbed into the Commonwealth Employment Service in 1945.614 
Endres and Cook have argued that the public employment services failed to develop innovate 
labour market programs however, this thesis refutes this claim. Instead it is argued that the 
NSW public employment service adopted a number of innovate labour market programs 
including; the rationalisation of registry operations along the lines of gender and union 
association; and the introduction of a sophisticated classification system which allowed a 
more in depth understanding of the labour market: dedicated labour exchange offices, Labour 
sub-agents; labour farms, village settlements. While some of these reforms were only short 
lived, others were adapted and modified it does demonstrate the State’s willingness to 
experiment and innovate.615 
In terms of international developments public employment services developed in a similar 
pattern to those in Germany, USA, UK, France and Sweden by initially establishing a single 
labour bureau in the metropolitan area before developing a network of labour bureau offices 
across the state before establishing a national public employment service. While NSW was at 
the forefront in establishing the public employment service in the late nineteenth century, the 
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move towards a national public employment service, with the establishment of the 
Commonwealth Employment Service, did not occur until 1945 subsequently, in comparative 
terms with the other nations it was one of the last. The reasons for this delay could be in part 
attributed to the Australian Constitution which limited the Federal Government’s role to 
certain areas.616    
It appears that the earliest labour bureau occurred in Victoria in 1874 however, little is known 
of its role and the reasons it was abolished. Regardless of this it is apparent that both Victoria 
and NSW were quite innovative for their time in establishing public employment services in 
the 1870s and 1880s, before the New Zealand Labour Bureau was established in 1891. It is 
important to note that the other Colonies were also interested and active in developing public 
employment services. However, like Victoria little is known of the origins and development 
of Queensland Labour Bureau, which was established in the same year as the New Zealand 
labour bureau, and the labour bureaus established in Tasmania in 1893 and Western Australia 
in 1898. Clearly these are further areas of research which would broaden our understanding 
of public employment services.617 
With regard to theoretical frameworks, this thesis found that in NSW the public employment 
service operated as a labour market intermediary within a social democratic labour market 
regime whereby Keynesian measures were combined with micro labour market programs to 
produce comprehensive placement services. From its early inception as the Casual Labour 
Board and under its successive names, the State demonstrated a commitment to the public 
employment service and actively pursued labour market programs to support capital 
development through the organisation of the labour market. Faced with cyclical 
unemployment the State, where financially was able, continued to expand the operations of 
the public employment service throughout the period.618 
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Prior to the establishment of a public employment service the NSW labour market operated in 
a Market regime with the unemployed forced to rely on private registry operations. Following 
the establishment of the Casual Labour Board and its successor the Government Labour 
Board, the labour market was characterised by being a free co-existence labour market 
regime, with the public employment service operating alongside unregulated private 
registries. From 1918 onwards with the regulation of private registries and the continued 
operations of the public employment service the labour market became a regulated co-
existence system.619 
From 1887, with the establishment of the Casual Labour Board and until its eventual transfer 
to the Federal Department of Labour and National Service in 1942, the NSW public 
employment service adopted the mediation procedures of a closed system of administrative 
matching: matching registered job seekers with registered vacancies. However, in the earlier 
period of the Casual Labour Board and Government Labour Bureau this mediation procedure 
was applied in a fairly unsophisticated manner. Due to the high levels of industrial distress of 
the time and the general lack of experience as a labour market intermediary the NSW public 
employment service relied upon the ballot system. Under this system all the suitable men for 
the position were selected then placed in a ballot. However, this system was seen to be 
inherently unfair and was later replaced with the rotation system. Under the rotation system, 
men of the same classification and similar experience would be assigned work in order of 
rotation to ensure greater fairness. In the following periods the mediation procedures of 
administrative matching became more sophisticated and individualised.620 
 This thesis challenged the claims of the neo-classical economists that public employment 
services are both ineffective and inefficient. These writers view labour markets in the same 
way as competitive product markets, assuming that individuals are rational economic 
maximisers. Any interference in the market by the state is deemed ineffectual, compared to 
unbridled market forces. However as the literature has shown labour markets, are unlike 
competitive product markets, instead labour markets are search markets and are not in least 
homogenous, because jobs and skills differ greatly in terms of level and scope there is a wide 
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variety of labour market segments all of which experience differing economic 
circumstances.621  
Through an historical analysis of the public employment services in NSW it is argued that 
from the perspective of efficiency, the public employment service contributed to overriding 
market imperfections which had led to an under-provision of employment services. 
Furthermore, from an equity perspective the public employment service organised the labour 
market playing an important role in safeguarding NSW workers. These imperfections 
included the presence of social externalities, imperfect capital markets, and asymmetric 
information. As a labour market intermediary, the NSW public employment service was 
successful in channelling information and bringing together the buyers and sellers of labour. 
In undertaking this role the NSW public employment service was both an effective and 
efficient means of organising the labour market, while also supporting capital long-term 
capital development.622 
This thesis also found that from an equity perspective, the need for a public employment 
service in NSW was clear. Prior to 1918 private employment registries operated in an 
unregulated environment which allowed them to perpetrate fraudulent behaviour on 
vulnerable unemployed people, thus impeding the operation of the labour market and causing 
considerable social distress. Furthermore, as the contemporary literature has shown, private 
registries are for-profit businesses and have been found to focus on those easiest to place in 
the labour market, thereby neglecting the low skilled and disadvantaged. In line with previous 
findings of Boreham et al, Fay, Gregg and Wadsworth, this thesis found that the NSW public 
employment service played an important part in overcoming this neglect by assisting those 
most disadvantaged: the low skilled in the NSW labour market.623 
Many writers including Commons, have been influential in identifying the abuses perpetrated 
by private registries on the unemployed. Martinez has provided the most sophisticated 
analysis identifying four themes: misrepresentation, fee-splitting; proselyting; discrimination. 
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In this case study the abuses of misrepresentation, fee-splitting and proselyting were also 
found to have been committed. Discrimination may have occurred, but as noted previously 
this is the hardest to prove. These abuses led in part, to the establishment of the public 
employment services in NSW. Following the regulation of the private registry offices in 
1918, the unemployed were now offered some protection as well as an avenue for complaint. 
Despite this, abuses were still being committed by private employment registries, but it 
appears likely, as Becker argues, that they were often not reported.624 
The findings of this thesis also support the arguments put forth by Showler and Simon. They 
argued that a focus on economic values leads to methods of approach to policy matters that 
underestimate the partially non-quantifiable social and non-market benefits which accrue. 
They assert that it is unwise to frame a discussion of the socio-economic contribution of the 
public employment service around neo-classical economic notions of human capital. As this 
thesis has found, it has been largely through an analysis of the deficiencies of the ‘market’ 
explanation of labour force behaviour that we find the case for state intervention in the form 
of public employment services: industrial dislocation, economic and industrial distress, 
fraudulent acts perpetrated by private registries, and asymmetrical information.625  
While writers from the Beveridge and Keynesian tradition have focussed their analysis of 
public employment services on predetermined economic modelling, this thesis has adopted 
the institutional approach.  In doing so, this thesis has been able to identify the socio-
economic factors that led to the establishment of the NSW public employment service: 
industrial distress, the agency of the unemployed and fraudulent acts perpetrated by private 
registries. In line with the writings of Commons, this thesis found that the public employment 
service was established, in part, as a social and economic necessity to counteract the 
discrimination and fraud perpetrated by the private registries. Importantly this thesis 
demonstrates that the value of public employment services should be seen in more than 
purely economic terms, instead its value is in its socio-economic contribution to both the 
labour market and society.626 
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However, this thesis identified one other factor that has not previously been fully discussed 
within the existing literature: the agency of the unemployed. This thesis found that the 
industrial distress of the late nineteenth century led the unemployed to form temporary 
combinations to campaign for relief and assistance. Rather than being passive actors, the 
unemployed combined together to form deputations advocating for parliamentary assistance. 
Furthermore, despite the temporary nature of these combinations they were successful in 
advocating for the establishment of the Casual Labour Board as well as its successor, the 
Government Labour Bureau. The agency of the unemployed had not been discussed in 
previous literature on the role of the public employment service. Clearly, this neglect should 
be incorporated in further research in this area particularly if they were as influential in the 
development of the public employment services in other states.627  
Was the early NSW public employment service successful? O’Donnell had claimed that it 
was not successful as it failed to fulfil Beveridge’s prophecies of alleviating unemployment 
or decasualising the labour market. However, as Anderson reminds us ‘success is relative to 
expectations.’628 Therefore it is important to remember that the NSW public employment 
service was a labour market intermediary, its role being to channel information and bring 
together those wishing to buy and sell labour. Furthermore, as Blankenburg states they are 
peculiar among the public administration institutions as they have to mediate more than they 
can govern.629 
As a labour market intermediary, the NSW public employment service was successful in 
channelling information and bringing together those who wished to buy and sell labour. 
Furthermore, it also fulfilled a socio-economic role by providing the unemployed with an 
alternative avenue to find employment and thereby allowing them to avoid the often corrupt 
private employment registries. During the fifty years of continued operations, it registered 
2,478,567 people of which 1,416,983 were sent to work (refer to Appendix 8). Clearly this 
was a remarkable achievement in period of time categorised by drought, industrial 
dislocation, economic depression and uncertainty, war and technological change. The public 
employment services played a pivotal role in assisting the development of fledging industrial 
economy.  
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The question now remains how can we continue to further our understanding of public 
employment services? The findings of this thesis highlight the important socio-economic role 
that they have played. Policy makers and economists, both Keynesian and Neo-classical, 
need to broaden their approach to include these non-market explanations when analysing the 
effectiveness of employment service providers and formulating labour market policy. More 
attention needs to be drawn to question the role of private employment agencies and their 
ability to deliver assistance to those most vulnerable: the long-term unemployed. This thesis 
concurs with the findings of Fay, Boreham et al, Wadsworth and Gregg and argues that the 
public employment services have traditionally assisted the low skilled vulnerable members of 
the labour market. Therefore, if as the contemporary literature asserts that private registries 
are failing to assist those most vulnerable, the low skilled long term unemployed, then 
Governments in Australia and elsewhere need to rethink labour market policies that are based 
on neo-classical economic theory and take into account non-economic factors.630  
This thesis has expanded our knowledge on public employment services. It did this through 
three means. Firstly, it expanded our historical knowledge of public employment services in 
NSW from 1887 until 1942. In doing so it provides an historical context for contemporary 
debates. Secondly, this thesis has refuted claims by the neo-classical economists that public 
employment services are ineffective and inefficient. Instead it argues that they played an 
important socio-economic role in the labour market by improving the flow of information, 
bringing together the buyers and sellers of labour and safeguarding those most vulnerable in 
society. In short, this thesis is important because it has contributed to our theoretical and 
historical understanding of origins and development of public employment services in NSW. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1 Casual Labour Board Registrations including occupations. 631  
Occupations Registered - March 
1888 
Registered – 
November 1888 
Brewer 1  
Blacksmiths 133  
Boilermakers 60  
Butchers 69  
Brass finishers 10  
Bootmakers 10  
Bakers 77  
Brickmakers 90 90 
Bricklayers 67 70 
Bellhangcr   1  
blind maker 1  
Boatbuilder 1 4 
Basketmakers 3 5 
Bookbinders 2  
Carpenters 369 309 
Cabinetmakers 23 39 
Chemists 8  
Coachbuilders 33 37 
Cooks  89  
Coopers  15 20 
Clerks  100 110 
Confectioners  17  
Candlemakers  4  
Coal miners  114  
Dyers 5  
Drapers  36 40 
Engine-fitters  86 68 
Engineers 141 141 
Engravers  4 7 
Farmers  42 37 
Farriors  3  
Firemen  98 98 
Galvanisers  16  
Gardeners  47  
Grocers  42  
Grooms  9  
Coachsmiths  2  
Grinder  1  
Glass-blowers  5  
Hatters 5 5 
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Iron Moulders 99 101 
Iron-Miners 13 15 
Ink-maker  1  
Jewellers 10 12 
Locksmith  1  
Labourers 4433 4494 
Miners 147  
Marble Polisher 1  
Machinists  11 12 
Millers  6  
Painters  71 71 
Printers  22 22 
Photographers  4  
Plasterers  77 77 
Plumbers  42 
Potters  3  
Pattern-Makers 8  
Piano-Tuners 2  
Quarrymen  81  
Rope Makers 3  
Riveters  7  
Shearers  34  
Sawyers  49 60 
Slaters 15  
Sugar-Boilers 3  
Shipwrights  37  
Spinners  3  
Smelter  1  
Sailors  389  
Surveyors  2  
Stone Masons  96 90 
Saddlers  17  
Stationers  7  
Tobacco-Twisters 37  
Tailors  12  
Tinsmiths  27  
Tutors  5  
Tanners  5 11 
Turner  1  
Waiters  7  
Wool-Sorters 4  
Wood-Turners 7 8 
Wheelwrights 6 6 
Undertaker  1 
TOTAL 7,690 7916 
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Appendix 2 Summary of Private Employment Licenses in NSW 1923-1933 632 
 
Year 
Licenses in 
force 
beginning 
of month 
Applications Received Licenses License 
in force 
at end of 
month Renewals New License 
Total Expired Granted 
New Renewals Total 
Jan 
1923 
60 2 1 3 6 2 1 3 57 
Feb 
1923 
57 0 4 4 1 0 2 2 60 
March 
1923 
60 4 3 7 3 3 1 4 61 
April 
1923 
61 2 3 4 3 3 3 6 64 
May 
1923 
64 2 3 5 4 2 2 4 64 
June 
1923 
64 3 1 4 7 2 
 
2 4 61 
July 
1923 
61 2 3 5 1 2 3 5 65 
Aug 
1923 
65 14 0 14 4 2 2 4 65 
Sept 
1923 
65 11 1 12 15 0 8 8 58 
Oct 
1923 
58 4 0 4 12 1 18 19 65 
Nov 
1923 
65 3 0 3 5 0 3 3 63 
Dec 
1923 
63 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 66 
Jan 
1924 
66 3 2 5 5 1 0 1 62 
Feb 
1924 
62 5 1 6 2 1 2 3 63 
March 
1924 
63 3 2 5 5 4 2 6 64 
April 
1924 
64 3 3 6 5 2 3 5 64 
May 
1924 
64 4 3 7 5 3 4 7 66 
June 
1924 
66 2 1 3 5 4 3 
 
7 68 
July 
1924 
68 1 1 2 2 2 1 3 69 
Aug 
1924 
69 5 10 15 6  1 1 64 
Sept 
1924 
64 2 17 19 13 6 9 15 66 
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Oct 
1924 
66 4 4 8 13 2 17 19 72 
Nov 
1924 
72 3 2 5 5 1 5 6 73 
Dec 
1924 
73 1 4 5 0 3 2 5 78 
Jan 
1925 
78 1 2 3 3 3 0 3 78 
Feb 
1925 
78 2 2 4 2 1 3 4 80 
March 
1925 
80 5 1 6 7 4 2 6 79 
April 
1925 
79 2 0 2 6 1 5 6 79 
May 
1925 
79 2 1 3 6 1 0 1 74 
June 
1925 
74 3 3 6 6 
 
1 3 4 72 
July 
1925 
72 3 2 5 2 3 4 7 77 
Aug 
1925 
77 4 1 5 4 2 3 5 78 
Sept 
1925 
78 17 5 22 19 1 14 15 74 
Oct 
1925 
74 6 6 12 14 3 3 6 66 
Nov 
1925 
66 3 4 7 6 4 8 12 72 
Dec 
1925 
72 5 3 8 3 4 3 7 76 
Jan 
1926 
76 0 2 2 5 5 6 11 82 
Feb 
1926 
82 3 2 5 1 2 0 2 83 
March 
1926 
83 7 0 7 8 2 2 4 79 
April 
1926 
79 1 1 2 5 0 6 6 80 
May 
1926 
80 2 0 2 4 0 3 3 79 
June 
1926 
79 1 1 2 5 1 
 
2 3 77 
July 
1926 
77 3 8 11 4  1 1 74 
Aug 
1926 
74 5 10 15 6 6 2 8 76 
Sept 
1926 
76 12 5 17 14 10 3 13 75 
Oct 
1926 
75 6 1 7 14 10 4 14 75 
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Nov 
1926 
75 5 2 7 11 6 3 9 73 
Dec 
1926 
73 2 0 2 4 3 5 8 77 
Jan 
1927 
77 3 5 7 2 0 1 1 73 
Feb 
1927 
73 0 1 1 2 2 3 5 76 
March 
1927 
76 7 2 9 7 3 1 4 73 
April 
1927 
73 2 1 3 3 0 5 5 75 
May 
1927 
75 3 3 6 2 2 0 2 75 
June 
1927 
75 3 2 5 
 
3 1 3 4 76 
July 
1927 
76 1 2 3 1 2 3 5 80 
Aug 
1927 
80 2 6 8 10 3 3 6 76 
Sept 
1927 
76 13 3 16 15 4 2 6 67 
Oct 
1927 
67 7 4 11 12 5 11 16 71 
Nov 
1927 
71 8 2 10 12 1 9 10 69 
Dec 
1927 
69 4 2 6 2 2 3 5 72 
Jan 
1928 
72 3 3 6 3 2 10 12 81 
Feb 
1928 
81 1 5 6 2 1 4 5 84 
March 
1928 
84 6 2 8 10 4 0 4 78 
April 
1928 
78 3 3 6 3 2 2 4 79 
May 
1928 
79 4 7 11 4 3 4 7 82 
June 
1928 
82 3 2 5 4 8 6 14 
 
92 
July 
1928 
92 1 1 2 3 0 3 3 92 
Aug 
1928 
92 3 1 4 6 2 1 3 89 
Sept 
1928 
89 10 1 11 15 2 2 4 76 
Oct 
1928 
76 7 9 16 12 3 10 13 77 
Nov 
1928 
77 11 7 18 9 4 8 12 80 
Dec 
1928 
80 1 1 2 6 3 10 13 87 
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Jan 
1929 
87 6 2 8 5 1 5 6 88 
Feb 
1929 
88 1 2 3 2 1 6 7 93 
March 
1929 
93 5 5 10 10 1 1 2 85 
April 
1929 
85 3 9 12 5 4 5 9 89 
May 
1929 
89 4 7 11 6 4 3 7 90 
June 
1929 
 
90 1 4 5 11 6 4 10 89 
July 
1929 
89 3 1 4 0 6 1 7 96 
Aug 
1929 
96 3 4 7 5 4 5 9 100 
Sept 
1929 
100 12 1 13 10 3 1 4 94 
Oct 
1929 
94 9 5 14 11 1 11 12 95 
Nov 
1929 
95 5 3 8 14 4 9 13 94 
Dec 
1929 
94 7 3 11 10 4 4 8 92 
Jan 
1930 
92 7 3 10 9 0 7 7 90 
Feb 
1930 
90 2 4 6 2 0 0 0 88 
March 
1930 
88 5 3 8 4 2 5 7 91 
April 
1930 
91 3 4 7 8 5 4 9 92 
May 
1930 
92 2 4 6 4 4 2 6 94 
June 
1930 
94 8 0 8 13 4 2 6 87 
July 
1930 
87 2 1 3 5 1 6 7 89 
Aug 
1930 
89 5 0 5 9 0 3 3 83 
Sept 
1930 
83 8 2 10 13 0 4 4 74 
Oct 
1930 
74 5 2 7 9 1 9 10 75 
Nov 
1930 
75 6 2 8 11 0 4 4 68 
Dec 
1930 
68 8 2 10 16 1 5 6 58 
Jan 
1931 
58 3 0 3 3 1 1 2 57 
Feb 
1931 
57 3 2 5 1 1 9 10 66 
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No Licenses Granted between March 1931 and Jan 1932 
Jan 
1932 
5 3 2 5 0 0 0 0 5 
Feb 
1932 
5 4 0 4 2 0 19 19 22 
March 
1932 
22 1 1 2 7 2 8 10 25 
April 
1932 
25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 
May 
1932 
25 4 1 5 1 0 0 0 24 
June 
1932 
24 3 0 3 5 0 0 0 19 
July 
1932 
19 2 1 3 2 1 6 7 24 
Aug 
1932 
24 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 24 
Sept 
1932 
24 9 1 10 9 1 0 1 16 
Oct 
1932 
16 3 2 5 7 1 6 7 16 
Nov 
1932 
16 5 4 9 8 2 1 3 11 
Dec 
1932 
11 4 1 5 5 2 4 6 12 
Jan 
1933 
12 4 2 6 3 1 5 6 15 
Feb 
1933 
15 3 2 5 4 0 2 2 13 
March 
1933 
13 7 0 7 2 0 0 0 11 
April 
1933 
11 3 3 6 3 2 1 3 11 
May 
1933 
11 2 4 6 1 4 3 7 17 
June 
1933 
17 3 3 6 4 0 0 0 13 
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July 
1933 
 
13 1 3 4 2 3 4 7 18 
Aug 
1933 
18 2 2 4 2 4 1 5 21 
Sept 
1933 
21 7 1 8 9 3 7 10 22 
Oct 
1933 
22 4 7 11 4 2 4 6 24 
Nov 
1933 
24 5 4 9 7 4 3 7 24 
Dec 
1933 
24 6 2 8 9 2 9 11 26 
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Appendix 3 Distribution of licensed Private Registry Operations in NSW 1923-1928 633  
Year and 
Month 
Sydney Suburbs Total Sydney 
and Suburbs 
Rest of State NSW Total 
Jan 1923 30 10 40 17 57 
Feb 1923 31 11 42 18 60 
March 1923 32 12 44 17 61 
April 1923 34 13 47 17 64 
May 1923 34 14 48 16 64 
June 1923 34 12 46 15 61 
July 1923 35 13 48 17 65 
August 1923 35 13 48 17 65 
Sept1923 29 11 40 18 58 
Oct1923 37 11 48 17 65 
Nov1923 37 10 47 16 63 
Dec1923 37 11 48 18 66 
Jan 1924 36 11 47 15 62 
Feb 1924 36 10 46 17 63 
March 1924 39 10 49 15 64 
April 1924 38 9 47 17 64 
May 1924 41 9 50 16 66 
June 1924 41 10 51 17 68 
July 1924 40 11 51 18 69 
August 1924 37 11 48 16 64 
Sept 1924 34 14 48 18 66 
Oct 1924 40 15 55 17 72 
Nov 1924 42 15 57 16 73 
Dec 1924 43 16 59 19 78 
Jan 1925 43 18 61 17 78 
Feb 1925 43 19 62 18 80 
March 1925 41 19 60 19 79 
April 1925 41 20 61 18 79 
May 1925 38 19 57 17 74 
June 1925 40 18 58 14 72 
July 1925 42 19 61 16 77 
August 1925 41 20 61 17 78 
Sept 1925 39 18 57 17 74 
Oct 1925 37 14 51 15 66 
Nov 1925 40 19 59 13 72 
Dec 1925 40 21 61 15 76 
Jan 1926 43 19 62 20 82 
Feb 1926 44 19 63 20 83 
March 1926 43 18 61 18 79 
April 1926 42 18 60 20 80 
May 1926 42 18 60 19 79 
June 1926 42 17 59 18 77 
                                                           
633
 Data compiled from NSWIG, Vol. 23, 1923 – Vol. 34, 1928. 
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July 1926 41 15 56 18 74 
August 1926 42 17 59 17 76 
Sept 1926 40 17 57 18 75 
Oct 1926 39 20 59 16 75 
Nov 1926 40 19 59 14 73 
Dec 1926 42 20 62 15 77 
Jan 1927 39 21 60 13 73 
Feb 1927 42 20 62 14 76 
March 1927 42 19 61 12 73 
April 1927 41 20 61 14 75 
May 1927 40 21 61 14 75 
June 1927 43 21 64 12 76 
July 1927 46 22 68 12 80 
August 1927 44 21 65 11 76 
Sept 1927 36 21 57 10 67 
Oct 1927 43 19 62 9 71 
Nov 1927 44 16 60 9 69 
Dec 1927 43 16 59 13 72 
Jan 1928 45 23 68 13 81 
Feb 1928 45 25 78 14 84 
March 1928 44 22 66 12 78 
April 1928 43 22 65 14 79 
May 1928 45 23 68 14 82 
June 1928 50 28 78 14 92 
July 1928 49 27 76 16 92 
August 1928 48 27 75 14 89 
Sept 1928 39 24 63 13 76 
Oct 1928 41 23 64 13 77 
Nov 1928 47 21 68 12 80 
Dec 1928 46 26 72 15 87 
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Appendix 4 Private Registry Prosecutions 1919-1928 634  
Date Agency Breach Punishment 
January 1919 Norman’s 
Employment 
Agency, Elizabeth 
Street Sydney 
1.statutory fees were 
not being displayed 
2.overcharged fees 
3.engagement in 
wrongful capacity 
Prosecuted - fine of 
20s 
February 1919 Miss F.E. 
McNamara, Sydney 
failing to keep a 
register 
failing to issue a 
receipt 
Prosecuted 
February 1919 Firth’s  Employment 
Agency, Castlereagh 
Street, Sydney 
failing to issue a 
receipt  
receiving fees above 
the schedule 
Prosecuted 
February 1919 Miss Scholefield, 
Elizabeth Street, 
Sydney 
receiving fees greater 
than those prescribed 
A summons was 
issued but later 
withdrawn upon the 
defendant agreeing to 
pay costs 
February 1919 . W. H. Nunn trading 
as “Everett’s 
Employment 
Agency, Elizabeth 
Street, Sydney 
five breaches of the 
Act: two breaches of 
charging fees in 
excess of the 
schedule; 
two breaches for 
failing to issue a 
receipt; 
one breach for 
falsifying an entry of 
payment in the 
register 
Prosecuted 
August 1919 Mary O’Donnell, 
Katoomba 
failing to keep 
prescribed register of 
engagements; 
failing to issue a 
receipt for fees; 
charging fees other 
than those prescribed 
Prosecuted - 
cancellation of the 
license 
July 1922 Miller’s Agency¸ 
George Street, 
Sydney 
failing to keep a 
register of all 
engagements; 
failing to keep 
originals of all letters 
Prosecuted - fine of 
10s on each count 
                                                           
634
 NSWIG, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1919, pp. 47, Vol. 15, No. 2, 1919, pp. 323, Vol. 15, No. 3, 1919, pp. 399, Vol. 16, 
No. 2, 1919, pp. 171, Vol. 22, No. 2, 1922, pp. 273, Vol. 23, No. 6, 1923, pp. 1238, Vol. 24, No. 4, 1923, pp. 
605, Vol. 24, No. 5, 1923, pp. 968, Vol. 30, No. 6, 1926, pp. 1552, Vol. 31, No. 2, 1927, pp. 314. 
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received 
May 1923 The N.S.W, 
Victuallers, Clubs, 
Farmers, Agricultural 
and General 
Employment Office, 
King Street, Sydney 
failing to issue a 
receipt in the 
prescribed form 
Prosecuted - fine of 
5s. and costs 
September, 1923 Select Registry, 
Castlereagh Street, 
Sydney 
receiving fees greater 
than those prescribed 
Prosecuted - fine of 
10s with costs of 8s 
October 1923 Blades Agency, 
Elizabeth Street, 
Sydney 
receiving greater than 
those prescribed 
Prosecuted - fine of 
£1 with costs 8s 
October, 1926 N.S.W. Licensed 
Victuallers, Clubs, 
Farmers, Agricultural 
and General 
Employment 
Agency, King Street, 
Sydney 
charging fees greater 
than those prescribed 
Prosecuted - fined 
20s. and 12s. Costs 
November, 1926 Miss A. N. Fennell, 
Oxford Street, 
Sydney 
failing to keep a 
register  
failing to keep 
duplicate receipts 
charging fees greater 
than those prescribed 
Prosecuted - fined 
40s. and 8s. costs and 
45s. and 16s. Costs 
January, 1927 Gregg Employment 
Agency, Enmore 
Road, Newtown 
failing to issue a 
receipt for fees 
received 
Prosecuted - fined £5 
and 9s. 6d. Costs 
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Appendix 5 Cancellation of Labour Exchange Sub-Agents from 1940635 
 
Labour Exchange Sub-Agent District Date of Cancellation 
Eumingerie 24 June, 1940 
Louth 24 June, 1940 
Nellingen 24 June, 1940 
Perthville 17 July, 1940 
Ford’s Bridge 17 July, 1940 
Yerranderie 19 August, 1940 
Georges  Creek 5 November, 1941 
Majors Creek 13 January, 1942 
Rappville 13 January, 1942 
Bendick Murrell 13 January, 1942 
Bargo 13 January, 1942 
Central Tilba 21 January, 1942 
Mulaley 27 April, 1942 
Jenolan Caves 27 April, 1942 
Spring Ridge 18 May, 1942 
Rand 18 May, 1942 
Windeyer 17 June, 1942 
Tarana 17 August, 1942 
Rowena 17 August, 1942 
 
                                                           
635
 NSWIG, Vol. 57, No. 6, 1940, pp. 750, Vol. 58, No. 1, 1940, pp. 24, Vol. 58, No. 2, 1940, pp. 195, Vol. 63, 
No. 2, 1941, pp. 255, Vol. 64, No. 1, 1942, pp. 13, Vol. 65, No. 2, 1942, pp. 317, Vol. 65, No. 3, 1942, pp. 752, 
Vol. 66, No. 2, 1942, pp. 238. 
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Appendix 6 Summary Labour Exchange Operations 1912-1941636 
 
Year 
Registered for 
employment 
Sought By 
Employers 
Sent to Employment  
 
1912 1,102 n/a 1,797 
1913 5,519 n/a 5,527 
1914 29,117 n/a 11306 
1915 30,984 32,899 15,355 
1916 16,602 18,518 16,435 
1917 25,246 26,163 11,619 
1918 21,659 37,510 15,706 
1919 27,677 28,313 20,975 
1920 49,595 41,597 33,773 
1921 45,702 38,176 34,656 
1922 43,967 37,615 31,773 
1923 35,442 32,802 27,831 
1924 39,856 37,032 30,651 
1925 45,284 39,350 33,631 
1926 56,376 41,328 37,183 
1927 56,674 38,095 35,018 
1928 83,353 38,764 41,205 
1929 72,630 41,041 38,910 
1930 250,128 101,620 106,218 
1931 269,852 71,587 87,110 
1932 173,691 78,132 78,050 
1933 197,068 131,037 130,717 
1934 121,656 94,236 92,158 
1935 126,741 61,235 58,301 
1936 101,933 51,206 47,914 
1937 84,671 60,046 56,536 
1938 94,091 n/a 38,889 
1939 95,462 n/a 39,505 
1940 87,004 n/a 36,325 
1941 51,846 n/a 35,037 
Total 2,340,928 1,132,231 1,250,111 
                                                           
636
 Data compiled from NSWIG, Vol. 1, 1912 to Vol. 62, 1941. 
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Appendix 7 Break down of Labour Exchange Operations 1912-1941637 
 
 
YEAR 
PERSONS 
REGISTERED FOR EMPLOYMENT SOUGHT BY EMPLOYERS SENT TO EMPLOYMENT 
MALE FEMALE TOTAL MALE FEMALE TOTAL MALE FEMALE   
EX-
SOLDIERS 
OTHERS EX-
SOLDIERS 
OTHERS TOTAL 
1912   1,102 
(Dawes 
Point) 
  1,102         1,797   1,797 
1913   5,519(Dawes 
Point) 
  5,519         5,527   5,527 
1914   11,363 
(Dawes 
Point) 
2,067 29,117         10,654 652 11306 
15,687 (Self 
Reg Aug-
Dec) 
1915   10,057 
(Dawes 
Point) 
3,626 30,984 4,553 2,957 7,510   9,230 2,454 15,355 
17,301 (Self-
Reg) 
3,671 
1916   7,539 
(Dawes 
Point) 
3,998 16,602 7,034 4,145 11,179   8,078 3,153 16,435 
9,063 (Self-
Reg) 
5,204 
                                                          
637
 Data compiled from NSWIG, Vol. 1, 1912 to Vol. 62, 1941. 
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1917   5,626 (L/E 
Jan-Aug) 
5,308  25,246 8,419 4,401 12,820   3,358 3,137   
14,312 (Self-
Reg) 
5,134 
1918       21659     37510       15706 
1919   22,179 4,140 27,677 18,472 7,424 28,313   15,638 4,117 20,975 
  
1920 10,939 32,391 6,265 49,595 31,720 9,877 41,597 4,337 22,657 6,779 33,773 
1921 3907 35,304 6,491 45,702 28,425 9,751 38,176 2830 24,613 7,213 34,656 
1922 6,003 32,999 5,465 43,967 25,435 12,180 37,615 3,712 20,332 7,729 31,773 
1923 2,905 26,551 5,986 35,442 21,860 10,942 32,802 2,614 17,915 7,302 27,831 
1924 3,021 32,112 4,723 39,856 26,466 10,566 37,032 3,588 20,285 6,778 30,651 
1925 2,683 38,018 4,583 45,284 30,024 9,326 39,350 2,707 24,911 6,013 33,631 
1926 81 51,883 4,412 56,376 31,987 9,341 41,328 66 30,892 6,225 37,183 
1927 413 51,065 5,196 56,674 28,781 9,314 38,095   28,330 6,688 35,018 
1928 149 77,263 5,941 83,353 35,421 8,843 38,764   34,103 7,102 41,205 
1929 1,270 65,754 5,606 72,630 32,926 8,115 41,041   32,602 6,308 38,910 
1930 
 
237,452 12,676 250,128 95,398 6,222 101,620   100,886 5,332 106,218 
1931   249,311 20,541 269,852 67,167 4,420 71,587   83,312 3,798 87,110 
1932   152,056 21,635 173,691 71,307 6,825 78,132   71,827 6,223 78,050 
1933   160,935 36,133 197,068 104,120 26,917 131,037   105,681 25,036 130,717 
1934   102,269 19,387 121,656 58,182 36,054 94,236   57,994 34,164 92,158 
1935   115,189 11,552 126,741 51,797 9,438 61,235   51,104 7,197 58,301 
1936   91,056 10,877 101,933 41,346 9,860 51,206   40,537 7,377 47,914 
1937   75,125 9,446 84,671 49,989 10,057 60,046   48,752 7,484 56,536 
1938   86,162 7,929 94,091 
  
      32,642 6,247 38,889 
1939   82,874 12,588 95,462         31,446 8,059 39,505 
1940   74,733 12,271 87,004         28,199 8,126 36,325 
1941   37,828 14,018 51,846         24,654 10,383 35,037 
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Appendix 8 Registrations by Industry 1915-1932 638 
Year Building 
Domestic 
& 
Personal 
Services 
Engine 
Driving 
Etc Labouring Manufacturing 
Mining & 
Mineral 
Treatment 
Mining Misc 
Professional 
& Shop 
Workers 
Public 
Utilities 
Rural 
Industries 
Transport 
Land 
Transport 
Sea 
1915 2,305 804  6,830 1997 1038 1373  232 1674 1030 18 
1916 901 782  2575 1359 867 1262  0 781 536 0 
1917 1228 759  5073 2285 911 1431  0 1698 810 117 
1918 2022 3703  6474 3675 633 1699  0 1909 1210 331 
1919 2234 6092 300 7025 3671 570 622 1632 231 3496 1272 532 
1920 2202 7784 579 19852 4775 742 1322 4383 229 4737 2588 402 
1921 2050 6281 348 23560 3346 229 986 2162 15 5395 1048 282 
1922 1764 5820 442 24,369 2766 218 865 1079 22 5563 903 156 
1923 1283 6221 291 17491 2278 139 830 1032 91 4941 741 104 
1924 1802 5518 434 20216 2774 135 1649 1034 44 5018 993 239 
1925 2278 5623 307 25544 2858 159 1330 1003 69 4879 1147 87 
1926 1136 5445 324 40041 1965 200 922 656 61 4249 1189 188 
1927 908 5331 256 41622 1966 98 791 420 50 4090 1055 87 
1928 2746 6261 392 62101 3769 438 645 679 73 4743 1425 81 
1929 5466 12265 627 114751 6628 498 1581 1300 82 10018 2624 143 
1930 13506 10967 453 198649 10017 559 5460 1998 6 4894 3526 93 
1931 2888 13794 154 227364 6742 520 9171 2650 1 3929 2587 52 
1932 2515 12040 349 134406 7011 295 3473 3537 47 6733 3275 10 
Total 49,234 115490 5256 977,943 69882 8249 35412 23565 1253 78747 27959 2922 
Table Registrations by Industry 1915-1932- in the period from 1915 to 1918 the categories for Engine Drivers and Professional and shop 
workers were not collected and those workers would have been captured under miscellaneous  
                                                          
638
 Data compiled from NSWIG Vol. 7, 1915 – Vol. 41, 1932. Industry information was published between 1915 and 1932 with some minor changes to categories for 
example In the period from 1915 to 1918 data for both ‘Engine Drivers’ and ‘Professional and shop workers’ was not collected separately instead those workers were 
captured under miscellaneous 
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Appendix 9 Summary of Total Registration 1892-1941  
Period Registrations Sent to Work 
Government Labour Bureau 
1892-1901 
98,115 107,355 
NSW Labour Commissioners 
1901-1905 
17,943 34,769 
State Labour Bureau 
1805-1912 
21,581 24,748 
State Labour Branch/Labour 
Exchanges 
1912-1941 
2,340,928 1,250,111 
TOTAL 2,478,567 1,416,983 
This table does not include registrations for the Casual Labour Board due to problems with 
the accuracy of the data.  
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